Poly‐criminal Pirates and Ballooning Effects: Implications for International Counter‐piracy
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12636 |
| Published date | 01 February 2019 |
| Date | 01 February 2019 |
| Author | Katja Lindskov Jacobsen |
Poly-criminal Pirates and Ballooning Effects:
Implications for International Counter-piracy
Katja Lindskov Jacobsen
Centre for Military Studies, University of Copenhagen
Abstract
In view of continued international counter-piracy efforts and these recent incidents, this article takes the five obstacles pre-
sented by Percy and Shortland (2013), as its point of departure for an analysis of key developments of importance for Somali
piracy since 2013. Specifically, the article firsts offer an analysis and updated version of Percy and Shortland’sfive obstacles.
Second, I argue, that a sixth obstacle should be added. This obstacle is the phenomenon that practitioners as well as aca-
demics working with organised crime refer to as ‘poly-criminals’. Having elaborated on this additional obstacle –with refer-
ence to interviews conducted with key actors in Somalia –the third section explicates the policy impact of poly-criminal
pirates; it offers a discussion of what this alternative conception means for external actors’counter-piracy engagements, with
particular attention to the risk of creating ‘balloon effects’when addressing a challenge of this kind (poly-criminals) through
too narrowly defined counter-piracy lenses, mandates and programmes.
Policy Implications
•Continued focus on on-shore challenges is necessary despite the fact that levels of Somali piracy are historically low.
•Continue corruption and impunity points to need for more concerted international donor pressure in current counter-
piracy efforts.
•A key implication of understanding Somali pirates as poly-criminals is that the risk of pirates shifting to another type of
criminal business as a result of narrowly defined counter-piracy mandates and programmes become visible –which in turn
should have implications for future counter-piracy/counter-maritime crime engagement.
•Describing the current balancing act of industry eager to ease the expensive security measures being advised by best
management practices and industry releasable threat assessments and the risk of ‘lowering the bar too far’also has impli-
cations for how to think about the future of industry involvement in counter-piracy off the Horn of Africa.
Though Somali piracy has been suppressed, as evidenced for
example by the very low number of reported incidents in
recent years and by the termination of NATO’s Operation
Ocean Shield in December 2016, the five obstacles to ‘effec-
tive control of Somali piracy’that Percy and Shortland
unfolded in 2013 –lack of alternative employment, corrup-
tion, that pirates prey on outsiders, industry’s poor adher-
ence to best management practices and unintended
consequences from counter-piracy efforts –remain relevant
today. Indeed, 10 years into international counter-piracy
efforts off the coast of Somalia, numerous activities and pro-
grammes are still in place: EUNAVFOR had its mandate
extended, the 32-nation US-led navy coalition, Combined
Maritime Forces (CMF), still has a dedicated counter-piracy
component (TF151), various UN programmes (UNSOM,
UNODC, UNOPS), individual Navies (India, China, Russia) and
numerous bilateral counter-piracy engagements are all still
on-going. Yet, today Somali piracy cannot be viewed in iso-
lation from other types of criminal businesses at sea –
including the smuggling of weapons, humans and/or nar-
cotics. Hence, this article adds another ‘obstacle’, which it
describes through the concepts of poly-criminals and
ballooning effects. These concepts, so it is argued, are par-
ticularly suitable for advancing our appreciation of linkages
between Somali piracy and other crimes at sea, and of why
such linkages are important to consider when designing
future counter-measures.
Currently, however, many international efforts are still
legitimised with reference to the risk that Somali piracy may
return. Indeed, after years of low levels of pirate activity, we
saw one attempted attack and three hijackings in 2017 (IMB
2018, p. 8). In March of 2017, when merchant vessel Aris 13
was captured with 11 crew members on board, this repre-
sented the first successful pirate attack in the region for
almost 5 years. This incident became the first in a series of
piracy-related occurrences in 2017, and in February 2018
tanker MT Leopard Sun was attacked. Together these inci-
dents have reignited debates about Somali piracy. As noted
by a key player in international counter-piracy, they ‘re-
minded us, that Somali piracy was not yesterday’s news’.
1
In view of continued international counter-piracy efforts
and these recent incidents, this article takes the five obsta-
cles presented by Percy and Shortland (2013), as its point of
departure for an analysis of key developments of
©2018 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2019) 10:1 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12636
Global Policy Volume 10 . Issue 1 . February 2019
52
Research Article
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