Presidents and Cabinet Payoffs in Coalition Governments
| Author | Cristina Bucur |
| DOI | 10.1177/1478929919856875 |
| Published date | 01 February 2020 |
| Date | 01 February 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Special Issue Articles |
research-article2019
Special Issue Article
Political Studies Review
2020, Vol. 18(1) 30 –52
Presidents and Cabinet
© The Author(s) 2019
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Payoffs in Coalition
https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929919856875
DOI: 10.1177/1478929919856875
journals.sagepub.com/home/psrev
Governments
Cristina Bucur
Abstract
As a key consequence of government formation negotiations among executive and legislative
actors, portfolio allocation offers a window to understand the impact of constitutional design and
presidential prerogatives on cabinet dynamics across democratic regime types. This article uses
Shugart and Carey’s emphasis on the implications of regime distinctions and institutional variation
in presidential powers for executive-legislative relations as a starting point for an examination
of the extent to which presidents influence government formation outcomes in parliamentary
and semi-presidential systems. Many presidents in these political systems have some influence on
government formation, which enables them to shape cabinet composition. Yet, whether these
powers advantage presidential parties in reaping more cabinet spoils than their proportional share
has yet to be investigated. Using data on 442 government formation situations in 23 European
parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies during 1945–2015, this study finds that parties of
strong presidents generally, or presidents formally empowered to choose a formateur, are more
likely to be advantaged in the allocation of cabinet seats than their peers who are not allied with
the head of state.
Keywords
coalition bargaining, cabinet proportionality, government formation, presidential powers, semi-
presidentialism
Accepted: 21 May 2019
Government formation is one of the most consequential political processes regardless of
whether it takes place in a parliamentary, semi-presidential or presidential system of gov-
ernment. Shugart and Carey’s 1992 ground-breaking book, Presidents and Assemblies,
highlighted the main institutional distinctions between regime types based on the balance
of constitutional powers between executive and legislative branches. However, their
analysis paid less attention to cabinet politics and the crucial ways in which cabinets
link the executive and legislative branches of government (Samuels, 2009: 710). This
University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
Corresponding author:
Cristina Bucur, University College Dublin, Dublin 4, Ireland.
Email: cristina.bucur@ucd.ie
Bucur
31
contribution to the PSR Special Issue on Shugart and Carey’s 1992 seminal volume
focuses on the relationship between presidential powers and outcomes of government
formation. Specifically, we ask whether variation in the constitutional powers granted to
the head of state and the complexity of the bargaining context in which a new govern-
ment forms affect the extent to which presidents are able to tilt the balance of cabinet
appointments in favour of their parties not only under separation of powers regimes,
where they always play the role of formateurs, but also in semi-presidential and parlia-
mentary systems, where their role in government formation has been considerably less
studied. This research question is firmly anchored in the agenda set by Shugart and
Carey’s pivotal book, as it deals with consequences of institutional variation on govern-
ment formation outcomes within and among different regime types beyond pure presi-
dential systems.
Although Shugart and Carey stopped short of discussing the implications of institutional
variation for cabinet politics, they highlighted the important consequences that the allocation
of presidential powers has for regime durability and performance. As heads of state with
strong legislative powers have few incentives to negotiate with the legislature, Shugart and
Carey argued, presidential regimes are more likely to experience crises and failure. In con-
trast, presidents whose powers over legislation are constrained have little choice but to regu-
late conflict through negotiations with the legislature. Subsequently, scholars have focused
on variation in the president’s constitutional prerogatives to help explain outcomes of cabinet
politics, including the allocation of cabinet portfolios among coalition parties (Amorim and
Neto, 2002, 2006; Alemán and Tsebelis, 2011; Amorim Neto and Samuels, 2010; Chaisty
et al., 2014). For example, the cross-regional comparison carried out by Chaisty et al. (2018)
has shown that the ability to distribute cabinet seats to reward loyal coalition partners is the
presidents’ most important tool of coalition management, confirming these actors’ strong
motivation to influence the composition and the division of cabinet spoils.
