Pre-electoral coalitions and cabinet stability in presidential systems
| Author | Adrián Albala,André Borges,Lucas Couto |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/13691481211056852 |
| Published date | 01 February 2023 |
| Date | 01 February 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Original Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481211056852
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
2023, Vol. 25(1) 64 –82
© The Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/13691481211056852
journals.sagepub.com/home/bpi
Pre-electoral coalitions and
cabinet stability in presidential
systems
Adrián Albala , André Borges
and Lucas Couto
Abstract
Previous research on coalition stability in presidential systems has relied to a substantial extent
on the parliamentary literature. By focusing on the post-electoral bargaining environment, these
approaches have neglected the key role played by pre-electoral agreements formed around the
winning presidential candidate in the making and breaking of coalitions under presidentialism. We
claim that cabinets derived from pre-electoral coalition should foster trust and reduce uncertainty
regarding partners’ future behaviour. However, the positive effect of pre-electoral coalitions over
cabinet duration is conditional on cabinet status, that is, the control of a legislative majority
or near majority. Therefore, we argue that pre-electoral coalition cabinets holding a majority
or near majority of seats will be more durable than purely post-electoral majority coalitions,
whereas minority pre-electoral coalition cabinets congruent should endure less than minority
post-electoral coalition cabinets. We test these hypotheses using a dataset of pre- and post-
electoral coalitions in 11 Latin American countries.
Keywords
cabinet stability, coalition cabinets, Latin America, political timing, pre electoral coalitions,
presidential regimes
Extant comparative research has typically assumed that government coalitions in presi-
dential systems are mainly produced through a post-electoral agreement whose objective
is to confer a majority to a president that could not be obtained in the election. Accordingly,
office-seeking particularistic parties should have a few incentives to form pre-electoral
coalitions (hereafter PEC) since presidential candidates can only distribute cabinet posts
if they win (Kellam, 2015a). However, this understanding is hard to reconcile with the
fact that government coalitions frequently emerge from pre-electoral agreements between
the winning presidential candidate and one or more parties (Albala, 2020; Carroll and
Instituto de Ciência Política, Universidade de Brasília, Brasilia, Brazil
Corresponding author:
Adrián Albala, Instituto de Ciência Política, Universidade de Brasília, IPOL, Campus Universitário Darcy
Ribeiro, Asa Norte, CEP 70904-970,Brasília-DF,Brazil.
Email: aalbala@unb.br
1056852BPI0010.1177/13691481211056852The British Journal of Politics and International RelationsAlbala etal.
research-article2021
Original Article
Albala etal. 65
Cox, 2007). In this sense, the coalition building process is rather proactive and constitutes
the materialisation of a political strategy.
Although PECs are fairly common in multiparty presidential countries, there is a pau-
city of research on the causes and implications of these electoral alliances. In particular,
we still know very little about the effects of pre-electoral bargainings on cabinet stability.
Research on coalition survival in presidential systems has relied, mostly, on analytical
models adapted from the parliamentary literature. These studies have typically focused on
explanatory factors pertaining to the post-electoral bargaining environment, such as pres-
idential legislative powers, levels of legislative polarisation and fragmentation and exog-
enous economic shocks (Kellam, 2015a; Martínez-Gallardo, 2012). Hence, while some
studies from parliamentary regimes dealing with the impact of timing over coalition sta-
bility have arisen recently (Chiru, 2015; Debus, 2009), scholars working on coalition
under presidentialism have mostly neglected the timing question, with a few exceptions
(Albala, 2020; Borges et al., 2020; Carroll, 2007; Freudenreich, 2016). We argue here that
this is a serious theoretical and empirical gap, to the extent that pre-electoral bargaining
not only shapes government formation in multiparty settings, but also significantly deter-
mines the odds of cabinet survival.
As a matter of fact, the popular election of the national executive is an ultra-majority
race that creates very strong incentives to form electoral alliances. In multiparty systems
with a large number of medium-sized parties, the absence of coordination between party
elites might produce an excessive number of presidential candidates. Thus, parties with
the most competitive candidates have incentives to seek the support of other parties to
increase their chances of victory. Compensations to electoral rally may involve support in
simultaneous elections for Congress and subnational offices, changes in the party’s pro-
gramme to incorporate allies’ proposals, and – more generally – portfolio distributions in
case of victory (Borges and Turgeon, 2019; Carroll, 2007; Freudenreich, 2016; Kellam,
2015b).
Pre-electoral bargaining implies that the electoral success of allied parties (and the
ensuing vote, office and policy benefits) will be tied to that of the winning presidential
candidate to some extent. Moreover, because PECs entail cooperation among parties dur-
ing the campaign, there is a higher likelihood that each coalition member will develop a
mutual understanding of the needs and priorities of their partners once in government
(Chiru, 2015). To the extent that PEC parties benefit from electoral and policy conces-
sions, and cooperate with the presidential candidate, they tend to be more loyal and reli-
able allies than any other potential coalition partner in the post-election period.
Consequently, we argue that presidential coalition cabinets that derived from an elec-
toral alliance will be more consistent, cohesive and thus, more stable than those predomi-
nantly formed after the election (Chiru, 2015; Debus, 2009). However, these effects are
shaped by post-election coalition status. When PEC parties form a minimum winning
coalition (MWC) or when they control a share of legislative seats close to a majority, the
incentives for keeping the original pre-electoral agreement will be high. In these settings,
presidents can approve bills by relying on the support of the PEC and/or negotiating addi-
tional legislative support on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, (H1), the greater the congru-
ence between the cabinet and a PEC, the lower the odds of termination for near majority
and MWC cabinets.
However, when PEC parties form oversized coalitions, the incentives to reward every
PEC member with cabinet positions and keep the coalition together will be much lower,
because one or a few partners would be unnecessary for passing bills. Thus, (H2), we do
To continue reading
Request your trial