Political normativity and the functional autonomy of politics
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1474885120918500 |
| Published date | 01 October 2022 |
| Date | 01 October 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article EJPT
Political normativity and
the functional autonomy
of politics
Carlo Burelli
University of Eastern Piedmont, Italy
Abstract
This article argues for a new interpretation of the realist claim th at politics is
autonomous from morality and involves specific political values. First, this article
defends an original normative source: functional normativity. Second, it advocates a
substantive functional standard: political institutions ought to be assessed by their
capacity to select and implement collective decisions. Drawing from the ‘etiological
account’ in philosophy of biology, I will argue that functions yield normative standards,
which are independent from morality. For example, a ‘good heart’ is one that
pumps blood well, and a good army is one that it is effective at exerting military
force. I then interpret realism’s naturalistic conception of politics as an etiological
function of social groups: namely making binding collective decisions under persistent
disagreement. I conclude that political institutions should be evaluated realistically by
how well they perform this task. Finally, I assess trade-offs between this functional
political normativity and other moral values. I conclude that justice, fairness, freedom
and equality remain obviously important concerns, but only once the basic political
function is secured.
Keywords
Functionalism, functions, moralism, political normativity, political realism, political
values, politics
Corresponding author:
Carlo Burelli, University of Eastern Piedmont, Sant’Andrea, via Galileo Ferraris 116, Vercelli VC, 13100, Italy.
Email: carlo.burelli@uniupo.it
European Journal of Political Theory
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885120918500
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2022, Vol. 21(4) 627–649
the function of government is to govern. A weak government,
a government which lacks authority, fails to perform its function
and is immoral in the same sense in which a corrupt judge,
a cowardly soldier, or an ignorant teacher is immoral.
(Huntington, 2006: 28)
Introduction
The old tradition of political realism has been revived to criticize the excessive
focus on moral values in political theory (Galston, 2010). While classical realists
forcefully argued against utopian thinkers, contemporary realism rejects the ‘mor-
alism’ (Williams, 2005: 1) that views political philosophy as ‘applied ethics’ (Geuss,
2008: 6). This moralism is usually understood as the idea that proper political
philosophy is grounded in a general theory that prescribes how persons should
act towards one another, which is then deductively applied to political problems.
Realists deem moralism to be flawed on a methodological level for two reasons.
First, it is insufficiently attentive to the actual characteristics of political life (e.g.
self-interest, power asymmetries, party loyalty, electoral systems etc.) (Horton,
2010). Secondly, moralism applies moral standards designed under idealized
assumptions to political contexts, which are strategic (Schmidtz, 2016) and coer-
cive (Sangiovanni, 2008) in character. Therefore, politics is conceived in an ideal-
istic way, roughly as the realm where we politely exchange reasons about what
justice demands. As such, moralism’s normative recommendations fail to offer
relevant guidance.
Moralism is also unsatisfactory on a substantive level, because of its sharp focus
on moral ideals like justice, fairness, freedom and equality. This sometimes leads to
prescriptions that miss their target in relevant real-world cases, taking for granted
essential political goods like peace (Gray, 2002; Wendt, 2013), legitimacy (Rossi,
2012; Sleat, 2014a), and order (Williams, 2005; Burelli, 2019).
Moralists retort that realists risk being ‘complacent’ towards the status quo,
lacking the critical bite to oppose undesirable social practices (Estlund, 2014). By
claiming that he who ‘let go of what is done for what should be done learns his
ruin’ (Machiavelli, 2010: 61), realists allegedly abdicate all normativity and merely
‘propose doing what is done’ (Rousseau, 1979: 34). If realists intend to criticize the
status quo, they must rely on some external moral ideal to ensure critical distance
(Erman and M€
oller, 2015). Realists are seemingly caught in a dilemma here: either
they are completely complacent towards the status quo, or they commit the same
faults they ascribe to moralists.
Yet realists intend to be normative, i.e. to offer reasons to prefer some institu-
tional arrangements over others (Rossi and Sleat, 2014). Rejecting unfeasible
ideals, as non-ideal theorists suggest (Valentini, 2012), is not sufficient from a
realist standpoint (Sleat, 2014b). Realists contend instead that politics is autono-
mous: the normative force emerges from within the political sphere, not from an
628 European Journal of Political Theory 21(4)
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