Preventing the Philippines from pivoting toward China: The role of the US–Japan security alliance
| Author | Renato Cruz De Castro |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/20578911221148005 |
| Published date | 01 March 2023 |
| Date | 01 March 2023 |
| Subject Matter | East Asia |
Preventing the Philippines from
pivoting toward China: The role
of the US–Japan security
alliance
Renato Cruz De Castro
De la Salle University, Philippines
Abstract
Shortly after becoming the Philippines’16th president in mid-2016, Rodrigo Roa Duterte had
unraveled his predecessor’s agenda of standing up to China’s expansive claims in the South
China Sea. He distanced his country from its long-time treaty ally and gravitated toward China
which is resolute in reconfiguring the global commons in the Asia-Pacific region. He also set
aside the 2016 UNCLOS decision on the South China Sea dispute favorable to the Philippines.
His appeasement toward China contrasted sharply with the late President Benigno Aquino III’s
balancing strategy. President Duterte reoriented Philippine policy alarmed both the US and
Japan. Consequently, Washington and Tokyo shored up their respective security ties with the
Philippine military. The effort was aimed to prevent the Philippines from being pulled into
China’s orbit. Moreover, the US is the hub while Japan and the Philippines are spokes in the
San Francisco System of alliances. This article concludes that the 1950 San Francisco Peace
Conference not only established the series of US bilateral alliances in Asia, but also laid down
the foundation of regional order and security which outlives the Cold War, and prevailed way
beyond the second decade of the 21st century.
Keywords
alliance, appeasement, China’s maritime expansion, Philippine foreign policy, San Francisco System
of alliance, security partnership, South China Sea dispute
Since he took office in June 2016, then-President Rodrigo Duterte pursued an appeasement policy
toward China. For the Duterte Administration, it was imperative to maintain an equilibrium
between ensuring the country’s external security and addressing domestic concerns, particularly
Corresponding author:
Renato Cruz De Castro, International Studies Department, De la Salle University, 2401 Taft Avenue, Manila 0922,
Philippines.
Email: renato.decastro@dlsu.edu.ph
East Asia
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics
2023, Vol. 8(1) 381–399
© The Author(s) 2022
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/20578911221148005
journals.sagepub.com/home/acp
with economic development. Thus, it sought to improve the Philippines’diplomatic relations with
China to increase economic cooperation by softening the country’s confrontational stance in the
South China Sea dispute (National Institute for Defense Studies, 2017). This diplomatic strategy
was predicated on a calculation that the Philippines’better option is to foster economic interdepend-
ence with China and ease the tension and risks of an outright armed confrontation in the contested
waters.
The Philippines’appeasement strategy required downplaying the contentious issues generated
by the South China Sea dispute and agreeing with China’s preferred means of resolving the terri-
torial row through the bilateral consultative mechanism and joint development (Zheng, 2018). It
meant undoing the Aquino Administration’s policy toward China. Furthermore, President
Duterte downgraded Philippine–US security arrangements and gave more weight to Philippine–
China economic ties. All these efforts are aimed to enable the Philippines to secure Chinese
loans for infrastructure projects under the government’s“Build, Build, Build”program.
This development alarmed the US, the Philippines’only formal treaty ally, and Japan, an import-
ant Philippine security partner. Hence, the two allies bolstered their respective defense ties with the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to prevent the Duterte Administration from gravitating
toward China. As members of the San Francisco System (also known as the “hub and spokes”)
of bilateral alliances, they also share common interests with the Philippines, especially in maritime
security to ensure that the Western Pacific remains secure and accessible in the face of China’s mari-
time expansion. The late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pushed for continued maritime cooperation
with the Philippines, even as former President Duterte backed out from most military exercises
between US and Philippine armed services (Smith, 2017).
This article examines the joint and coordinated US and Japanese moves to buttress their security
relationships with the Philippines from 2016 to 2021. It assesses how their efforts have thwarted the
Duterte Administration’s appeasement policy toward China. It poses this main problem: How did
the US and Japan use their respective defense ties with the AFP to prevent the Philippines from
ingratiating itself with China? It also addresses these corollary questions (1) What is the
San Francisco system of bilateral alliance? (2) As members of this alliance network, how have
Tokyo and Washington transformed their security relations? (3) What are the US and Japanese interests
in inhibiting the Philippines toward China? (4) How did the Duterte Administration implement its
appeasement policy on China? (5) How did China react to the Philippines’appeasement policy?
And (6) how successful were the US and Japan in restraining the Duterte Administration’s
pro-China decisions and actions?
The San Francisco system of bilateral alliances
An alliance is a formal or informal commitment to security cooperation between two or more states,
to augment each member’s power, security, and/or influence (Walt, 2009). It is formed when these
states agree to come to the assistance of another should an external challenger or party attack one of
the signatories. If the states are serious and resolute in the alliance formation, any threatening
outside party will assume that an attack on a member of the alliance will cause the other
members to come to the targeted member’s defense. An attack on a member-state of an alliance
is therefore expected to be more costly than an attack on a state which does not belong to an allian ce
(Kenwick et al., 2015). Alliances vary in scope, depth, and costliness of the circumstances to which
the military obligations of an alliance have applications (Benson and Clinton, 2016).
382 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 8(1)
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