Police legitimacy, ideology and qualitative methods: A critique of procedural justice theory
| Author | Diarmaid Harkin |
| DOI | 10.1177/1748895815580397 |
| Published date | 01 November 2015 |
| Date | 01 November 2015 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
research-article2015
Article
Criminology & Criminal Justice
2015, Vol. 15(5) 594 –612
Police legitimacy, ideology and
© The Author(s) 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/1748895815580397
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of procedural justice theory
Diarmaid Harkin
Deakin University, Australia
Abstract
I argue that there are unconsidered complexities to police legitimacy and use examples from my
study of police–public consultation forums in Edinburgh, Scotland to illustrate. I make a number
of conceptual and methodological critiques by drawing upon Steven Lukes’ social theory on
power to show how legitimacy can be a product of authority relations as much as it is a cause
of authority relations. This view finds support from systems-justification theory. I also tackle
Beetham’s conception of legitimacy and argue that there is evidence from police studies that the
police breach his key antecedents to legitimacy without incurring the expected consequences.
Furthermore, I take an original methodological approach to studying police legitimacy which
reveals additional insights. For instance, Bottoms and Tankebe suggest legitimacy addresses
multiple ‘audiences’; I would also add that it addresses multiple recipients as legitimacy is shown
to vary among officers and positions of rank.
Keywords
Ideology, police legitimacy, power, procedural justice, systems-justification theory
Introduction
There are two primary approaches to considering police legitimacy in police studies.
There is historical analysis that assesses how legitimacy develops over historical phases
(see Reiner, 2010; Smith, 2007a, 2007b), and also the approach developed by procedural
justice theory that often uses quantitative, survey-based analysis. Historical analysis
gives attention to episodes and periods of contest and change such as the introduction of
professional policing within England from 1829 (Reiner, 2010: 39–66), or the decline of
Corresponding author:
Diarmaid Harkin, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, Burwood, Victoria 3125, Australia.
Email: diarmaid.harkin@deakin.edu.au
Harkin
595
police legitimacy across the latter half of the 20th century (Hough, 2007; Loader and
Mulcahy, 2003: 3–36; Smith, 2007a, 2007b). This approach establishes interpretations of
legitimacy based on author analysis and evaluation. Procedural justice theory on the
other hand most often uses survey data and original, quantitative empirical analysis (see
Bradford et al., 2014; Gau, 2011; Gau and Brunson, 2010; Hough et al., 2013; Jackson
et al., 2014; Mazerolle et al., 2013; Murphy, 2009; Murphy and Cherney, 2011; Murphy
et al., 2014; Reisig and Lloyd, 2009; Reising et al., 2013; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003;
Tankebe, 2009a, 2009b; Tankebe and Mesko, 2015; Wells, 2007).
In this article I engage with the conceptualizations of legitimacy in police studies and
make three key arguments. Principally focusing on procedural justice theory I begin by
arguing that the social theory of Steven Lukes (2005) on power and ideology provides a
useful critique by showing how authority produces legitimacy, in addition to being a
product of it. Procedural justice theory relies on political theorist David Beetham’s
(1991) conception of legitimacy and I demonstrate how this interpretation should give
more attention to the psychological motivations to support the status quo (Jost and Van
Der Toorn, 2012). The police benefit, I argue, from their position of authority which
encourages beliefs akin to what Marx would regard as ‘false consciousness’ cultivating
pro-authority beliefs by virtue of unequal power relations. The social theory of Steven
Lukes (2005) is combined with the social psychology of Jojanneke Van Der Toorn and
John Jost (2014: 413) to point to the ways in which there is a general ideological pressure
to ‘maintain the perceived fairness and legitimacy of the status quo’, which complicates
understandings of the foundations of police legitimacy.
Second, I argue that procedural justice and David Beetham’s interpretation of legiti-
macy cannot account for the episodes or instances of police rule-breaking that do not
result in notable damage to legitimacy. Beetham (1991: 15–16) establishes a formula
which procedural justice theorists apply to the police suggesting that if the police adhere
to rules, show regard for popular beliefs and court consent, then legitimacy prospers (see
Jackson et al., 2011: 272–273, 2013a: 31–35). I argue that there is evidence from police
studies that the police often violate these standards and still maintain legitimacy.
