Prepared Statements, Legal Advice and the Right to Silence: R v Knight
| DOI | 10.1350/ijep.8.1.62.36510 |
| Published date | 01 January 2004 |
| Date | 01 January 2004 |
| Author | Andrew L.-T. Choo |
| Subject Matter | Case Note |
6 2 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE & PROOF
CASE NOTE
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE & PROOF (2004) 8 E&P 62–67
I
Prepared statements, legal advice and
the right to silence:
R
v
Knight
By Andrew L.-T. Choo
Professor of Law, Brunel University; Barrister, Matrix Chambers
n England and Wales, s. 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act
1994 permits inferences to be drawn from an accused’s failure to
mention in interview a fact later relied on at trial which in the
circumstances existing at the time the accused could reasonably have been
expected to mention. The decision of the Court of Appeal in July 2003 in R v
Knight1 addresses two important issues raised by this provision that had not
previously been satisfactorily resolved. As will be seen, the court’s treatment of
one of these issues is commendable, and led to the defendant’s conviction being
quashed. Unfortunately, however, the court succeeded only in muddying the
waters further in relation to the other issue.
The facts
When the police sought to interview Knight, a prepared statement was read out
to them by his solicitor at the beginning of the interview process. This statement,
which was eventually admitted in evidence and read by the judge to the jury as
part of the summing-up, provided a narrative account that was wholly in line
with Knight’s later testimony before the jury. He declined to answer any of the
questions that the police asked him, claiming that he did so on his solicitor’s
advice. The two salient issues for consideration were identified by the Court of
Appeal as being the following:
1 [2003] EWCA Crim 1977. For another discussion of the case see A. Keogh, ‘The Right to Silence—
Revisited Again’ (2003) 153 NLJ 1352.
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