Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
| DOI | 10.1177/002070206502000405 |
| Author | Franklyn Griffiths |
| Date | 01 December 1965 |
| Published date | 01 December 1965 |
| Subject Matter | Notes and Comment |
Notes
and
Comment
Franklyn
Griffiths,
New
York
City
Preventing
the
Spread
of
Nuclear
Weapons
The
hope
for
agreement
on
arms
control
that
was
initially generated
by
President
Kennedy
and
Premier
Khrushchev in
1963
seems
all
but
to
have
vanished
in
the deterioration
of
East-West
relations
this
year.
And
yet in recent
months
there
have
been
signals
of
varying
strength
from
Washington
and
Moscow
that
indicate
a
continued
interest
in
arms control.
Moreover,
at
the
United
Nations
and
elsewhere
the
ominous
view
is
increasingly
expressed
that
we
are
reaching
the
end
of
the
eleventh hour
for
an
agreement
to
prevent the
further
spread
of
nuclear
weapons.
In the
coming
months
the
private
and
public
discussions
in
the
various
capitals,
in
the
Eighteen
Nation
Disarma-
ment
Commission
(E.N.D.C.)
and
at
the
United
Nations
General
Assembly
will
offer
Washington and
Moscow
perhaps
a
final
oppor-
tunity
to
reconsider
the
problem
of
nuclear proliferation
before
a
world
of
nuclear irresponsibility
is
upon
us.
The
outlook
for
measures to
prevent the
spread
of
nuclear
weapons
is
not
promising.
A
high degree
of
political
will
and
imagination
will
be
required
if
governments
are
to
overcome
their
propensity
to
sacrifice
considerations
of
the
long
term
to
the
demands
of
the
immediate
situation.
Ultimately the
cause
of
non-proliferation may
benefit
from
a
desire
to
moderate the
clash
of
Soviet
and
American
interests
in
Vietnam
and
elsewhere
in
the
economically
underdeveloped
world.
But
in
the
day-to-day
aggravation
of
relations
between
Moscow
and
Wash-
ington
during
the
Vietnam
war,
and
in the
uncertainty
(especially
in
Washington)
of
the
impact
of
major
East-West
arms
controls
on
the
current
political
situation
in
Europe
there
are
profound
inhibitions
to
a
non-dissemination
agreement.
These
political impediments
are
rein-
forced by
certain
military-strategic
and
economic effects
of
the
arms
controls
that
have
so
far
been
reached,
and
by
the
increasing
difficulty
in
obtaining
an
effective
anti-proliferation
measure.
The
various
agreements
of
1963-64--the
direct
communications
link
or
"hot line"
between
Washington and
Moscow,
the
limited
nuclear
test
ban,
the
simultaneous
unilateral
reductions
in
Soviet
and
American
defence
budgets
(approximately
4
per
cent),
and
the
simultaneous
uni-
lateral
expressions
of
intent
not
to
place
nuclear
weapons
in
space
and
to
reduce
the
production
of
fissionable
materials
employed
in
nuclear
warheads-introduced
a
new
element
of
stability
into
the
Soviet-Ameri-
can
confrontation.
Increasingly
it
is
possible
for
the
two
governments
to
amplify
the
sensation
of
mutual
security
by
means
of
tacit
under-
standings
and
unilaterally
declared
measures,
thereby
avoiding
the
political
costs
of
formal
agreement
among
adversaries.
In
addition
there
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