Policy Polarization, Income Inequality and Turnout
| Author | Matthew Polacko,Ruth Dassonneville,Michael S Lewis-Beck,Oliver Heath |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321720906581 |
| Date | 01 May 2021 |
| Published date | 01 May 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321720906581
Political Studies
2021, Vol. 69(2) 455 –477
© The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321720906581
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Policy Polarization, Income
Inequality and Turnout
Matthew Polacko1, Oliver Heath1,
Michael S Lewis-Beck2
and Ruth Dassonneville3
Abstract
Past research on the relationship between income inequality and turnout has produced mixed
results, with some studies suggesting that income inequality leads to lower turnout while other
studies find little or no significant effects. In this article, we investigate the extent to which these
mixed results are due to the contingent nature of inequality on turnout, which depends upon the
nature of the policy options that are presented to the electorate. We test these expectations
on data from national elections in 30 established democracies from 1965 through 2017 covering
300 elections. Regression analysis using country-level fixed effects reveals consistent evidence
in favor of our hypotheses: Inequality tends to have a negative impact on turnout, especially in
depolarized party systems, but as party system polarization increases the negative impact of
inequality is mitigated.
Keywords
Turnout, inequality, democracy
Accepted: 24 January 2020
Introduction
Income inequality has increased in many established democracies around the world
(Alderson and Nielsen, 2002; Alvaredo et al., 2017; Organisation for Economic
Co-Operation Development (OECD), 2011; Piketty, 2014; Smeeding, 2005). In most
OECD countries, the gap between rich and poor is at its highest level for 30 years. Today,
the richest 10% of the population in the OECD area earn 9.5 times the income of the poor-
est 10%. In the 1980s, this ratio stood at 7:1 and has been rising steadily ever since
1Department of Politics and International Relations, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, UK
2Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, USA
3Département de science politique, Université de Montréal, Montreal, QC, Canada
Corresponding author:
Oliver Heath, Department of Politics and International Relations, Royal Holloway, University of London,
Egham, UK.
Email: oliver.heath@rhul.ac.uk
906581PSX0010.1177/0032321720906581Political StudiesPolacko et al.
research-article2020
Article
456 Political Studies 69(2)
(Cingano, 2014). However, the rise in overall income inequality is not (only) about surging
incomes at the top. Incomes at the bottom grew much slower during the prosperous years
and fell during downturns, putting relative (and in some countries, absolute) income pov-
erty on the radar of policy concerns.
A recent report by the World Economic Forum (WEF), drawn from over 700 experts
in attendance, pronounced inequality to be the greatest threat to the world economy in
2017 (Elliott, 2017). According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), income ine-
quality matters for growth and its sustainability. Specifically, if the income share of the
top 20% (the rich) increases, then Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth actually
declines over the medium term, suggesting that the benefits do not trickle down (Dabla-
Norris et al., 2015). A recent Pew Research Center (PRC, 2014) survey found that the gap
between the rich and the poor is considered a major challenge by more than 60% of
respondents worldwide.
A diverse range of leading global figures such as former American President Barack
Obama, Pope Francis, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and the head of the IMF, Christine
Lagarde, have all offered speeches on the gravity of income inequality and the need to
address its rise. Political scientists have also recognized this challenge. In 2004, an
American Political Science Association (APSA) Task Force on Inequality and American
Democracy (2004: 661) concluded “we know little about the connections between chang-
ing economic inequality and changes in political behavior.”
Since then, a burgeoning literature has examined the link between income inequality
and turnout. The nature of this link is important for a number of reasons. Widening income
inequality can concentrate political and decision-making power in the hands of a few. But
policies that focus on the poor and the middle class can potentially mitigate inequality. By
demanding greater redistribution mass participation in elections can therefore potentially
redress this imbalance, but only if those who have most to gain from redistribution vote
(Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Indeed, as Mahler (2002) shows, electoral turnout is posi-
tively related to government redistribution in developed democracies.
Yet, key questions remain unsettled. Past research on the relationship between income
inequality and turnout has produced mixed results: some studies suggest that income
inequality leads to lower turnout (Anderson and Beramendi, 2008; Jensen and Jespersen,
2017; Lancee and Van de Werfhorst, 2012; Solt, 2008, 2010; Schäfer and Streeck, 2013;
Steinbrecher and Seeber, 2011), while other studies find little or no effect (Fumagalli and
Narciso, 2012; Horn, 2011; Stockemer and Parent, 2014; Stockemer and Scruggs, 2012).
One reason for these mixed results may have to do with the contingent nature of inequal-
ity on turnout, which plausibly depends upon the nature of the policy options that parties
present to the electorate. Here, we investigate this possibility and test the effect of income
inequality on turnout, and whether it is conditioned by the policy programs of parties.
When faced with rising income inequality, if political parties do not articulate policy dif-
ferences on matters of equality and redistribution, are voters more likely to abstain?
Alternatively, if political parties adopt distinctive policy responses, can income inequality
actually spur an increase in turnout?
In answering these questions, we build on past research. Broadly speaking, two
main approaches dominate the literature: “relative power theory” and “conflict the-
ory.” Relative power theory posits that income inequality has a negative effect on
turnout because it leads to a greater concentration of wealth—and with it political
power—in the hands of high-income individuals (Steinbrecher and Seeber, 2011: 5).
According to this theoretical perspective, political decision-makers are more
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