Populist political ideation and communication of gubernatorial candidates in Indonesia’s 2018 gubernatorial elections: Anti-establishment views, secular nationalism and Islamism as ideational-populist elements
| Published date | 01 March 2022 |
| Author | Nyarwi Ahmad |
| Date | 01 March 2022 |
| DOI | 10.1177/2057891120931932 |
| Subject Matter | Research articles |
Research article
Populist political ideation and
communication of gubernatorial
candidates in Indonesia’s 2018
gubernatorial elections:
Anti-establishment views, secular
nationalism and Islamism
as ideational-populist elements
Nyarwi Ahmad
University of Gadjah Mada, Indonesia
Abstract
Populism has been evolving across the globe. Knowledge of the ways and degree to which political
actors in Asian democracy exploited anti-establishment views, secular nationalism and Islamism as
ideational elements when they established populist political communication strategies for local
elections has, however, been under-developed. Focusing on such issues, this work selects
gubernatorial candidates who ran in Indonesia’s 2018 gubernatorial elections as cases, using
extracts from materials they posted on their Facebook pages. The findings are as follows.
Candidates did not merely advocate anti-establishment views, but also adopted secular nationalism
and Islamism as ideational-populist elements for developing populist political communication
strategies. Those who exploited anti-economic elites favoured establishing secular nationalist and
Islamic-based populist political communication strategies inclusively. Those who propagated
anti-economic, anti-political and anti-bureaucratic elites instead greatly preferred advancing an
Islamic populist political communication strategy. However, through employing such efforts, only
few succeeded in these elections.
Keywords
anti-establishment, Islamism, populist political communication, populist political ideation, secular
nationalism
Corresponding author:
Nyarwi Ahmad, Department of Communication Science, Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Gadjah Mada,
Jalan Sosio Justicia No. 1, Bulaksumur, Yogyakarta, 55281, Indonesia.
Email: nyarwiahmad@ugm.ac.id
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics
ªThe Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/2057891120931932
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2022, Vol. 7(1) 73–94
Introduction
Along with people-centrism, sovereignty and the exclusion of others, anti-establishment
strategies have been widely seen as primary components that constitute populism (Albertazzi and
McDonnell, 2008: 3; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007: 323–324; Laclau, 2005: 150; Panizza, 2005: 4).
However, while such components have been recognized as empty signifiers (De Vreese et al.,
2018: 4; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007: 323–324; Laclau, 2005: 13), controversial debates regarding
the structural elements that underlie anti-establishment approaches have been unresolved (Barr,
2009; Rooduijin, 2019; Schedler, 1996). Whilst such issues remained, we lacked knowledge
regarding the ways and degrees to which political actors in Asian democratic countries, which
have been populated by substantial numbers of secular and conservative Muslims, such as Indo-
nesia, signified and exploited such components while establishing populist political communica-
tion strategies in facing the elections.
Within the last couple of decades, populism has been investigated robustly in Asian democ-
racies, such as Pakistan (Mulla, 2017), Thailand (Brown and Hewison, 2005), the Philippines
(Curato, 2016, 2017; Hedman, 2001; Thompson, 2010) and also Indonesia (Hadiz, 2016, 2017;
Mietzner, 2015). Focusing on Indonesian politics, some authors have examined transformations of
secular nationalist and Islamic populisms in the post-Suharto regimes, and structural conditions
that propelled such transformations (Aspinall, 2015; Hadiz, 2016, 2017; Hadiz and Robison, 2017;
Mietzner, 2015; Ziv, 2001). However, whilst most of them commonly adopted an actor-centred
perspective (Aspinall, 2015; Mietzner, 2015; Ziv, 2001), none explored the ways that those who
ran in Indonesia’s 2018 gubernatorial elections adopted anti-establishment views, secular nation-
alism and Islamism as ideational populist elements in facing these elections, and the degrees to
which they did this when they established populist political communication strategies to win in
such elections.
So far, most of those who have studied populism in Asian democracy in general, and Indone-
sia’s democracy in particular, have favoured adopting actor-centred, economic and structural
perspectives and focusing on transformations of populist actors and organizations in the national
political system (Aspinall, 2015; Brown and Hewison, 2005; Curato, 2016, 2017; Hadiz, 2016,
2017; Hadiz and Robison, 2017; Hedman, 2001; Mietzner, 2015; Mulla, 2017; Thompson, 2010;
Ziv, 2001). None of them, however, explored the populist political communication models
advanced by political actors and organizations in the local politics, although a subsequent author
examined transformations of populist actors that emerged in Indonesian local politics (Hamid,
2014, 2019). Nonetheless, we lacked knowledge regarding the ways and degrees to which those
who ran in Indonesia’s 2018 gubernatorial ele ctions strategically exploited anti-esta blishment
views, secular nationalism and Islamism as ideational populist elements in political communica-
tion practices they performed when facing these elections.
This work argues that these elections would be a good case to evaluate such issues. The reasons
are as follows. Firstly, as imposed by the local election regulation (Law No. 10/2016), guberna-
torial candidates who run in such elections should be voted for directly by the Indonesian electo-
rate. Those who obtain the highest number of votes in the provincial area wherein such elections
are organized would be granted rule in the provincial government. To achieve such numbers, each
candidate needs a workable political communication strategy.
Secondly, such elections were conducted a year before the 2019 parliamentary and presidential
elections were held. Such elections were organized in 17 Indonesian provinces and involved nearly
79%of the total of eligible Indonesian voters. The results of such elections, therefore, were seen as
74 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 7(1)
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