Political participation as self-cultivation: Towards a participatory theory of Confucian democracy
| Author | Jingcai Ying |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885117751763 |
| Published date | 01 April 2021 |
| Date | 01 April 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
E J P T
European Journal of Political Theory
2021, Vol. 20(2) 290–311
Political participation as
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self-cultivation: Towards
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885117751763
a participatory theory
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of Confucian democracy
Jingcai Ying
University of Virginia, USA
Abstract
Challenging the popular perception that Confucianism provides mostly a moral defense
of political hierarchy, this article demonstrates that Confucianism is more than compa-
tible with democracy and fundamentally contradicts political hierarchy, be it autocracy
or meritocracy. Drawing on Zhu Xi (1130–1200 CE), the spokesperson for the state
orthodoxy in late imperial China and one of the towering figures in the Confucian
tradition, I argue that to realize the Confucian self-cultivation program for all requires
popular participation in politics beyond casting ballots. My argument builds on Zhu Xi’s
moral egalitarianism that all human beings can pursue sagehood by self-cultivation and
should be given the equal opportunity to do so. Since Zhu Xi’s self-cultivation program
requires acquiring and perfecting political knowledge in political practice, to realize his
moral egalitarianism requires political equality for all. As such, my participatory theory
of Confucian democracy exhorts all people to engage in self-governance and daily
administration of the state more proactively. Thus, it enriches the prevalent liberal
theory of Confucian democracy that focuses on political representation but not on
popular participation in politics.
Keywords
Confucian democracy, Neo-Confucianism, democratic theory, perfectionism, Zhu Xi
In recent years, Confucianism has re-emerged as a prominent political ideology in
China, as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) increasingly turns to China’s trad-
itional cultures to shore up its legitimacy. The CCP’s co-optation of Confucianism
seems fitting because the tradition is popularly perceived as a moral defense of
political hierarchy (e.g. Bell, 2016a: 86–87, 91). I challenge this popular perception
Corresponding author:
Jingcai Ying, Department of Politics, University of Virginia, 1540 Jefferson Park Avenue, Charlottesville,
VA 22904, USA.
Email: jingcaiying@gmail.com
Ying
291
by drawing on Zhu Xi
(1130–1200 CE), one of the towering figures in
the diverse traditions of Confucianism. More radical than any existing defense
of Confucian democracy, I argue that Zhu Xi’s Confucian ethics, upon close
examination,
turns
out
to
cohere
better
with
democracy
than
with
authoritarianism.
As such, this article intervenes in the lively debate on the compatibility between
Confucianism and democracy. To those who are skeptical of the possibility of
Confucian democracy, I will show that political equality can be a moral ideal
internal to the Confucian tradition because it enhances Confucian Learning for
all. To Confucian democrats, my argument reinforces their defenses of Confucian
democracy by adding a robust participatory dimension. Enriching the prevalent
liberal model of Confucian democracy, which does not expand the scope of popu-
lar participation beyond electoral politics, I will demonstrate that popular partici-
pation in self-governance should be an indispensable activity or mode of Confucian
self-cultivation. Therefore, this article not only justifies democracy on Confucian
terms but also illustrates how Confucian ethics can help build a robust democratic
civic culture.
The following is divided into four sections. The first section reviews the current
literature and specifies my contributions. The second section introduces Zhu Xi as
an influential philosopher and addresses two charges of anachronism against my
democratic reconstruction of his thought. The third section lays the moral foun-
dation of Confucian democracy by explaining Zhu Xi’s moral egalitarianism,
which stems from his ontology of coherence (li
) and material force (qi
).
The fourth section demonstrates why Zhu Xi’s investigative self-cultivation pro-
gram (gewu zhizhi
), along with his belief in the universal accessibility to
sagehood, calls for popular political participation.
The (im)possibility of Confucian democracy
The CCP’s recent resort to Confucianism is unsurprising. In contemporary China,
there are many grass-root efforts to revive various Confucian elements (e.g. see
Billioud and Thoraval, 2015; Ivanhoe and Kim, 2016, chs. 1–4; Sun, 2013).
Although many Confucian political theorists do not necessarily support the
CCP’s way to revitalize Confucianism, they reject the idea of a Confucian democ-
racy for four different reasons. First, some hesitate to endorse political equality
because they are concerned with the kind of liberal individualism that undergirds
the popular understanding of democracy (e.g. Ames, 2011: 268; Hall and Ames,
1999: ch. 8; Rosemont, 2015: 63, 125). Second, some think that Confucian ethics is
an inegalitarian tradition and does not support political equality (e.g. Angle, 2012:
54–56; Chan, 2014: 85; Elstein, 2010: 440; Tan, 2003: 153–156; Tan, 2016: 502).
