Power Relations and International Migration: The Case of Italy and Libya
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2010.00849.x |
| Date | 01 June 2011 |
| Author | Emanuela Paoletti |
| Published date | 01 June 2011 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Power Relations and International Migration: The
Case of Italy and Libyapost_849269..289
Emanuela Paoletti
University of Oxford
Building upon the scholarly discussion concerning the growing blurring of domestic and foreign policy domains and
the changing spheres of competences of states both within and outside their borders, this article focuses on inter-state
cooperation in the field of migration and international relations.I attempt to answer two interrelated questions:how does
collaboration on migration affect the bargaining dynamics between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries?
And specifically,howdoes the contested process of externalisation of border control practices to third countries influence
power relationsbetween the two? Particular attention is paid to the agreements on migration between Italy and Libya,
mainly between the late 1990s and 2009,and I examine how the putative processof exter nalisation of migration policies
from Italy to Libya impacts upon their negotiations.I argue that this case of externalisation does not merely consist of
a univocal delegation of sovereignty. ThereforeI conclude that the theoretical debate is still open, both with regard to
the applicability of the externalisation concept to this particular case, and to its broader representativeness.
Until the second half of the 1970s, migration1policy was treated as a secondary aspect of
the political debate in most European countries, and management of migration was dealt
with mainly through domestic administrative measures.Since the 1980s, however, migration
has become a salient issue on the international agenda. Accordingly,notions of states’ power
and borders in relation to migration have attracted increasing attention from politicians,
media, the public and academics (Geddes, 2000). In particular, a critical question for
academics and policy makers regards the authority and capacity of states to control the entry
and exit of people over their territory. This reality supplies the three central themes of this
article, that is,borders, international migration and inter-state relations. In this context, an
apparent paradox is observable.
The process of boundary construction, in the form of restrictive policy measures and
national(ist) narratives, takes place alongside,and is fuelled by, the blurring of the analytical
distinctions between ‘the inside’ and ‘the outside’. Rising levels of cross-border mobility
seem to coexist with trends that consolidate the state’s authority over its territory. The
more states and supranational bodies do to restrict and manage migration, the less successful
they seem to be (Castles, 2004, p. 205). Likewise, according to the ‘gap hypothesis’,
‘significant and persistent gaps exist between official migration policies and actual policy
outcomes’ (Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 4). Indeed, few migrant-receiving countr ies ‘have
immigration control policies that are perfectly implemented or do not result in unintended
consequences’ (Cornelius et al., 1994, p.4). Simply put,states are either unwilling or unable
to prevent illegal entry (Gibney,2004). This paradox has important implications for patterns
of collaboration between states. State decisions on, and capacities to control, borders
influence not only the magnitude and directionality of international migration, but also
interactions between them (Weiner, 1995).
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2010.00849.x
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2011 VOL 59, 269–289
© 2010The Author.Jour nal compilation © 2010 Political StudiesAssociation
The recognition of ‘the irreducible political element’ characterising international migration
is not new in the academic literature (Zolberg, 1989; Teitelbaum,1984). In 1989, Aristide
Zolberg suggested that it is precisely the control that states exercise over borders that defines
international migration as a distinctive social and political process (Zolberg, 1989, p. 405).
This idea, that migration policies and corresponding people movements are the cause as
well as the result of power asymmetries among countries, is the starting point of this article.
Building upon the discussion on the growing intertwining of domestic and foreign policy
domains, and on the evolving responsibilities of states both within and outside their borders,
this article focuses on inter-state cooperation2in the field of migration through the lens of
international relations (IR). As such, I attempt to answer two interrelated questions. First,
how does collaboration on migration affect the bargaining dynamics between migrant-
sending and migrant-receiving countries? Second, how does the contested process of
externalisation of border control practices to third countries3(hereafter, externalisation)4
influence power relations between the two?
Specific attention is given to the agreements on migration between Italy and Libya,mainly
from the late 1990s until 2009, and I examine how the putative externalisation from Italy
to Libya impacts upon their negotiations. Ultimately, in arguing that Italy, as receiving
country,finds itself vulnerable, I probe beneath much of the conventional wisdom about the
weak position of countries on the Southern shore of the Mediterranean. I will suggest that
existing conceptions of externalisation are simplistic and that Italy has made significant
compromises. Before entering into the detail of the argument, let me illustrate why it is
worthwhile investigate this specific case study, and clarify its limitations.
First, no in-depth academic work on the Italian–Libyan agreements has been conducted
before on the basis of direct field research. Only two non-academic pieces of work on
migration, by Human Rights Watch (2006) and the European Commission (2005), are
supported by direct fieldwork in Libya. Even these, however, lack primary research covering
the Italian perspective. Conversely,the few academic studies on Libyan–Italian relations on
migration are not based on primary resources collected in Libya (Andrijasevic, 2006). This
gap is attributable to both the recent nature of the negotiations and the difficulty in
conducting research in Libya.Hence this study based on four months of direct research in
Libya between 2007 and 2008 offers a unique contribution to the academic debate.
Second, from a comparative perspective, the interaction between Italy and Libya is instruc-
tive because,in the European context, it is a pioneering and relatively advanced example of
inter-state cooperation on migration. Other European countries,such as Spain and Greece,
are replicating with third countries, albeit with marked differences, the cooperation that
Italy has undertaken with Libya (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006). Thus a rigorous and thorough
investigation of the Italian–Libyan collaboration may enrich the body of knowledge about
the putative ‘externalisation’ of migration policies and power relations. Moreover, beyond
the issue of migration, a scrupulous investigation of Libya is of broader relevance. After
protracted isolation, the country remains under-researched. Yet at the same time, it is
expected to emerge as a strategic player in the international milieu in years to come.In view
of the increasing importance of migration in the international arena and the renewed
270 EMANUELA PAOLETTI
© 2010The Author.Jour nal compilation © 2010 Political StudiesAssociation
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2011, 59(2)
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