Prison Governors as Policymakers, Phronetic Practices as Enacted Knowledge
| Date | 01 September 2018 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/hojo.12255 |
| Published date | 01 September 2018 |
| Author | CHRISTOPHE DUBOIS |
The Howard Journal Vol57 No 3. September 2018 DOI: 10.1111/hojo.12255
ISSN 2059-1098, pp. 363–378
Prison Governors as Policymakers,
Phronetic Practices as Enacted
Knowledge
CHRISTOPHE DUBOIS
Lecturer, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Liege, Belgium
Abstract: In the last 15 years, Belgian prisons have been characterised by an increase of
managerial and legal regulations. Building on an empirical account of prison governors’
work practices and bureaucratic working context, this article shows how the rise of policy
inscriptions paradoxically leads to a sharper need of prison governors for practical knowl-
edge. Drawing on four years of qualitative research with 40 Belgian prison governors,
the article illustrates how they define ‘ethical dilemmas’ – that is, uncertain and ambigu-
ous events – and reach a particular decision. Two analytical concepts are used in that
respect. First, the concept of ‘phronetic practices’ (Nonaka and Takeuchi 2011) relates
to the practical knowledge used to make decisions in uncertain and ambiguous situations.
Second, the concept of ‘enacted knowledge’ (Freeman and Sturdy 2015) enlightens how
such decisions contribute to shaping prison policy, organisations, and administration. In
that perspective, this article proposes to recognise the ethics of prison governors conceived
as policymakers.
Keywords: enactment; knowledge; organisations; phronesis; policy; prison
governors
Formally responsible for running their prison and administrating the
regime within the limits of law and budget, Belgian prison governors
have been facing an increase of managerial and legal regulations over
the last 15 years (Kennes and Van de Voorde 2015; Snacken, Bevens and
Beernaert 2010). Organisational scholars have long emphasised two con-
sequences following the proliferation of formal regulation. First, in his
analysis of the Bureaucratic Phenomenon, Cozier (1964) depicted how an
increasing number of rules contribute to multiplying the ‘zones of uncer-
tainty’ that are vested with ‘power games’ and ‘discretionary practices’,
as pointed out by various studies of prison officers’ and managers’ work
(Cheliotis 2008; Crawley 2013; Crewe and Liebling 2015; Liebling 2000,
2004; Sparks, Bottoms and Hay 1996). Second, considering that rules, law,
and policy do not apply automatically, Lipsky (1980) and Weick (1988)
have inspired various analyses of how human actors mobilise practical
knowledge and create meaning in relation to the situation whenever they
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2018 The Howard League and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK
The Howard Journal Vol57 No 3. September 2018
ISSN 2059-1098, pp. 363–378
interpret formal – and often ambiguous – inscriptions. I therefore assume
that knowledge is a central ingredient of prison governors’ practices, espe-
cially because they use it to cope with the many ‘dilemmas’ – that is, zones
of uncertainty and sources of ambiguity – proliferating in their working
context. In other words, how do prison governors get to know what to
decide whenever they have to choose between relying on a prison guard
or on a prisoner’s narrative of a disciplinary incident; or whenever they
have to arbitrate between complying with the law or with the Minister’s in-
structions; or whenever they have to prioritise individual health issues over
collective educational activities or vice versa; or whenever the administra-
tive measure they take is likely to be subject of an appeal to a complaints
jurisdiction.
Many scholars have frequently highlighted the relevance of knowl-
edge as a key concept to analyse work practices in public policy, admin-
istration and organisation studies (Freeman 2007; Laws and Hajer 2006;
Raadschelders 2008; Wagenaar 2004; Weick1988). But what is knowledge?
An Aristotelian typology distinguishes between three forms of knowledge:
episteme, ‘a universally-valid scientific knowledge’; techne, ‘a skill-based tech-
nical know-how’; and phronesis, or ‘know-what-should-be-done’ (Nonaka
and Takeuchi 2011, pp.60–1). The typology elaborated by Freeman and
Sturdy (2015) considers that knowledge is often ‘embodied’ in people, ‘in-
scribed’ in documents and instruments, or ‘enacted’ in interaction with
others. Formal and informal meetings, like dilemmas, are ‘occasions for
the expression, articulation and negotiation of knowledge in response to a
question . . . or the sharing of a concern’ (p.206).
Drawing on this double typology, and conceiving prison administra-
tion as ‘a highly complex and knowledge-intensive area of practice that
places high analytical, judgmental, political, ethical, and other demands
on its practitioners’ (Rooney and McKenna 2008, p.709), this article ad-
dresses the following question: what happens when prison governors have
to deal with some ethical dilemmas caused by proliferating inscriptions,
where neither ‘epistemic’ nor ‘technical’ knowledge is available? Adopting
an interpretive approach (Annison, article in this special issue; Bevir and
Rhodes 2003), this article aims to illustrate how they define ethical situa-
tions, how they think through their options, and how, and why, they reach
a particular decision (Sullivan and Segers 2007, p.309). The concepts of
‘phronetic practices’ (also translated into ‘practical wisdom’ or ‘prudential
practices’ by Champy (2012); Chia and Holt (2008); Nonaka and Takeuchi
(2011); Shotter and Tsoukas (2014)), and ‘enacted knowledge’, lie at the
centre of this study as they relate to the practical knowledge used to make
decisions in uncertain and ambiguous situations, making sense of these
situations, and contributing to shape the meaning of prison policy.
This article draws on four arguments that are being put forward on the
basis of the research findings. First, following Lipsky (1980) and Souhami
(2015), I argue that prison governors can be considered as policymakers.
My focus ‘thus lies on the decentral-problem-solving of local actors rather
than on hierarchical guidance’ (P¨
ulzl and Treib2007, p.94). Second, follow-
ing Bennett (2016a), governors can be conceived as ‘micro-actors entangled
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2018 The Howard League and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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