Populist leniency, crime control and due process
| Published date | 01 August 2010 |
| Date | 01 August 2010 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1362480610371667 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Populist leniency, crime control and
due process
RICHARD JONES
University of Edinburgh, UK
Abstract
This article identifies and discusses examples of populist calls against
punishment and for leniency—a phenomenon here termed ‘populist
leniency’. A penal moderate might find such populist opposition to
punishment superficially appealing. However, drawing from Packer’s
classic models of the criminal process, it is argued that both populist
leniency and penal populism express ‘Crime Control’ values, the
view that the proper role of the criminal process (and criminal
justice) is to protect ‘law-abiding citizens’ from dangerous others.
Since ‘Crime Control’ does not advocate any net reduction in penal
power (and if anything, quite the opposite), the article asks whether
Packer’s other model, ‘Due Process’, presents a more attractive
potential resource for penal moderates, since this model offers a
sceptical view of criminal justice, protecting individuals from
unconstrained official power.
Key Words
leniency •moderation •populism •punishment •values
Introduction
Since its formulation by Bottoms (1995) some 15 years ago, the notion of
‘populist punitiveness’ (nowmore frequently referred toas ‘penal populism’)1
has been explored within criminology variously as an aspect of ‘the punitive
turn’ in sentencing policy, an element of a wider ‘culture of control’, a char-
acteristic of certain politicians’ and media discourse or a shade of public
opinion. Matthews (2004) does an impressive job of dismantling many of
Theoretical Criminology
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Vol. 14(3): 331–347; 1362–4806
DOI: 10.1177/1362480610371667
331
the less cautious criminological claims, showing for example how penal
populism is poor at explaining a rising prison population, describing much
public opinion on sentencing, characterizing ‘non-punitive’ developments
such as restorative justice, and accounting for continued liberal beliefs
among much of the middle class. While Matthews (2004: 195–6) is entirely
correct to challenge the overstating of the extent of penal populism, and to
maintain that ‘populism’ and ‘punitiveness’ remain ‘under-theorized’, as he
himself recognizes this does not mean that ‘punitiveness’ is not present, but
rather that its influence and role is ‘overplayed’. King and Maruna’s (2009)
research found a range of views from highly punitive to highly liberal to be
held across the UK public. Given this, it makes sense to return to the study
of populist rhetoric on criminal justice, recognize its existence, but to study
it in the first instance as a rhetoricexpressing an ideology, without yet making
any further claims as to its wider influence. Moreover, if circumscribed in
this way, it raises the question as to the principles that are or could inform
an alternative politics of penal moderation.
In this article, I will show how a certain ideology informs penal populism
and other politically reactionary policies of ‘law and order’ on the one hand,
and how other principles could guide more liberal or radical approaches.
More specifically, the article identifies and discusses examples of populist
calls against punishment and for leniency—a phenomenon here termed
‘populist leniency’. While a penal moderate might find such populist opposi-
tion to punishment superficially appealing, it is argued that populist leniency
is in fact closely related to populist punitiveness, and as such, a ‘false friend’.
Drawing from Packer’s (1969) classic models of the criminal process, it is
argued that both populist leniency and penal populism express ‘Crime
Control’ values, the view that the proper role of the criminal process (and
criminal justice) is to protect ‘law-abiding citizens’ from dangerous others.
Since ‘Crime Control’ does not advocate any net reduction in penal power
(and if anything, quite the opposite), the article asks whether that Packer’s
other model, ‘Due Process’, presents a more attractive potential resource for
penal moderates, since this model offers a sceptical view of criminal justice,
protecting individuals from unconstrained official power.
The politics of punitiveness has been the more vocal in the UK in recent
years. However, it remains conceivable (though by no means certain) that a
more self-conscious and self-confident politics of penal moderation could
make inroads into British political space (Loader, this issue) as a result.
The following analysis concludes with some suggestions as to how such
an ideology might develop and some of the contradictions and challenges it
is likely to face.
Populist politics
As Pratt (2007) has noted, an understanding of further aspects of the
‘ideology’ behind penal populism, is affordedby the study of politicalpopulism
Theoretical Criminology 14(3)
332
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