Poverty and Violent Conflict: A Micro-Level Perspective on the Causes and Duration of Warfare
| Author | Patricia Justino |
| Date | 01 May 2009 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343309102655 |
| Published date | 01 May 2009 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
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vol. 46, no. 3, 2009, pp. 315–333
Sage Publications (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi,
Singapore and Washington DC) http://jpr.sagepub.com
DOI 10.1177/0022343309102655
Poverty and Violent Conflict: A Micro-Level
Perspective on the Causes and Duration of
Warfare*
PATRICIA JUSTINO
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; and
Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex
This article discusses how endogenous mechanisms linking processes of violent conflict and the
economic well-being of individuals and households in combat areas provide valuable micro foundations
to the ongoing debate on the causes and duration of armed conflict. Notably, the endogenous relation-
ship between conflict processes and household economic status leads to the emergence of symbiotic
associations between armed groups and households living in areas they control that affect substantially
the probability of a conflict starting and its effectiveness thereafter. Households in conflict areas draw on
local armed groups to protect their economic status when anticipating violence and during the conflict,
while armed groups make use of different levels of (either reluctant or voluntary) participation, support
and cooperation from local populations to advance their strategic objectives at the onset and throughout
the conflict. The level of household participation at the start and during the conflict is a function of
two interdependent variables, namely household vulnerability to poverty and household vulnerability
to violence. The poorer the household is at the start of the conflict, the higher is the probability of the
household participating and supporting an armed group. The higher the risk of violence, the higher is
the probability of the household participating and supporting armed groups. The interaction between
these two variables varies with the conflict itself and is defined by the direct and indirect effects of con-
flict-induced violence on the economic behaviour and decisions of households in combat areas.
Introduction and Scope of the
Article
Empirical analyses of civil war point to low
per capita income as one of the most robust
explanations for the outbreak and duration
of violent internal conflict (Collier et al.,
2003; Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom, 2004;
Collier & Hoeffler, 1998, 2004; Do & Iyer,
2007; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Elbadawi &
Sambanis, 2000, 2002; Fearon, 2004;
Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre & Sambanis,
2006; Murshed & Gates, 2005; Stewart
& Fitzgerald, 2001; World Bank, 2005).
* I would like to thank Armando Barrientos, Tony
Addison, two anonymous referees and JPR Associate Edi-
tor Patrick Regan for extensive comments on previous
drafts of the article. I am also grateful to participants of the
expert group meeting on Post-Conflict Recovery and Eco-
nomic Insecurity at the UNDP in New York, 30 Novem-
ber 2007, Maeve Powlick in particular, and to participants
of the 2008 MICROCON annual meeting in Bulgaria
and the 2008 MICROCON summer school in Olympia,
Greece for comments and suggestions. Bruce Guenther has
provided excellent research assistance. A number of ideas
addressed in this article draw on discussions with Tilman
Brück and Philip Verwimp before and since the founda-
tion of the Households in Conflict Network. The article
has received funding from the European Commission as
part of the MICROCON Integrated Project (http://www.
microconflict.eu). The views expressed in this article are
those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect
those of the European Commission and its members.
Correspondence: p.justino@ids.ac.uk.
journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 46 / number 3 / may 2009
316
Although this evidence rests on implicit
assumptions on what makes low national or
sub-national incomes a condition for violent
conflict – association with weak state insti-
tutions, large group-based grievances and
low economic opportunity costs of fighting
– existing research offers only limited sys-
tematic accounts of the micro-level chan-
nels through which low incomes among a
large fraction of individuals in society affect
the viability of violent conflicts. This article
addresses this gap in the literature by explor-
ing analytically and theoretically internal
characteristics of conflict processes rooted in
endogenous interactions between violence
and the economic behaviour of ordinary
people living in areas of armed conflict that
may provide valuable though overlooked
micro foundations to recent debates on the
causes and duration of civil wars.
The importance of population support
for the success of armed rebellions is well
recognized in the literature on civil wars
(see review in Weinstein, 2007). What is
less well understood is how micro-level
economic factors and decisions influence
the start of violent conflicts, and how those
processes change and evolve throughout
the conflict itself as the economic effects of
violence shape the behaviour of individu-
als and households in combat areas and the
behaviour of surrounding institutions. At a
fundamental level, the outbreak and viabil-
ity of violent armed conflicts is closely linked
to the conduct and motivations, not only of
rebel groups, elites and the state army, but
also of ordinary members of society living in
(potential) combat areas. These people must
adapt to stressful circumstances to survive.
They take on available opportunities (which
may or may not include fighting, looting and
denunciation of former friends and neigh-
bours), adopt forms of livelihoods that may
lead to severe poverty traps but avoid fam-
ine (or not), join in informal exchange and
employment markets (which may or may
not include illegal activities), form social and
political alliances in new areas of residence
that may allow economic survival or may lead
to a life of crime and violence (or both), and
take on different social and political identi-
ties in response to their anticipated exposure
to violence before the conflict, their actual
exposure to violence during the conflict, the
efficacy of mobilization by different factions
before and during the conflict and changes
in territorial and population control by state
armies and rebel groups (see Kalyvas, 2007;
Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007; Petersen, 2001;
Wood, 2003).
Part of this process of adaptation to vio-
lence is the establishment of relationships
between armed groups and individuals and
households living in areas they control or
wish to control. Rarely will a civil war start or
progress without opposing factions securing
significant population support (see Azam,
2006; Weinstein, 2007). In addition, ordi-
nary citizens draw on armed groups to pro-
tect their economic status, when anticipating
outbreaks of violence and during conflict,
when the costs of non-participation may sig-
nify poverty and destitution (see Kalyvas &
Kocher, 2007). Armed groups, in turn, make
use of different levels of support from local
populations to advance their strategic objec-
tives. This symbiotic association between
armed groups and populations in combat
areas will affect substantially the probabil-
ity of a conflict starting and its effectiveness
thereafter.
The main objective of this article is to
provide a theoretical and analytical frame-
work to understand processes leading to
this association and how those processes
change throughout the conflict itself, as a
response to the effects of violence on the
economic status of people living in conflict
areas. The article concentrates on processes
of violence that result from ‘armed com-
bat within the boundaries of a recognized
sovereign entity between parties subject to
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