Post-conviction Disclosure and the Duty of the State: R (on the application of Nunn) v Chief Constable of Suffolk Police (Justice and Others Intervening) [2014] UKSC 37
| DOI | 10.1350/1740-5580-78.5.383 |
| Published date | 01 October 2014 |
| Date | 01 October 2014 |
| Subject Matter | Supreme Court |
383
Post-conviction Disclosure and
the Duty of the State
R (on the application of Nunn) v Chief Constable of Suffolk Police
(Justice and Others Intervening) [2014] UKSC 37
Keywords Disclosure; Post-conviction; Finality; Criminal Cases Review
Commission
In 2006 the claimant, Kevin Nunn, was convicted following trial of the
murder of his former partner, Dawn Walker. His defence at trial was that
the murder must have been committed by someone else and the claimant
accused two other men, one of whom had also been romantically involved
with the victim. An element of the claimant’s defence focused on the fact
that four sperm cells were discovered on the victim’s body. The claimant
adduced medical evidence that he had had a vasectomy and that it was
unlikely that he could have produced the sperm cells which must therefore
have been deposited by a ‘killer other than him’ (at [5]). The small number
of sperm cells discovered meant that a DNA profile could not be obtained;
the cells were retained for future testing in case advances in technology
could yield a profile. This element of the claimant’s defence and his
accusations against the other men whom he asserted were responsible for
the murder were tested over the course of a six-week trial and ultimately
rejected by the jury. The claimant was subsequently refused leave to
appeal against his conviction.
In 2011 the claimant sought judicial review of a decision by the Chief
Constable of Suffolk Constabulary to deny his solicitors access to inter alia
‘the working papers of the forensic scientists who advised the Crown and/
or gave evidence and … requests for re-testing, or first testing, of various
exhibits recovered in the course of the investigation’ (at [11]). The
Divisional Court (Nunn v Chief Constable of Suffolk [2012] EWHC 1186
(Admin)) dismissed the claim for judicial review, but certified as raising a
point of law of general public importance the following question for
consideration by the Supreme Court:
Whether the disclosure obligations of the Crown following conviction extend
beyond a duty to disclose something which materially may cast doubt on the
safety of a conviction, so that the [Chief Constable] was obliged to disclose
material sought by the claimant in these proceedings?
Held, dismissing tHe appeal and upHolding tHe decision of tHe
divisional court, ‘the principled origin of the duty of disclosure is fairness’
(at [22]). Although this principle ‘informs the duty of disclosure at all
stages of the criminal process’ (at [22]) fairness does not require that the
same disclosure requirements are applied to every stage. Post-conviction
there is a public interest in identifying whether a conviction may be
unsafe, but there is also a ‘powerful public interest in finality of proceedings’
(at [32]). Whilst the common law recognises a duty on the prosecution to
disclose, post-conviction, any material which may cast doubt on the safety
of a conviction or to carry out an inquiry if there exists a real prospect that
Post-conviction Disclosure and the Duty of the State
To continue reading
Request your trial