Power Games: Elites, Movements, and Strategic Cooperation
| Author | Markus Holdo |
| Published date | 01 May 2020 |
| Date | 01 May 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1478929919864778 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929919864778
Political Studies Review
2020, Vol. 18(2) 189 –203
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/1478929919864778
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Power Games: Elites,
Movements, and Strategic
Cooperation
Markus Holdo
Abstract
Cooperation between movements and political elites are frequently associated with the risk of
cooptation. Because it undercuts contentious actors, cooptation may seem rational for elites
that seek to protect their interests. However, recent scholarship questions whether this view is
empirically valid. Adding to these debates, this article demonstrates that even if we accept, for
the sake of argument, that elites always act to maintain power, cooptation may often not be the
rational choice of strategy. This article presents a typology of elite responses that focuses on three
phases of elite–movement interaction: preparatory, term-setting, and confrontation phases. In
each phase, elites’ choice between cooptation and conditional cooperation depends on whether
legitimacy appears instrumental to achieve their goals. Cooperation, as opposed to cooptation,
generates legitimacy and can, therefore, be used strategically by movements.
Keywords
movements, cooptation, power
Accepted: 4 June 2019
By the conventional definition, we say that a movement has been coopted if elites have
gained its cooperation without giving it new advantages in return (see Gamson, 1975: 29;
Selznick, 1949: 34). Coopted movements lose credibility and can no longer challenge the
elites. From the elites’ perspective, cooptation thus provides a cost-efficient means of
domination.1 When successful, cooptation undermines the power of movement leaders,
because it makes them appear to accept cooperation without gaining anything in return.
The risk of losing credibility, and thereby the public support they need to have political
influence, makes cooptation an important concern for social movements. Leaders of envi-
ronmental organizations, labor unions, anti-racist protest movements, and feminist groups
are therefore reasonably watchful of attempts of members of the political establishment
to disarm them by convincing them to support policies that are less radical than their
Department of Government, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
Corresponding author:
Markus Holdo, Department of Government, Uppsala University, 751 20 Uppsala, Sweden.
Email: Markus.Holdo@statsvet.uu.se
864778PSW0010.1177/1478929919864778Political Studies ReviewHoldo
research-article2019
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