Prisoners of their own device: Brexit as a failed negotiating strategy
| Author | Benjamin Martill |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/13691481211044645 |
| Published date | 01 November 2022 |
| Date | 01 November 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Original Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481211044645
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
2022, Vol. 24(4) 582 –597
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/13691481211044645
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Prisoners of their own device:
Brexit as a failed negotiating
strategy
Benjamin Martill
Abstract
Brexit has occasioned a rightward shift in British politics as successive leaders have grappled
with the difficulties of negotiating with the European Union and the vicissitudes of politics in the
governing Conservative party. Explanations for the hardening of Eurosceptic preferences focus
on the demands of ‘taking back control’ and the polarisation of post-referendum politics as key
drivers. But they have not explored the ways in which negotiation strategies shaped – rather than
reflected – domestic political developments. Drawing on two-level games accounts of ‘synergistic’
bargaining, this article argues both David Cameron and Theresa May sought to leverage Eurosceptic
sentiment in their respective negotiations to make it more credible the United Kingdom would
walk away if its demands were rejected. While both leaders failed to convey their resolve, they
inadvertently strengthened Eurosceptic constituencies back home, contributing to the paucity
– and the rejection – of their negotiated agreements.
Keywords
Brexit, European Union, hand-tying, international negotiations, two-level games, United Kingdom
Introduction
The United Kingdom’s protracted withdrawal from the European Union (EU) has brought
countless surprises over the years. From Cameron’s announcement of an in/out referen-
dum in 2013 to the shock decision of the British public to leave the Union in June 2016,
and from Theresa May’s ‘hard’ interpretation of the Brexit mandate to the unprecedented
rejection of her Withdrawal Agreement in early 2019, the Brexit process has seldom been
smooth. Taken together, these distinct moments have also revealed a deeper and more
puzzling process of hardening preferences in which concerns about the United Kingdom’s
position in the EU have morphed into sustained support for a clearer break with the EU
among key public and elite constituencies. Explanations for this rightward shift have
focused either on the incompatibility of British demands for ‘taking back control’ with
core principles of European integration, such that a shift towards a ‘harder’ outcome was
School of Social and Political Science, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
Corresponding author:
Benjamin Martill, School of Social and Political Science, Chrystal Macmillan Building, 15a George Square,
The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, EH8 9LD, UK.
Email: benjamin.martill@ed.ac.uk
1044645BPI0010.1177/13691481211044645The British Journal of Politics and International RelationsMartill
research-article2021
Original Article
Martill 583
always on the cards (e.g. Donnelly, 2018; Oliver, 2017; Rogers, 2019), or on the role of
domestic factors such as May’s status as an insecure Remain supporter, the prevalence of
internal party conflict in the Westminster system, the shifting balance of power in the
governing Conservative party, and the polarising dynamics of the referendum in shifting
opinion in a rightward direction (e.g. Allen, 2018; Heinkelmann-Wild et al., 2020;
Sobolewska and Ford, 2020). But these cannot account for the extent of Cameron and
May’s Euroscepticism during the talks, nor their subsequent abandonment of these posi-
tions, nor can they fully explain why criticism of both leaders focused so heavily on their
failure to gain leverage over Brussels.
This article argues that to understand the hardening of preferences accompanying the
Brexit process, we need to examine how the United Kingdom’s negotiating strategy con-
tributed to change at the domestic level. Drawing on the literature on two-level games, it
argues that successive British leaders deployed ‘synergistic’ strategies involving the
instrumental use of domestic constraints in order to overcome their diminished bargain-
ing power vis-à-vis the EU. These strategies involved the manipulation of key facets of
the domestic political environment, including the shaping of the domestic discourse and
the establishment of decision-moments, while also producing unintended consequences
at the domestic level, ratcheting up hard Brexit sentiment among Leave supporters. These
effects took on a path-dependent quality, not only because they consistently pushed
towards a more Eurosceptic position, but also because subsequent events – the 2016 ref-
erendum and the rejection of May’s Withdrawal Agreement – prevented any recourse to
previously ‘softer’ positions. Understanding the role of negotiating strategies in shaping
domestic politics helps us to account for the shifting positions of Cameron and May in
relation to their domestic detractors and to explain how the vision for Brexit gradually
hardened over the course of the talks. Theoretically, the Brexit example highlights the
distinct ways in which synergistic strategies can bring about unintended consequences for
leaders, which can come back to haunt them at later stages.
The Brexit puzzle
It is perhaps a truism to note that the Brexit process, which has unfolded over the past few
years in the United Kingdom, comprised a series of unexpected developments. Even
before the United Kingdom voted to leave, then prime minister David Cameron’s com-
mitment to an in/out referendum on the country’s EU membership was regarded by many
observers as a rather drastic solution to the domestic pressures on Cameron and his desire
to safeguard the United Kingdom’s position within the EU (Matthijs, 2013; Oliver, 2017).
The subsequent victory of the Leave campaign in the 23 June 2016 referendum by 51.9%
of the British electorate confounded the expectations of observers and pollsters alike and
was widely regarded as a seismic and unexpected event, as indeed it still is (Sobolewska
and Ford, 2020: 219). The selection of unity-candidate Theresa May as Conservative
leader and prime minister in the aftermath of the referendum result surprised many, as did
her decision to pursue a hard-line and uncompromising Brexit agenda, characterised by
hard bargaining, anti-EU rhetoric, unattainable ‘red lines’, and an outright refusal to
negotiate with stakeholders outside of the Conservative party (Jones, 2019: 28, 40). Fast-
forward to early 2019 and the formerly hard-line May appears conciliatory compared to
the Brexit supporters in the Conservative party and their collaborators in the Democratic
Unionist Party (DUP), whose opposition contributed to the defeat of May’s negotiated
deal by the greatest margin in living memory (Baldini et al., forthcoming). And, while the
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