Populism and Support for Protectionism: The Relevance of Opposition to Trade Openness for Leftist and Rightist Populist Voting in The Netherlands
| Date | 01 August 2018 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321717723505 |
| Published date | 01 August 2018 |
| Author | Willem de Koster,Jeroen van der Waal |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321717723505
Political Studies
2018, Vol. 66(3) 560 –576
© The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321717723505
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Populism and Support for
Protectionism: The Relevance
of Opposition to Trade
Openness for Leftist and
Rightist Populist Voting in
The Netherlands
Jeroen van der Waal and Willem de Koster
Abstract
Leftist and rightist populist parties in Western Europe both oppose trade openness. Is support for
economic protectionism also relevant for their electorates? We assess this in the Netherlands,
where both types of populist parties have seats in parliament. Analyses of representative survey
data (n = 1,296) demonstrate that support for protectionism drives voting for such parties, as do
the well-established determinants of political distrust (both populist constituencies), economic
egalitarianism (leftist populist constituency) and ethnocentrism (rightist populist constituency).
Surprisingly, support for protectionism does not mediate the relationship between economic
egalitarianism and voting for left-wing populists, or the link between political distrust and voting
for either left-wing or right-wing populist parties. In contrast, support for protectionism partly
mediates the association between ethnocentrism and voting for right-wing populists. We discuss
the largely independent role of protectionism in populist voting in relation to the cultural cleavage
in politics and electoral competition, and also provide suggestions for future research.
Keywords
protectionism, populism, economic egalitarianism, ethnocentrism, political distrust
Accepted: 16 May 2017
Populist politicians and parties on both sides of the Atlantic claim to ‘truly’ cater to ‘the
needs of the common man’ (March, 2011; Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015; Rooduijn et al.,
2014; Schumacher and Rooduijn, 2013). One way in which they promise to do so is
Department of Public Administration and Sociology, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The
Netherlands
Corresponding author:
Jeroen van der Waal, Department of Public Administration and Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Erasmus
University Rotterdam, Burgemeester Oudlaan 50, Rotterdam 3000 DR, The Netherlands.
Email: vanderwaal@fsw.eur.nl
723505PSX0010.1177/0032321717723505Political StudiesVan der Waal and De Koster
research-article2017
Article
Van der Waal and De Koster 561
opposing free trade (also referred to as ‘support for protectionism’), which featured prom-
inently during the 2016 presidential election in the United States, as it did in the prelude
to the national parliamentary elections in various Western European countries in 2017.
Donald Trump, for instance, stated, ‘I am all for free trade, but it’s got to be fair. When
Ford moves their massive plants to Mexico, we get nothing. I want them to stay in
Michigan’ (OnTheIssues, 2016). This is reminiscent of Ross Perot’s fierce opposition to
the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) in the 1990s (Hawthorn, 1994).
Perot, a presidential candidate, resisted NAFTA because it would lead to, as he put it, ‘a
giant sucking sound going south’, which was a metaphor for the relocation of industrial
production to Mexico and a loss of manufacturing jobs in the United States.
Similar stances can be found among populists in Europe. Leftist populist parties, such
as the Socialistische Partij (SP; Socialist Party) in the Netherlands and die Linke (the
Left) in Germany,1 as well as right-wing populists like Front National (National Front) in
France and Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV; Party for Freedom) in the Netherlands, are
fierce opponents of common markets, especially when it comes to their expansion. Such
parties argued vociferously against the Bolkenstein Directive in 2006, for instance, by
warning of the ‘unfair competition’ that workers would endure from proverbial ‘Polish
plumbers’ entering North-West European labour markets. Furthermore, in the prelude to
the parliamentary elections of 2017, they have fiercely opposed trade agreements such as
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (Charlemagne, 2015). This
opposition to trade openness neatly fits into the more encompassing agendas of these par-
ties, which aim to shield the ‘common man’ from the perceived vagaries of economic
globalisation, agreements made in so-called ‘elitist institutions’ such as the European
Union, and the alleged ‘violation’ of national cultures and sovereignty.
It is, however, not yet clear whether support for protectionism also characterises the
populist electorate. Having clarity on this will deepen our understanding of the social
bases of populism and uncover the potential electoral relevance of support for protection-
ism, especially when free trade treaties are politicised. We therefore aim to answer the
following questions: Does support for protectionism drive voting for leftist and rightist
populist parties? And, if so, how can this be explained? To do so, we compare the elector-
ates of the populist left and populist right to those of non-populist parties. Focusing on both
leftist and rightist populist constituencies is especially relevant, because these groups may
have different reasons for opposing free trade due to their different attitudinal profiles.
As trade openness increases economic inequality due to the falling demand for lower
skilled workers (Mayda and Rodrik, 2005), it may be that support for protectionism is
part of the link between economic egalitarianism and support for left-wing populist par-
ties. A right-wing objection to trade openness could also be in play. More specifically,
since opposition to free trade is part of a more encompassing resistance to perceived
infringements of national culture and may reflect a sense of national superiority (Mansfield
and Mutz, 2009; Margalit, 2012; Mutz and Kim, in press; Van der Waal and De Koster,
2015), support for protectionism may be part of the link between ethnocentrism and
nationalism on the one hand and support for right-wing populist parties on the other.
Additionally, if trade associations and partnerships such as NAFTA and TTIP are consid-
ered to be projects of ‘corrupt political elites’ beyond the control of the common man
(Kaina, 2008; Mudde, 2004), support for protectionism might be part of the well-estab-
lished link between political distrust and support for both leftist and rightist populist par-
ties (Hooghe and Oser, 2015; Hooghe et al., 2011; Kemmers et al., 2016).
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