<p>As the editors of this work observe in their incisive and very useful introduction, the shared features of Scots and South African law have provided a fruitful basis for comparative study. An extensive literature exists and much work has been done expounding points of similarity (1). Both systems have, in the relatively recent past, undergone a constitutional remodelling, meaning (among other things) that “human rights values… must now be translated into the domain” of private law (2). But anyone thinking that this is evidence of continued parallel evolution and ongoing commonality is in for a bit of a shock. As both the editors (5–6) and a number of the individual contributors note (see, e.g., Sutherland, 82–83; Carey-Miller, 467), the constitutional moments at which these changes have occurred, and the structures by which they have been effected, are vastly different. In Scotland, we have (somewhat belatedly) brought home a relatively restricted range of rights and freedoms from interference by means of a mechanism that preserves the sovereignty of (the UK) parliament and often leaves government and law with a considerable margin of appreciation. This seemed quite radical at the time, and is still too radical for the tastes of some, who deplore the interference of Mr Justice Foreigner in the affairs of the United Kingdom. It is, however, a step that seems tentative indeed when compared to the constitutional revolution that marked the end of the Apartheid era. The South African Constitution is both supreme and transformative in a way that the <a href="https://international.vlex.com/vid/convenio-europeo-libertades-fundamentales-67895138">European Convention on Human Rights</a> (<a href="https://international.vlex.com/vid/convenio-europeo-libertades-fundamentales-67895138">ECHR</a>) is not. Its concern with social justice means that it includes positive social welfare rights (such as a right to adequate housing: Steven, 428) not present in the <a href="https://international.vlex.com/vid/convenio-europeo-libertades-fundamentales-67895138">ECHR</a>. The differences are significant and mean that the comparative story told by this book is often one of divergence rather than similarity.</p>
<p>Following on from the introduction, Du Bois contributes a thought-provoking theoretical paper which draws on the work of Kant and Hegel in order to demonstrate how human rights considerations can provide a normative framework for private law reasoning. Barnard-Naude addresses the politics of private law by addressing human rights' role in advancing the recognition of equal rights for members of sexual minorities. Thereafter, the essays turn to address particular questions of substantive law. There are three main areas into which the majority of the rest of the papers...</p>