A similar logic to coalition-building underpins non-presidential systems. In contrast to
presidential regimes, the presidential party may not always be in government in multi-
party parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, where the identity of the formateur
and the composition of the cabinet depend on inter-party negotiations over executive
coalitions. Although most parliamentary and semi-presidential constitutions, explicitly or
implicitly, assign at least some discretion to the head of state in either directly appointing
the prime minister, or designating the individual in charge of conducting negotiations to
form a government (the formateur), few studies have incorporated presidents in models
of parliamentary bargaining over executive coalitions. Indeed, the coalition theory litera-
ture has traditionally assumed that heads of state in parliamentary systems are non-strategic
in appointing a formateur (Bassi, 2013) and have no preferences over potential govern-
ments (Morelli, 1999). Nevertheless, heads of state in non-presidential systems have
strong incentives to deploy their powers to advantage their own party in the division of
cabinet spoils. For example, being able to influence this process may enable presidents to
hand-pick individual ministers (Protsyk, 2005; Tavits, 2008). Moreover, the inclusion of
the presidential party in government may influence the policymaking process to the presi-
dent’s advantage. By aligning the cabinet and the president’s policy goals, the potential
for conflict and delays in policymaking is reduced and presidents are in a better position
to advance their policy agenda (Urbanavicius, 1999).
Indeed, numerous studies have drawn attention to the significant variation in the role
that heads of state in non-presidential systems play in government formation, ranging
from an active involvement in selecting the prime minister (PM) and cabinet to merely
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Political Studies Review 18(1)
formally appointing a PM who was nominated and selected exclusively by parliament
(Bäck and Dumont, 2008; Bucur and Cheibub, 2017; Laver and Schofield, 1990). For
example, Strøm and colleagues (1994) counted heads of state among the coalition bar-
gaining constraints that may reduce the range of coalition options. Importantly, these
authors credited the head of state with an agenda-setting role in government formation
and expected the president’s party to gain bargaining power under certain circumstances
(Strøm et al., 1994: 320). More recent empirical studies pointed out a strong correlation
between presidential powers and the share of non-partisan ministers (Amorim Neto and
Strøm, 2006; Tavits, 2008) and argued that partisan presidents have considerable leeway
in choosing formateurs and deciding their exploratory scope (Bucur, 2017; Carroll and
Cox, 2012). Moreover, speaking about cabinet politics as a ‘missing link’ in the study of
the separation of powers, Samuels (2009: 712) argued that cabinet dynamics in semi-
presidential systems represent a middle ground between parliamentarism and pure presi-
dentialism. Consequently, Samuels argued, parties may expect lower office and/or policy
payoffs in semi-presidential systems relative to parliamentary systems (Samuels, 2009:
710–711). However, while several studies have compared the proportionality of the dis-
tribution of cabinet portfolios as a function of regime attributes (Amorim Neto and
Samuels, 2010; Samuels, 2009), they stopped short of investigating whether presidential
parties in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems do exploit this institutional source
of bargaining power to reap more than their fair share of cabinet portfolios. This article
addresses this gap and asks whether presidents with more extensive prerogatives in gov-
ernment formation are more effective in generating portfolio bonuses for their political
allies across non-presidential democracies.
In sum, the literature on government formation has produced considerable evi-
dence that presidents influence various aspects of coalition outcomes, including the
duration of bargaining processes (Savage, 2018), selection of PMs (Bucur and
Cheibub, 2017; Glasgow et al., 2011; Kang, 2009), the share of non-party ministers
in cabinet (Amorim Neto and Strøm, 2006; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones, 2009; Tavits,
2008), and the choice of specific coalitions (Kang, 2009). To identify the mecha-
nisms through which the president’s influence on government formation is realised,
scholars have focused on various constitutional factors such as direct and indirect
elections (Bucur and Cheibub, 2017; Glasgow et al., 2011; Kang, 2009), the vote of...
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