Populism and the politicisation of foreign policy
| Author | Sandra Destradi,Johannes Plagemann,Hakkı Taş |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/13691481221075944 |
| Published date | 01 August 2022 |
| Date | 01 August 2022 |
https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481221075944
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
2022, Vol. 24(3) 475 –492
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/13691481221075944
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Populism and the politicisation
of foreign policy
Sandra Destradi1, Johannes Plagemann2
and Hakkı Taş3
Abstract
Populists in power often resort to the politicisation of foreign policy to generate domestic
support. This article explores this process. First, it conceptualises populist politicisation of foreign
policy. Second, it develops expectations on how such politicisation will take place: the distinctive
features of populism (the intensity of populist discourse, the relative weight of anti-elitism and
people-centrism, and a transnational understanding of the ‘people’ or the ‘elite’) will have an
impact on how foreign policy is politicised. The empirical analysis focuses on selected public
speeches and tweets by two populist leaders from the Global South: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and
Narendra Modi. The analysis reveals huge differences: the more populist Erdoğan emphasises
anti-elitism and extensively resorts to the politicisation of Turkish foreign policy by constructing
foreign threats. Modi is less populist and his discourse emphasises people-centrism; as expected,
he only marginally politicises foreign policy, highlighting the greatness of the Indian nation.
Keywords
foreign policy, India, politicisation, populism, Turkey
Introduction
In recent years, we have seen the formation of populist governments all over the world.
Besides the extensive existing works on the domestic drivers and consequences of pop-
ulism, a growing literature has addressed populism’s implications for international affairs.
This includes the impact of populist-government formation on individual countries’ for-
eign and security policies (e.g. Chryssogelos, 2017; Destradi and Plagemann, 2019; Taş,
2020a; Verbeek and Zaslove, 2017; Wehner and Thies, 2020). While some studies have
started theorising under what conditions populism impacts foreign policy or what consti-
tutes a genuinely ‘populist’ foreign policy, the links between populism’s domestic and
international dimensions remain unspecified. In particular, we have relatively little
1Department of Political Science, University of Freiburg, Freiburg, Germany
2GIGA Institute for Asian Studies, Hamburg, Germany
3GIGA Institute for Middle East Studies, Hamburg, Germany
Corresponding author:
Hakkı Taş, GIGA Institute for Middle East Studies, Neuer Jungfernstieg 21, 20354 Hamburg, Germany.
Email: hakki.tas@giga-hamburg.de
1075944BPI0010.1177/13691481221075944The British Journal of Politics and International RelationsDestradi et al.
research-article2022
Special Issue Article
476 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 24(3)
systematic knowledge about the role foreign policy plays for populists’ efforts to mobilise
support and, vice versa, the extent to which foreign policy is politicised by populist lead-
ers and parties. This is surprising given widespread presumptions that populists from
Donald Trump to Viktor Orbán habitually employ foreign threats and foreign policy as
mobilising devices. Moreover, the Comparative Politics literature tells us that populists,
once voted into power, tend to keep mobilising and polarising as they face a substantial
dilemma: they themselves have become the much-despised ‘elite’ and need new ways to
generate popular support. As a result, they are permanently on the campaign trail (Müller,
2016: 41).
Foreign policy topics might be particularly suitable to generate popular support.
Electoral cycles co-determine the conduct of foreign policy in democracies, often favour-
ing short-term considerations over long-term strategy (Quandt, 1986). The literature on
the ‘rally-around-the-flag effect’ tells us that foreign policy issues and potential threats
from abroad can be easily used for domestic political mobilisation (Tir, 2010). More gen-
erally, political leaders play ‘two-level games’, seeking to satisfy domestic supporters
while negotiating international treaties (Putnam, 1988) or revising their countries’ grand
strategies (Chryssogelos and Martill, 2021). In the case of populists in power, we might
expect such links between foreign and domestic issues to be even stronger. This is so
because, according to many, populism often emerges in response to distinctively interna-
tional factors,1 first and foremost the negative consequences of globalisation – real or
perceived. Indeed, populism is often described as a backlash against the increasing influ-
ence of ‘international bureaucracies’ (Chryssogelos, 2019) or resentment towards
Westernisation (Holmes and Krastev, 2019).
On the other hand, populism is also often portrayed as an inward-oriented strategy
concerned with fighting domestic ‘enemies of the people’ rather than with the conduct of
world politics. Populism, as the opposite of cosmopolitanism (Ingram, 2017), may sug-
gest disengagement and ignorance of international issues instead of raising awareness
thereof. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests a wide variation in the ways and extent to
which populists politicise foreign policy (see below). Overall, while politicisation seems
to be an important feature of the foreign policy of populist governments, there are also
indications that it might be an uneven occurrence and one that certainly deserves greater
scrutiny.
With few exceptions limited to the European context (e.g. Chryssogelos, 2019), the
study of populist politicisation of foreign policy is uncharted territory in both theoretical
and empirical terms. Thus, in this article we explore to what extent and how populists
politicise foreign policy. Specifically, we ask whether and how the distinctive features of
populism impact on how foreign policy is politicised. To that end, we link the literatures
on populism and on politicisation and we outline a conceptualisation of populist politici-
sation of foreign policy. Moreover, we develop expectations about how populism’s inten-
sity, the relative weight of its constitutive dimensions (anti-elitism and people-centrism),
and the distinctive way in which the ‘people’ and the ‘elite’ are defined affect the politi-
cisation of foreign policy. As the populist politicisation of foreign policy can have varying
intensities, it is a continuous concept. Moreover, we expect a prevalence of people-cen-
trism versus anti-elitism in populist discourse to lead to different subtypes of politicisa-
tion. Our empirical analysis focuses on the foreign policy discourses of two populist
leaders who employ populist discourse to different degrees: Turkey’s Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan and India’s Narendra Modi, respectively. These two case studies from the Global
South promise insights into the populist politicisation of foreign policy outside the denser
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