Political Action, Error and Failure: The Epistemological Limits of Complexity
| Date | 01 March 2012 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00901.x |
| Published date | 01 March 2012 |
| Author | Adrian Little |
| Subject Matter | Original Article |
Political Action, Error and Failure:
The Epistemological Limits of Complexitypost_9013..19
Adrian Little
University of Melbourne
The trend in government and public policy towards evidence-based policy making has recently been the subject of
criticism from authors such as Ian Sanderson who argue that the insights of complexity theory undermine the claims
of evidence that these forms of policy design advocate.While taking on board the primary claim of this critique, this
article examines the contribution of complexity theory in more detail to suggest that the epistemological obstacles that
complexity science identifies also challenge the kind of pragmatic, deliberative model that Sanderson prefers. Instead,
it examines the work of Michael Freeden on failure and Michel Foucault on error to demonstrate the ways in which
approaches that are less wedded to epistemological certainty can enable policy makers to think more creatively about
the complex terrain they must navigate and develop more innovative and less risk-averse forms of political action.
Keywords: complexity; failure; error; political action; epistemology
Error is the permanent contingency [aléa] around which the history of life and the develop-
ment of human beings are coiled (Foucault, 1998, p. 477).
In his recent article in Political Studies, Ian Sanderson (2009) provides a much-needed and
thought-provoking critique of evidence-based policy making and the ‘what works’ ratio-
nality that was fundamental to the development of Third Way theory, New Labour
discourse in the UK and, more recently, the agenda of the Rudd/Gillard Federal Labor
government in Australia. Sanderson’s argument cogently expresses the limitations of
evidence-based policy making on the grounds that ‘evidence’ is highly contested and that
policy design, implementation and evaluation are bound up with a number of other
contingent factors. Thus, issues such as the structure of power, the politics of influence and
judgements about the contextual constraints in any policy environment have a direct
bearing on whether the policies that are actually pursued are grounded in evidence or
whether the evidence is manufactured to suit the policy agenda. Sanderson points to the
additional constraints that emanate from complexity theory to suggest that, at best, recent
policy developments have been ‘evidence informed’ rather than ‘evidence based’. On this
foundation he constructs an argument for a much more pragmatic approach to policy
processes which relies less heavily on the normative arguments for specific policies and
instead concentrates on deliberative processes to justify particular courses of action given
the epistemological limits that conditions of complexity impose.
Sanderson’s recognition of the challenges that complexity generates for public policy is
most welcome but arguably it does not go far enough in identifying just how problematic
the epistemological limits that complexity identifies are for how we might rethink political
action. Ultimately, he makes a case for a ‘neo-modernist’ perspective which retains the
pursuit of rationally grounded models of normative progress while accepting that these
cannot be directly transferred into policy outcomes in a linear fashion. This is why
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00901.x
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2012 VOL 60, 3–19
© 2011The Author.Political Studies © 2011 Political Studies Association
Sanderson prefers a Deweyan pragmatism that comprehends the difficulties of implement-
ing normative objectives and that seeks legitimation through inclusive deliberation between
advocates of different conceptions of the good.While noting the advances that accrue from
Sanderson’s critique of evidence-based policy making, this article points to a number of
different conclusions that might result from engagement with complexity theory. First, it
argues for a more detailed and thorough account of the epistemological constraints that
complexity invokes than is provided by Sanderson. Second, it contends that normative
models of policy development do not grapple with the inevitabilities of failure that such
complexity generates (Freeden, 2009a). Third, Sanderson is criticised for hastily jettisoning
non-modernist accounts amid accusations of relativism. This fails to pay sufficient attention
to the contributions of theorists such as Michel Foucault (1998) who have identified the
ways in which we might think differently about errors in the creation of what we ‘know’.
Lastly, the article concludes that these theoretical approaches point us in a somewhat
different direction from pragmatism and deliberation if we are concerned with encouraging
innovative and creative approaches to political action.
The epistemological foundations of contemporary liberal democratic political organisa-
tion are well enshrined in the conduct and language of political institutions and the
mindsets of political actors, policy makers and everyday citizens. In this environment we
assume that political actions take place because we can specify that certain proposed or
desirable outcomes will ensue from a particular course of action. If these outcomes do not
materialise, then we either blame the constraints imposed by other unforeseen variables
(such as the global financial crisis) or we deem the actors and/or the ideas and policies they
advocate to have failed. However, as Sanderson intimates, this rather linear approach to
success and failure is problematic due to the epistemological framework it employs and the
potentially damaging ramifications for how we conduct politics. This article exposes the
problem that ‘because political failure is ubiquitous and salient, one would expect its
conceptualisation to be developed and complex. That expectation is confounded by the
paucity of systematic reflection on the possible interstices between political thinking and
failure’ (Freeden, 2009a, p. 144). In order to explain the full implications of this situation
(and the reasons why Sanderson’s critique of evidence-based policy making is incomplete),
three central concepts are discussed in the course of the article: complexity,failure and error.
Complexity Theory and the Limits of Epistemological Certainty
Complexity science and its theoretical implications are becoming increasingly important
perspectives within the social sciences, particularly as analysts explore the ramifications of
complexity for thinking about and engaging in political action (Geyer and Rihani, 2010;
Little, 2008; Urry, 2003; Zolo, 1992). It is these developments that underpin Sanderson’s
argument that in ‘dynamic, non-linear systems,change, instability and disequilibrium are the
norm, not the stability and equilibrium assumed in traditional mechanistic models’ (Sand-
erson, 2009,p. 705).By this account, traditional ‘cause–effect assumptions cease to be valid’
(Sanderson, 2009, p. 705). Thus, for Sander son, the major contr ibution of complexity
theory to the social sciences is the identification of non-linearity between cause and effect
or action and outcome.Significant as this is, complexity theory also proposes that social and
political actions generate unforeseen consequences and emergent properties that emanate
4ADRIAN LITTLE
© 2011The Author.Political Studies © 2011 Political Studies Association
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2012, 60(1)
To continue reading
Request your trial