PROCEDURAL INDIVIDUALISM AND OUTCOME LIBERALISM*
| Published date | 01 August 1983 |
| Author | A. P. Hamlin |
| Date | 01 August 1983 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9485.1983.tb01017.x |
Scortish
JourM/o/Polincd
Economy,
Vol.
10,
No.
3.
November
1983
0
1983
Scottish
Economic
Society
PROCEDURAL INDIVIDUALISM AND
OUTCOME LIBERALISM*
A.
P.
HAMLIN
University
of
Southampton
I
INTRODUCTION
In recent years much has been written by economists, philosophers and others
on the topic
of
liberalism;’ indeed it is possible
to
point to a modern liberal
revival. This paper sets out to chart a course through one part
of
the liberal
debate-that concerning liberalism’s basis in individualism-with the aid of
some simple, but frequently overlooked distinctions. The primary intentions
are to distinguish clearly between individualism and liberalism in terms of the
underlying ethical criteria, to investigate the possibility of positions involving
both liberalism and individualism, and finally, to relate the discussion
to
the
work
of
Hayek.
I
have argued elsewhere (Hamlin,
1983)
that the distinction between a
process
and an
outcome
is of some importance from the constitutional
perspective
;
furthermore, this distinction is itself distinct from that between a
means
and an
end.
In this paper, as before, the words process and outcome are
used in a purely descriptive manner whilst the notions of means and ends are
reserved for distinguishing between those things (whether processes or
outcomes) which are valued purely instrumentally (means), and those things
valued intrinsically (ends). These four concepts and their possible inter-
relationships are discussed in the context of the establishment
of
ethical
criteria in section
I1
below.
In section
111
these distinctions will
be
utilised to characterise normative
individualism as a stance which takes individual liberty (in a particular sense)
as “good” in itself, i.e. as an end, and thereby derives a purely procedural
criterion for evaluating economic or social action. This stance will be
contrasted with the position of the “free market individualist” which
I
shall
suggest is based on a confounding
of
ends and means.
To
the extent that liberalism concerns itself with outcome criteria for
*
Thanks are due
to
Jim
Buchanan, Geoffrey Brennan, Loren Lomasky, Karl-Heinz PaquC: and
the members of the Public
Choice
Seminar at the Center for Study
of
Public Choice where the
author
was
a visiting research associate during the preparation
of
this
paper. The comments
of
an
anonymous referee are
also
gratefully acknowledged.
‘See,
for example, Buchanan (1975% 1977, Rowley and Peacock (1975). Sen (1976). Hayek
(1973,1976, 1979). Hamowy (1978). Levine (1981).
Date
of
receipt of final manuscript:
3
March 1983.
25
1
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