Power, proximity, and democracy
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343317727328 |
| Author | Jonathan N Markowitz,Christopher J Fariss |
| Published date | 01 January 2018 |
| Date | 01 January 2018 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Power, proximity, and democracy: Geopolitical
competition in the international system
Jonathan N Markowitz
School of International Relations, University of Southern California
Christopher J Fariss
Department of Political Science, University of Michigan
Abstract
Why do only some powerful states chooseto develop power projectioncapabilities? To answer this question, we test the
proposition that states choose to develop power projection capabilities when they face a competitive geopolitical envi-
ronment.This proposition is derivedfrom our theory, which is usedto construct a new measure of the levelof geopolitical
competition that every state in the system faces. This measure incorporates each state’s relative geographic position to
everyother state in the internationalsystem, therelative amount of economicpower of those otherstates, and the degreeto
which their interests are compatible. We then apply this unique country-year measure to test the proposition that
competitive environments are associated with the development of power projection capabilities, as measured by the
tonnage of naval ships maintained by each country in each year. We demonstrate that our measure helps explain the
degreeto which states chooseto invest in power projectioncapabilities.This providesan explanation for whythe world has
been economically multipolar,but militaryunipolar, for thepast quarter century,and why this mightchange in the future,
as rising powers with incompatible interests are increasing their investment in power projection capabilities.
Keywords
democratic institutions, international security, interstate conflict, liberal peace, military power
Introduction
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, European powers
continued in what had become a long tradition of building
and projecting military force to compete over access to and
control of territory, trade, and resources. However, over the
past eight decades, a remarkable decline in the number of
European states building and projecting military power has
occurred. This development contrasts with the recent trend in
Asia, where the diffusion of economic and military power has
resulted in a number of states rapidly modernizing their naval,
air, and expeditionary warfare capabilities (Horowitz, 2010).
Recently, China issued its first defense white paper, announ-
cing its intent to project power beyond its littoral waters as part
of a broader strategy of defending Chinese interests abroad.
1
What is puzzling about these contrasting trends is that
both regions contain states with large and growing econo-
mies capable of supporting the development and deploy-
ment of power projection capabilities. Why is it that most
European states have purposefully decreased their ability to
project power, while states in Asia are now increasing these
capabilities? The answer we offer is a simple one: the effect
of each state’s economic power on their decision to build
power projection capabilities is influenced by the level of
geopolitical competition they face. However, developing
an appropriate measurement strategy to assess this claim is
complex and represents the motivation for this article.
We focus on why states build power projection cap-
abilities to explain why states choose to invest in the
means to coercively bargain over foreign policy interests.
Corresponding author:
jonathnm@usc.edu
1
The white paper was produced by China’s Ministry of National
Defense.
Journal of Peace Research
2018, Vol. 55(1) 78–93
ªThe Author(s) 2017
Reprints and permission:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0022343317727328
journals.sagepub.com/home/jpr
Note that we define power projection as the deployment
of military force beyond a state’s borders or territorial
waters and projection capabilities as the force structure
required to deploy military force over distance.
Power projection has important implications for
understanding conflict. Research on war focuses on two
principal mechanisms – credible commitment and
information (Fearon, 1995: 379–414; Powell, 1999:
115–149). However, these mechanisms only come into
play once states have entered into coercive bargaining
interactions. If politics is a bargaining process and war
is politics by other means, then coercive bargaining is
politics with the threat of war. For states to credibly
threaten war, they must first choose to invest in the
capabilities to project power. This understudied precon-
dition for conflict – the acquisition and projection of
military power – has the potential to enhance our ability
to explain patterns of war and peace.
States cannot engage in gunboat diplomacy without
gunboats
To understand why coercive bargaining occurs, we need
to first understand why states acquire and project mili-
tary power. Why would some states choose to bargain
over their interests in the shadow of military power
(Powell, 1999), while others choose to bargain without
the threat of military coercion? States that operate within
competitive geopolitical environments are incentivized
to build power projection capabilities, whereas states
within cooperative geopolitical environments can safe-
guard their interests and bargain effectively without rely-
ing on power projection capabilities. Thus, states stop
experiencing bargaining failure that leads to war because
they stop employing military coercion when bargaining.
Today, states in North and South America and most of
Europe bargain with one another over a variety of con-
tentious issues; however, military coercion is rarely used
in these interactions. Since these bargains do not involve
military coercion, they cannot end in war.
We seek to build a theory that can explain this first
step in the causal chain of coercive bargaining and con-
flict: a state’s choice to build the capabilities necessary to
coercively bargain over its interests. We argue that eco-
nomically powerful states, when faced with a competitive
geopolitical environment, are more likely to build power
projection capabilities. We define a state’s geopolitical
environment as the set of countries with whom it can
interact. Geopolitical competition is defined as the
potential for coercive bargaining interactions between
each state and the other states in its geopolitical
environment. For each state, as the potential for coercive
bargaining interactions increases, so does the level of
geopolitical competition. Operationally, the level of geo-
political competition that each state faces is defined by a
function that combines three components: the geo-
graphic position of the state, relative to other states; the
relative economic power of each other state; and the
degree to which it has compatible interests with each
other state. The higher the level of geopolitical compe-
tition a state faces, the greater its incentive to invest in
power projection capabilities. States expect that if they
do not invest in these capabilities, they will be out-
gunned by other states when coercively bargaining.
We make three contributions in this article. First, we
develop a state-level theory of why states find their
strategic environment threatening and how they
respond to geopolitical competition. Second, we con-
struct a unique measure of the level of geopolitical
competition that each state faces in the international
system. Third, we apply the measure to explain why
only some powerful states invest in the capabilities to
project military force. Our approach represents an
improvement over existing explanations, such as struc-
tural realism and democratic peace theory, because it
can make predictions regarding whether individual
states like China, Russia, India, or Brazil will choose
to develop power projection capabilities.
Below, we discuss existing explanations and how our
theory addresses shortcomings with these competing the-
ories. We then develop the logical foundations of our
theory and our measure of geopolitical competition.
Next, we provide empirical evidence for our claim that
economically powerful states, when faced with a com-
petitive geopolitical environment, develop power projec-
tion capabilities. We conclude with a discussion on the
theoretical and policy implications of our findings.
Existing explanations and missing pieces
Two schools of thought represent our strongest theore-
tical competition. The first suggests that states stopped
projecting power because it became obsolete. Rosecrance
(1986) argues that states stopped projecting power
because it is no longer worthwhile for advanced states
to militarily seize the means (usually territory) to gener-
ate wealth. Other scholars suggest that war has become
obsolete as a means for advanced industrial states to deal
with their disputes (Mueller, 2009: 297–321). For
Mueller, public opinion has so turned against war that
its initiation is considered unthinkable by virtually all
economically developed states.
Markowitz & Fariss 79
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