Third, some defend Confucianism as China’s native identity, which is incompatible
with foreign egalitarian values (e.g. Fan, 2013: 103–109; Jiang, 2013: 27–43; for a
study of these nationalist positions, see Makeham, 2008). Lastly, some
praise Confucianism as a worthy rival to democracy. Unlike the mob rule by uni-
versal suffrage, Confucianism reserves political power mostly for the meritorious
292
European Journal of Political Theory 20(2)
(e.g. Bai, 2013: 76; Bell, 2016b: 99–108; for critiques, see Kim, 2014: ch. 3). Simply
put, none of these Confucians sees how the tradition can benefit much from the
ideal of political equality.
Against this inegalitarian current, a few egalitarian voices have emerged. New
Confucians in Taiwan maintain that liberal democracy benefits Confucianism, a
state-centered political tradition, by protecting individual autonomy and popular
welfare against abuses of governmental power (Mou, 2010: 122–128; Xu, 1979:
287–289; see also Angle, 2012: ch. 2; Liu, 1993: 138–140). Thus, they believe that
democracy is necessary for realizing Confucian ideals (Elstein, 2015: chs. 3–5; Lee,
2005: 35–37). Others like Sungmoon Kim are less concerned with how democracy
may benefit Confucianism. They consider democratic ideals intrinsically valuable
and reconstruct Confucianism as civic instruments for strengthening democracy
(Kim, 2014: 85; Kim, 2016: 18, 27, 67–68; Kim, 2017: 246). For example, Kim
affirms the value of democratic participation, but he does so ‘‘without rendering the
value of democracy dependent on traditional philosophical Confucianism’s perfec-
tionist moral ends’’ (Kim, 2017: 247). As such, Confucian democrats remain
divided on the theoretical relationship between Confucianism and democracy:
does democracy benefit Confucianism or vice versa?
My answer to this question combines insights from both sides of Confucian
democrats. First, I agree with New Confucians like Mou Zongsan and Xu
Fuguan that the philosophical relationship between Confucianism and democracy
is more intimate than Kim has suggested. Kim refuses to associate his Confucian
political theory with any school of Confucian Learning and argues that ‘‘as a civic
culture, Confucianism is not necessarily democratic in itself, and it is compatible
with a wide range of political systems’’ (Kim, 2017: 246). This article shows that
Zhu Xi’s Confucian ethics is incompatible with authoritarianism and that democ-
racy is a key implication of Confucian ethics. My exegesis of Zhu Xi will demon-
strate that democracy should be ethically valuable to Confucians because it is a
political ideal deduced from their own ethical commitments.
To be sure, although I agree with Mou and Xu that democracy is necessary for
realizing Confucian ideals, my article draws on a different source than Mou’s and
Xu’s work. Xu mostly focuses on Classical Confucians, whereas Mou relies heavily
on the Heart-Mind school (xinxue
) of the Neo-Confucian tradition. My
theory of Confucian democracy rests on Zhu Xi’s Coherence school (lixue
),
which reinterprets Classical Confucianism in the wake of Buddhism and Daoism
and against which the Heart-Mind school developed itself. Thus, supplementing
Mou’s and Xu’s defenses of Confucian democracy, my appeal to Zhu Xi shows
that, even with all its diversities, the Confucian tradition has a strong philosophical
propensity towards democracy.1
Second, I side with Kim in affirming the value of democratic participation,
though I do so by grounding this participatory value in Zhu Xi’s perfectionist
ideals.2 New Confucians like Mou and Xu mostly adopt liberal democracy, i.e. a
limited, representative government with free and fair elections, with a non-liberal
justification (Elstein, 2015: 91–96). They never affirm the crucial need for
Confucians to participate in self-governance beyond casting ballots. Building on
Ying
293
Brooke A Ackerly’s insight that Confucian democratic institutions should foster
universal self-cultivation (Ackerly, 2005: 562), I contend that a participatory dem-
ocracy can benefit Confucians beyond the liberal need for political self-protection.
Popular participation in politics is internally valuable to Confucians because it can
facilitate their self-cultivation by encouraging them to acquire and perfect their
political knowledge in practice. Consequently, my perfectionist theory of
Confucian democracy can also help build a vibrant democratic culture,...
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