Professionalism and the Millbank Tendency: The Political Sociology of New Labour's Employees
| Author | Paul Webb,Justin Fisher |
| Published date | 01 February 2003 |
| Date | 01 February 2003 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.00175 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Professionalism and the Millbank
Tendency: The Political Sociology of
New Labour’s Employees
Paul Webb
University of Sussex
Justin Fisher
Brunel University
This article analyses party employees, one of the most under-researched subjects in the study of
British political parties. We draw on a blend of quantitative and qualitative data in order to shed
light on the social and political profiles of Labour Party staff, and on the question of their profes-
sionalisation. The latter theme is developed through a model derived from the sociology of pro-
fessions. While a relatively limited proportion of party employees conform to the pure ideal-type
of professionalism, a considerably greater number manifest enough of the core characteristics of
specialisation, commitment, mobility, autonomy and self-regulation to be reasonably described as
‘professionals in pursuit of political outcomes’.
Introduction1
One of the least researched fields in the study of British political parties is that of
party staff, a curious fact given that their importance is almost certainly now greater
than ever before. In part, this is because the modern age of election campaigning
and political marketing places greater emphasis on paid professional expertise than
it does on voluntary activist labour. In addition (and relatedly), parties have come
to rely increasingly on paid employees in the context of long-term membership
decline and the de-energisation of local parties (Seyd & Whiteley, 1992; Whiteley
et al., 1994; Webb, 1994). This is demonstrated by the changing ratio of central
staff to members. In 1964 the Labour party had one employee for every 2,786 indi-
vidual members, whereas by 1998 there was one employee for every 1,231
members, a net change of 56 per cent in the staff/membership ratio. The change
is even more pronounced if we narrow the focus to the real locus of staff growth,
the central (extra-parliamentary) party organisation; in 1964 there was one central
party employee for every 16,602 individual members, but by 1998 there was one
for every 2,263 members, a change of 86 per cent.2 Even allowing for the vagaries
of measuring party membership there is no doubt that there has been a substan-
tial increase in the ratio of paid employees to party members, which is to say a
substitution over time of paid for voluntary labour.
A single interpretive model which captures something of the shift from voluntary
to professional labour is Angelo Panebianco’s ‘electoral-professional party’ (1988,
© Political Studies Association, 2003.
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
P R O F E S S I O N A L I S M A N D T H E M I L L B A N K T E N D E N C Y
11
p. 264), but neither this ideal-type nor any of the hitherto available empirical evi-
dence takes the notion of ‘professionalisation’ much beyond the growing impor-
tance to modern parties of pollsters, advertisers and marketing experts (Hughes &
Wintour, 1990; Webb, 1992a; Shaw, 1994). Strangely, well-established models
drawn from the sociology of professions have been overlooked by political scien-
tists working in this field. In this article we use such models to consider the extent
and nature of professionalism within the contemporary Labour party, in the light
of new empirical data, both qualitative and quantitative.3
Defining professionalism
The sociological literature on professions recognises ‘a continuum of professional-
isation on which groups can be located according to the number of professional
characteristics which they exhibit’ (Romzek & Utter, 1997, p. 1254). A review of
some of the key items in this literature (Wilensky, 1959; Brante, 1990; Raelin,
1991) suggests that the characteristics most usually emphasised include the fol-
lowing:
• Expertise: At the heart of the notion of professionalism lies the notion of some
special competence which sets the professional apart from other workers. This
will most probably reflect a particular education and perhaps formal vocational
training or qualification.
• Autonomy: In view of the professional’s expertise, s/he tends to be entrusted with
an unusual degree of job autonomy; though answerable to the ‘client’, the pro-
fessional’s specialist knowledge means that s/he cannot be dictated to by line
managers. To some extent this distinguishes a professional from a mere ‘bureau-
crat’, who is a general functionary under the supervision of a manager.
• Mobility: Panebianco (1988, p. 227) points out that, by virtue of their expertise
and autonomy, professionals are usually in a good position to sell their labour
on the external job market if they so choose. Traditional party bureaucrats,
however, will typically be engaged in such work that would make it difficult
for them to find an equivalent job in the external market; this relative non-
transferability of their skills helps explain the bureaucrat’s subordination to line
managers and political leaders.
• Self-regulation: Given his or her specialist knowledge, only the professional is in
a position to protect clients against entry into the job market of charlatans or
incompetents. Hence, a profession will typically have the right to establish and
police its own code of vocational ethics. This is readily apparent if one considers
the roles of bodies such as the British Medical Association or the Law Society in
regulating and disciplining their members.
• Commitment: Although an archetypal professional may enjoy a considerable
degree of job autonomy, s/he will be expected to display a special level of devo-
tion to the tasks undertaken.
These key characteristics provide us with an ideal-type of professionalism. A pro-
fessional may be regarded as a member of the workforce with a relatively high status and
strong position in the labour market flowing from a special degree of expertise, commitment,
autonomy and capacity for self-regulation which in turn reflects a particular education and
© Political Studies Association, 2003.
12
PA U L W E B B A N D J U S T I N F I S H E R
formal training. By contrast, traditional party bureaucrats will have less status,
expertise, job autonomy or capacity to regulate their own activities, and are less
likely to have been through a special formal education. Moreover, given that their
status and rewards will usually be lower, they are less likely to be expected to
demonstrate a special devotion to duty. This calls to mind work conducted more
than three decades ago by Kornberg, Smith and Clark (1970) on party workers in
North America, where they described the prevalence of an amateur ethos, lack of
career prospects, low prestige and pay, poor commitment and a lack of any pro-
fessional reference group among party workers; this syndrome would seem poles
apart from our notion of a political professional.
Notwithstanding the foregoing discussion, it is notable how often people use the
term ‘professionalism’ in a rather less rigorous sense than we have adumbrated
here. Frequently, it is simply taken to mean a relatively...
To continue reading
Request your trial