Politics and corona lockdown regulations in 35 highly advanced democracies: The first wave
| Published date | 01 September 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/01925121221078147 |
| Author | Detlef Jahn |
| Date | 01 September 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Original Research Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/01925121221078147
International Political Science Review
2023, Vol. 44(4) 571 –586
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/01925121221078147
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Politics and corona lockdown
regulations in 35 highly advanced
democracies: The first wave
Detlef Jahn
University of Greifswald, Germany
Abstract
This article gives an initial overview of the explanatory power of established approaches in comparative
political science of various lockdown strategies in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic in 35
democracies. In a macro-comparative statistical analysis of the first wave of the pandemic, I test partisan
and veto player theories. I distinguish two phases of the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, which
show distinct patterns of political impacts. In the first phase of implementing lockdown strategies, central
governments were relatively uncontested and partisan theory has strong explanatory power. In the second
phase of lifting lockdowns, party differences lose relevance, but veto players have a strong influence during
this time. The analysis shows that political science theories are useful for analysing political processes not
only under normal conditions but also in extreme social crises. Moreover, it provides deeper insights into
the democratic decision-making process of advanced democracies in exceptional situations.
Keywords
COVID-19 pandemic, lockdowns, partisan theory, veto player theory, democratic decision making
Introduction
In a comparative perspective, the response to the COVID-19 pandemic differs substantially
between modern, highly industrialized democracies. Some countries reacted fast and implemented
strict lockdowns, other responded late and others kept restrictions to a minimum (Plümper and
Neumayer, 2020). Many factors play a role in explaining these differences, including economic
conditions, the healthcare system and even cultural aspects (Egger et al., 2021). So far, however,
there has been a lack of studies analysing the contribution of established theories of comparative
political science in explaining differences in the lockdown strategies of advanced democracies. I
test the explanatory power of two established approaches in macro-comparative analysis: partisan
theory and veto player theory. Both have proven to be very effective in explaining policy outcomes
in many areas (Hallerberg, 2011; Jahn, 2010; Potrafke, 2017; Schmitt and Zohlnhöfer, 2017).
Corresponding author:
Detlef Jahn, Department of Political Science, University of Greifswald, Ernst-Lohmeyer-Platz 3, Raum 3.09, Greifswald,
D-17489, Germany.
Email: DJahn@uni-greifswald.de
1078147IPS0010.1177/01925121221078147International Political Science ReviewJahn
research-article2022
Original Research Article
572 International Political Science Review 44(4)
Together they shed light on how the political process works in democracies. I use these theories to
analyse the first wave of the corona crisis in 35 highly industrialized democracies.
Testing these two theories is useful for at least two reasons. First, we can better understand the
first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic if we frame it in a theoretical explanation. This way of look-
ing at the first wave helps us to tap into the uniqueness of the crisis. Second, the rapidly changing
nature of the crisis enables us to test the broad generalizability of these theories even in this extreme
situation.
The article shows that both theories have a lot to offer when explaining the differences in the
first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. Partisan theories show that left-wing governments intro-
duce faster and tougher lockdowns than right-leaning governments. It also shows that constitu-
tional checks and balances were discarded in the first phase of the crisis. The situation changed in
the second phase of the first wave when the lockdowns were lifted. During this phase, veto players
became more relevant and partisan differences decreased. This result shows that after extreme
pressure, when the infection rate increased sharply, democratic control was suspended, but that
highly industrialized democracies, after overcoming the peak of the first wave, returned to the
democratic order again. This demonstrates that democracies are able to react to an extreme situa-
tion without permanently abandoning democratic processes.
This article starts out by formulating hypotheses deduced from partisan and veto player theory.
I then introduce the empirical model used for this study and the operationalization of the variables.
The next section presents the results. The conclusion summarizes the results and reflects on the
findings in a broader context.
The corona pandemic and politics
The COVID-19 pandemic is an extreme situation where different measures were taken to prevent
the spread of the coronavirus. These measures ranged from rules for keeping distance from each
other to a complete lockdown, which involved closing schools, universities and workplaces, and
limited travelling and international contacts. However, on which basis were these measures and the
various degrees of lockdown decided? Are they a result of a stimulus-response mechanism (i.e.
infection or death rates → degree of lockdown), or do different political factors make a difference?
Two approaches are highly relevant in macro-comparative policy analysis and together capture the
political process in modern democracies. Partisan theory analyses the effect of different party ide-
ologies on outcomes. That is, when parties are in government, they form results according to their
party ideology (Budde et al., 2018; Potrafke, 2017; Schmitt and Zohlnhöfer, 2017). This effect can
also be seen in health policy, which is probably the policy area most closely related to the COVID-
19 pandemic (Falkenbach et al., 2020).
While partisan theory covers the executive branch and focuses on setting the agenda, veto
player theory focuses on factors that prevent a smooth implementation of the executive branch’s
wishes. Veto player theory thus stands for the democratic checks and balances that take place when
compromises have to be taken into account. Like partisan theory, veto player theory has been
widely used in comparative political science (Ganghof, 2011, 2017; Hallerberg, 2011). Both
approaches taken together reflect the political process of modern democracies: how political action
is initiated and intermediated.
In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, too, one can assume that the left–right dimension is
decisive, as in many other policy areas. A strict lockdown policy has enormous economic conse-
quences, and one could argue that right-wing governments are reluctant to implement strong lock-
downs in order to protect the economy. In contrast, left-leaning governments may solve the
trade-off between economic stress and public health by supporting stricter lockdown strategies.
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