Moreover, while some violations do result in damage to legitimacy, the consequences are
often irregular or depend on who the chief victims are. Such exceptions are not accounted
for by Beetham and procedural justice theory because they do not consider the cynical or
misanthropic basis of support for police action (see Harkin, 2014).
And third, I argue that there are methodological shortcomings with the two chief
approaches to studying police legitimacy and that there are advantages to taking an origi-
nal and complementary strategy of using qualitative methods often seen in prison studies
(see Liebling, 2004; Liebling and Price, 2001; Sparks et al., 1996). At this stage I use
some brief examples and illustrations from my research into police–public consultation
forums in Edinburgh to illustrate how this unique approach delivers new insights into the
complexities of police legitimacy. In particular, I found that the holding of legitimacy
differs between officers and often between ranks; that immigrants can often ‘import’
evaluations of police legitimacy from other territories; and that a lot of police support
comes from indirect experience, or what Loader and Mulcahy (2003) refer to as ‘fantasy
content’, illustrating once again the importance wider ideology plays in shaping local
legitimacy.
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Criminology & Criminal Justice 15(5)
These three arguments aim to complicate understandings of police legitimacy and
encourage a greater consideration of the role of ideology. It is not disputed that people
‘care deeply about fairness of procedures’ (Smith, 2007b: 54) or that ‘fostering trust and
legitimacy via fair and decent treatment would pay dividends across the population’
(Jackson et al., 2013a: 42), rather the purpose of this article is to illustrate the conceptual
and methodological intricacies of investigating police legitimacy that have yet to be
contemplated. If the ultimate goal of ‘legitimacy’ studies is to map and model justified
exercises of authority, then its conceptualization is worth taking seriously.
‘Legitimacy’ in Police Studies
This article is primarily interested in the conceptualization of police legitimacy presented
by procedural justice theory. While analysis of the style offered by Robert Reiner (2010)
and David Smith (2007a, 2007b) shows the importance of history in framing contempo-
rary legitimacy (a point that will be returned to later), procedural justice theory has a
more precise and clearly defined articulation of ‘police legitimacy’. Moreover, its recent
popularity and success within police studies justifies a closer inspection of its core con-
cepts and ideas.
To summarize briefly, procedural justice theory emerges from the work of Tom Tyler
(1988, 1990, 2004, 2011; Tyler et al., 2007) who argues that if the police adequately
demonstrate ‘fair’ procedures this will have the consequence of increased police legiti-
macy. If the police have an increase in legitimacy, argues Tyler, the police can expect
increased cooperation and compliance from the public and thus deliver an improved
service of protection. Tyler (2004: 84) offers up ‘process-based strategies’ for how the
police may improve their legitimacy. They can achieve this by: ‘[providing] people with
opportunities for explanation before decisions are made; explaining how decisions are
being made; allowing people mechanisms for complaint; and, in particular, treating peo-
ple with courtesy and respect’ (Tyler, 2011: 260). Tyler (2011: 257) demonstrates that the
most important dimension to police–public encounters (both adversarial and coopera-
tive) is the perceived fairness of the process: ‘the primary issue shaping people’s reac-
tions to personal encounters with the police is whether or not the police exercise their
authority in fair ways’.
Successfully delivering policing in a ‘fair’ way will produce a number of related out-
comes: it can reduce the number of negative encounters that have been shown to be
damaging to the overall appraisal of the police (see Bradford et al., 2009; Skogan, 2006);
it can improve the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of individuals and communities
(Sunshine and Tyler, 2003); it can encourage the public to cooperate willingly and com-
ply with crime control efforts (Tyler, 2004: 89); and finally, it can inspire ‘everyday
compliance with the law’ (Tyler, 2004: 89). As will be shown, procedural justice theory
offers a number of important insights into police legitimacy, but can be improved by
considering further complexities around ideology and power-holders.
A thread runs through the work of procedural justice theorists including Hough et al.
(2011), Jackson and Bradford (2010), Jackson et al. (2011, 2013), Sunshine and Tyler
(2003), Tankebe (2013) and Tyler (2004, 2011), that...
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