Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000; Sex Offenders Act 1997: Definition of ‘Sexual Offence’
| Author | Alisdair Gillespie |
| Published date | 01 August 2005 |
| Date | 01 August 2005 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1350/jcla.2005.69.4.310 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
continuing duty to keep under review any additional material which
comes to light and which may assist the defence (s. 9, (5)). Despite the
fact that this duty extends for the duration of the prosecution (1996 Act,
s. 9(1)(b)), it is apparent that, in this case, the police failed to appreciate
the relevance of certain material as the defence case emerged.
More seriously, however, it appears that not only was potentially
relevant information withheld from the defence, it was also not put
before the court, with the Court of Appeal concluding that ‘the judge
was not given a complete factual picture by the police in this case’ (at
[10]). This is of far greater concern as it undermines the judicial con-
sideration of the sensitive material which is the central safeguard of PII.
If the judge is not fully apprised of the existence and significance of such
sensitive material, then it is impossible to ensure the ultimate fairness of
the proceedings. Yet, in this case, even the investigating officer was not
fully aware of the totality of the available evidence and only became so
as a result of the further inquiries ordered by the Court of Appeal. This
demonstrates the dangers of ex parte PII applications where the in-
vestigator is either unaware of intelligence material which might be of
relevance to the defence or, alternatively, seeks to conceal aspects of that
material in order to protect confidential sources. With the defence
excluded from the hearing it is crucial that the court is fully informed of
the available intelligence material and its possible relevance to the
defence case (see R vDownes [2005] EWCA Crim 457). The fact that this
case resulted in a conviction under such circumstances illustrates the
need for a far more rigorous approach by the police towards the collec-
tion and interpretation of such sensitive material.
Chris Taylor
Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000; Sex
Offenders Act 1997: Definition of ‘Sexual Offence’
R vParnell [2004] EWCA Crim 2523, [2005] 1 WLR 853
The appellant was a musician in an opera group that travelled around
the world. The group were due to play in Sri Lanka and shortly before
his departure he sent an e-mail to an internet group requesting a
teenage boy to have sex with. He received a reply but, unbeknown to
him, the reply was actually from law enforcement agencies in Sri Lanka.
When he arrived in Sri Lanka he was arrested by the police but was not
charged because he had not committed an offence under Sri Lankan law.
He was, however, deported and upon his arrival in the UK he was
arrested and charged with two offences. The first was attempting to
incite a male under 16 to commit an act of buggery and the second was
attempting to incite a male under 16 to an act of gross indecency. For
both of these offences the prosecution relied on the extra-territorial
provisions of the Sexual Offences (Conspiracy and Incitement) Act
1996.
The Journal of Criminal Law
310
To continue reading
Request your trial