Presidents and Cabinets: Coordinating Executive Leadership in Premier-Presidential Regimes
| Author | Tapio Raunio,Thomas Sedelius |
| DOI | 10.1177/1478929919862227 |
| Published date | 01 February 2020 |
| Date | 01 February 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Special Issue Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929919862227
Political Studies Review
2020, Vol. 18(1) 53 –70
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/1478929919862227
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Presidents and Cabinets:
Coordinating Executive
Leadership in Premier-
Presidential Regimes
Tapio Raunio1 and Thomas Sedelius2
Abstract
A key factor of semi-presidential regimes is power-sharing mechanisms between president and
government. Influenced by Shugart and Carey’s seminal work on premier-presidential regimes,
this article addresses intra-executive dynamics in light of recent scholarship on the risks and
consequences associated with conflict and cooperation between the president and the cabinet.
Through an in-depth comparison of three premier-presidential systems with broadly similar
constitutional designs, Finland, Lithuania and Romania, it forces us to reconsider how coordination
mechanisms and political context shape presidential influence. Absent of a working constitutional
division of labour and established modes of intra-executive coordination, presidents are more
likely to use alternative channels of influence – such as the strategy of ‘going public’ or direct
contacts with political parties, the legislature or civil society stakeholders – and to intervene in
questions falling under the competence of the government. Lack of institutionalized coordination
also benefits the presidents as they hold the initiative regarding cooperation between the two
executives.
Keywords
semi-presidentialism, constitution, coordination, executive, Finland, Lithuania, Romania
Accepted: 11 February 2019
Introduction
Understanding variation in president–cabinet relations in semi-presidential and presiden-
tial regimes, and to what extent this variation matters, are at the core of contemporary
research on constitutional regime types (Åberg and Sedelius, 2018). Matthew Shugart
and John Carey’s (1992) seminal study paved the way for this literature by making careful
distinctions – anchored in neo-Madisonian theory about institutional origin and survival
1Tampere University, Tampere, Finland
2Dalarna University, Falun, Sweden
Corresponding author:
Tapio Raunio, Tampere University, 33014 Tampere, Finland.
Email: tapio.raunio@tuni.fi
862227PSW0010.1177/1478929919862227Political Studies ReviewRaunio and Sedelius
research-article2019
Special Issue Article
54 Political Studies Review 18(1)
– between parliamentary, premier-presidential, president-parliamentary and presidential
regimes. Especially for semi-presidential regimes where a directly elected president
shares executive power with a prime minister (PM), president–cabinet relations are a very
delicate matter indeed and ‘a primary challenge of constitutional design must be to estab-
lish a clear division between the authorities of head of state and head of government’
(Shugart and Carey, 1992: 56).
Largely influenced by the work of Shugart and Carey, a number of studies have estab-
lished that conflict between the two executives is to be expected under semi-presidential-
ism – both in premier-presidential regimes (where the cabinet can only be dismissed by
the parliament) and president-parliamentary regimes (where both the president and the
parliament have the formal power to dismiss the cabinet) (e.g. Beuman, 2016; Elgie,
2018; Protsyk, 2005, 2006). Intra-executive conflict is associated with negative outcomes
such as cabinet instability (Sedelius and Ekman, 2010) and disruptive policy making
(Lazardeux, 2015, 2017). A largely neglected variable in the comparative literature, how-
ever, is the institutional instruments for coordinating policy and executive leadership
between the president and the cabinet. Shugart and Carey (1992: 59) indeed acknowl-
edged the risks associated with constitutional ambiguities where presidents ‘may attempt
to avoid conceding leadership of the executive by exercising extraordinary legislative
authorities’. Yet we still know very little about the extent to which coordination mecha-
nisms between the two executives vary among semi-presidential countries, and more
importantly, how such variation may influence the balance of power between the two
chief executives. To be clear, we do not expect coordination mechanisms to be more
important than key institutional variables, such as presidential powers or electoral and
party system dynamics. But we do argue that typical president/cabinet conflicts over pol-
icy, legislation and appointments may in fact be manifestations of coordination
problems.
Apart from facilitating beneficial outcomes, effective coordination mechanisms reduce
uncertainty and ‘can provide a salient point of reference for politicians who acknowledge
the rules of the game’ (Shugart and Carey, 1992: 61). Institutions can thus make a differ-
ence in that they induce actors otherwise driven by self-interest towards a ‘problem-
solving’ mode characterized by cooperation and search for mutually beneficial solutions
(e.g. North, 1990; Scharpf, 1989). And in line with the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March
and Olsen, 1989, 2006), stable and repeated coordination should also over time strengthen
the socialization effects of institutions whereby both executives, their offices, and other
stakeholders become accustomed to certain ‘ways of doing things’ and perceive regular
coordination as the appropriate course of action.
Against the backdrop of existing data on presidential powers and levels of intra-
executive conflict, and drawing on unique interview data in three premier-presidential
countries – Finland, Lithuania and Romania – this article examines institutional instru-
ments used for coordinating relations between the president and the cabinet. We have
chosen to compare three premier-presidential countries, as this enables us to explore
how the presence or absence of such instruments is related to the power balance and
level of conflict inside the core executive. While the three countries have rather similar
constitutional designs, they at the same time represent variation regarding presidential
powers, level of intra-executive conflict and political context. Finland is a stable democ-
racy with a highly institutionalized political system, where a constitutional reform
implemented in the 1990s resulted in a significant weakening of its historically strong
presidency. Lithuania, on the contrary, is a young democracy with a largely personalized
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