Populism as a Spectre of Democracy: A Response to Canovan
| Date | 01 March 2004 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00468.x |
| Published date | 01 March 2004 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Populism as a Spectre of Democracy:
A Response to Canovan
Benjamín Arditi
National University of Mexico (UNAM)
The literature on populism used to depict the phenomenon as an alternative to the standard path
from traditional to modern society; as a way to enfranchise the underclass; or as an anomaly vis-
à-vis class politics and liberal institutions. More recently, the debate has shifted into something of
a terra incognita as a result of the growing interest in the connection between populism and demo-
cratic politics. One of the more intriguing contributions to this debate is an article by Margaret
Canovan, if only because it makes this unknown territory less confusing. Her argument draws
from Michael Oakeshott’s claim that political modernity is characterised by the interplay of two
distinct styles – the politics of faith and the politics of scepticism. She renames them the redemptive
and pragmatic faces of democracy and suggests that populism arises in the gap between them. This
establishes a relation of interiority between populism and democracy. The former will follow
democracy like a shadow. At times, however, the theoretical status of the gap is somewhat uncer-
tain, as it seems more appropriate for thinking politics (particularly radical politics) in general. The
political valence of the shadow could also be specified further to show the undecidability between
the democratic aspect of the phenomenon and its possible ominous tones. This paper looks into
this in some detail to engage in a friendly interrogation of Canovan’s claims.
Populism and Democracy
Peter Worsley provided us with one of the first intelligent proposals on how to link
populism and democracy (1969). He took his cue from the double heading of pop-
ulism suggested by Edward Shils – the supremacy of the will of the people and the
direct relationship between the people and the government (Worsley, 1969,
p. 244). From this, Worsley extracted two consequences. One is that these notions
apply to a wide variety of situations, which is why he argued that we should regard
populism as an emphasis, ‘a dimension of political culture in general, not simply
as a particular kind of overall ideological system or type of organization’ (p. 245).
This was his way of saying that populism cannot claim any conceptual purity for
itself or that the ‘as such’ of populism is always already contaminated and cannot
be determined outside a context. The other consequence is that we can plot the
contact between the people and the leadership on a continuum that goes from the
total non-involvement of the masses at one end of the spectrum to the anarchist
ideal self-regulating commune at the other (p. 245). Worsley used this scale to dis-
tinguish right from left, although it seems more apt as a criterion to differentiate
elitist and participatory politics. Having said this, he also identified the limits of an
argument that rests solely on the directness of the link between leaders and masses,
for in complex societies this must necessarily be a symbolic or a mystifying direct-
ness. That is why he added an important modifier: populism refers not only to this
link, but also to forms of ‘direct’ participation in general, be they genuine or
© Political Studies Association, 2004.
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
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B E N J A M Í N A R D I T I
spurious, in the sense of the involvement of people in governing their own lives,
however ineffective this may turn out to be (p. 246).
The reference to participation is crucial for Worsley’s argument. He disputed Lipset’s
conception of the good society as one where citizens can choose among contenders
for political office, for he argued, quite correctly, that such a view reduces democ-
racy to the institutionalisation of opposition and to the periodic change of gov-
ernment. In other words, he questioned the enclosure of democracy in its liberal
format. By focusing on participation, he broadened the field of what we normally
understand as democracy. If the latter is a way of putting into practice the
supremacy of the will of the people, then democracy ‘has always involved a great
deal more than the ins-and-outs of parliamentarianism’ (1969, p. 246). He con-
cluded that populism is neither democratic nor anti-democratic in itself – fascists,
as well as egalitarian and reform movements, can claim to represent the people
and appeal to direct forms of participation – but at least it is compatible with democ-
racy (p. 247).
This compatibility is what interests me. The recent literature follows this line of
reasoning by focusing on the theoretical dimension of democratic politics. Jack
Hayward saw populism as a response to the perceived shortcomings of democra-
tic elitism (1996). Critics have said that, in the case of the EU, elites no longer act
in the public interest and corruption at the highest levels discredits them (Hayward,
1996, p. 10). The continuing decline of mass parties and the ability of elite-
oriented organisations to mobilise the public open up a space for the new politics
of social movements and challenger parties (pp. 21–2). This failure of the mediat-
ing role of impersonal elites, Hayward said, is an open invitation for populist and
other groups to step in to counteract the democratic deficit in the EU – even more
so, given that their methods of political action include the use of direct action,
which broadens the participatory horizon of citizens beyond that of infrequent
voters choosing among contending parties (p. 23). He concluded by saying that no
matter how unsavoury populism may be for some, representative democracy must
coexist with the countervailing forces of elitism and populism (p. 27).
Margaret Canovan developed a similar view; although instead of speaking of
elitism and populism, she referred to the pragmatic and redemptive faces of
democracy. Like other authors who have written on this subject, she understood
populism ‘as an appeal to “the people” against both the established structure of
power and the dominant ideas and values of the society’ (1999, p. 3). She speci-
fied what she meant by this. First, like new social movements, the anti-system
mobilisation of populism often runs against parties; but unlike the former,
populists direct their challenge to both the...
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