Power Shifts, Economic Change and the Decline of the West?
| DOI | 10.1177/0047117812461336 |
| Author | Michael Cox |
| Date | 01 December 2012 |
| Published date | 01 December 2012 |
| Subject Matter | Kenneth N Waltz Lecture |
International Relations
26(4) 369 –388
© The Author(s) 2012
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DOI: 10.1177/0047117812461336
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Power Shifts, Economic
Change and the Decline
of the West?
Michael Cox
London School of Economics
Abstract
It has become the new truth of the early twenty-first century that the Western world we have known
is fast losing its pre-eminence to be replaced by a new international system shaped either by the
so-called BRICs comprising Brazil, Russia, India and China, the ‘rest’, or more popularly by that very
broadly defined geographical entity known as Asia. This at least is how many economists, historians
and students of world politics are now viewing the future of the larger international system. This essay
does not dispute some self-evident economic facts. Nor does it assume that the world will look the
same in 50 years time as it does now. It does, however, question the idea that there is an irresistible
‘power shift’ in the making and that the West and the United States are in steep decline. Specifically,
it makes a number of critical arguments concerning the new narrative. First, it suggests that this story,
by reasonably focusing on what is obviously changing in the world, unfortunately ignores what is not;
as a result, it underestimates what might loosely be termed the continued structural advantages still
enjoyed by the United States and its major Western allies. Second, while it is true that many new
states are assuming a bigger role in the world economy, their rise needs to be looked at more carefully
than it has been so far; indeed, when such an examination is undertaken, it becomes increasingly clear
that the rise of others – including China – is still hemmed in by several obstacles, internal as well as
external. Third, though the Asian region, and China as part of it, is assuming an ever more important
role in the wider world economy, this development should not be seen as marking the beginning of
a new Asian Century. This now popular idea is not only conceptually problematic, it inevitably leads
to an underestimation of other key areas in the world including incidentally the Transatlantic region.
Finally I suggest that if the dubious idea of a power shift is taken to be true, this could very easily lead to
greater international insecurity and conflict. Understanding the modern world better than many seem
to be doing right now is therefore not only intellectually important; it is strategically necessary too.
Keywords
BRICs, power shift, rise of China, the Transatlantic relationship, US decline
Corresponding author:
Michael Cox, IDEAS, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London, WC1 2AE, UK.
Email: m.e.cox@lse.ac.uk
461336IRE26410.1177/0047117812461336International RelationsCox
2012
Kenneth N Waltz Lecture
370 International Relations 26(4)
Introduction
Memory can often play tricks on even the most historically minded individuals, particu-
larly those who have had to live through the last 10 turbulent years. Indeed, it is almost
impossible now to recall how self-confident so many in the West were during the decade
immediately following that most unpredicted of world-shattering events known generi-
cally as the ‘end of the Cold War’. To be fair, some observers did sense that there was
something distinctly unreal, possibly temporary, about the new post-Cold War order.1 A
few even forecast that we would all soon be missing the Cold War.2 But that is not how
most commentators viewed things at the time. On the contrary, having witnessed the
speedy collapse of the Soviet project followed by a decade of global market expansion
(otherwise known as globalization), most pundits came to believe that a successful mar-
riage between free markets democratic enlargement and US power would guarantee
order well into the next millennium.3 Certainly, the West at the time looked as if it was
definitely in the ascendancy, restructuring once planned economies, opening up previ-
ously closed systems, incorporating former enemies and smashing down political and
economic doors that had at one time been closed. Admittedly, it sometimes failed to act,
as say in Rwanda; and very often it ignored the fact that some actors (who later made
their name on 9/11) were clearly not becoming socialized into that fabled entity known
as the ‘international community’. But as one century gave way to another, it appeared as
if the Western world from the Pacific coast of the United States to the middle of a newly
united Europe could look forward to decades of self-confident prosperity and peace.
Nowhere was this mood of optimism more prevalent than in the land of the last
remaining superpower. Indeed, the United States appeared to be in an especially envi-
able position. Some continued to wonder whether the ‘unipolar moment’ was really an
illusion.4 One or two analysts even speculated about the possible limits of US power.5
And the occasional maverick continued to repeat the old Paul Kennedy line that the
United States was in decline.6 However few but the most pessimistic envisaged that any
other power would likely rise to balance its vast power in the future. Indeed, after hav-
ing seen off the USSR, and then having experienced an 8-year economic boom of its
own, America and Americans could reasonably look forward to another very American
century.7 In fact, so buoyant was the mood by the end of the 1990s that several writers
began to talk of the United States as the new Rome on the Potomac, even a modern
‘empire’ possessing global reach, an infinite surplus of soft power and a vast military
machine to match. For some of course the United States had become the greatest power
in history with one very obvious distinguishing feature: unlike its great power predeces-
sors from the Romans to the British, this one would never decline.8
It is often said that before every great fall there is a period of grace. So it was perhaps
with the last hubristic decade of the twentieth century. But the fall when it came was
profound nonetheless – to such an extent that one American magazine was later forced
to concede that the years between 2000 and 2010 had been nothing less than ‘the decade
from hell’.9 It all began with 9/11 and the strategically inept response to this by the Bush
administration.10 It continued with the gradual erosion of economic certainty that finally
culminated with the great geopolitical setback of the Western financial crisis.11 And it
went from bad to worse in some eyes when it became increasingly clear that the West
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