Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Case of Libya
| Published date | 01 March 2008 |
| Date | 01 March 2008 |
| Author | Gawdat Bahgat |
| DOI | 10.1177/0047117807087245 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 105
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:
The Case of Libya
Gawdat Bahgat, Indiana University of Pennsylvania
Abstract
In December 2003, the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libya) issued a state-
ment announcing that it had agreed to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
programs. Some policymakers in Washington and London were quick to establish con-
nection between Libya’s decision and the US-led war in Iraq (2003). Since then, Libya has
been presented as a model for other potential proliferators to follow. This article rejects these
two propositions. Instead, it argues that the dramatic transition in Libya’s stand on WMD
can be explained by a cluster of factors – leadership and ideology, economic and political
domestic developments, relations with Western powers, and security considerations. The
combination of these factors is unique. It is unlikely that the Libyan experience will be
repeated in other countries.
Keywords: Green Book, Libya, Non-Proliferation Treaty, security, succession, terrorism,
weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
On 19 December 2003, the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libya) issued
a statement, announcing that it had been conducting talks with the United States and
the United Kingdom about WMD. The Libyan government confi rmed that it had,
of its own free will, agreed to get rid of the substances, equipment and programs
that could lead to the production of internationally banned weapons. Specifi cally,
Tripoli pledged to:
• declare all nuclear activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
and sign the Additional Protocol (under the AP states are required to make
expanded, comprehensive declarations of all their nuclear material and nuclear-
related activities);
• eliminate ballistic missiles beyond a 300 km range with a payload of 500 kg;
• eliminate all chemical weapons stocks and munitions and accede to the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC); and
• allow immediate inspections and monitoring to verify all of these actions.1
This announcement was preceded by equally signifi cant steps to end Libya’s inter-
national isolation and pave the way for Tripoli to rejoin the global economic and
diplomatic system.2 In March 2003, Libya’s intelligence chief Musa Kusa – one of
Qadhafi ’s most trusted aides – approached offi cials in the British Secret Intelligence
Service (MI6) to express his government’s desire to initiate talks with Britain and
International Relations Copyright © 2008 SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore, Vol 22(1): 105–126
[DOI: 10.1177/0047117807087245]
106 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 22(1)
the United States about Libya’s WMD programs. Britain immediately informed the
Bush administration of Libya’s request and began negotiations between the three
parties that lasted for nine months. In the course of these negotiations in October
2003 the US, UK, German and Italian governments worked together to arrange the
diversion of a shipment of centrifuge components bound for Libya. These compo-
nents, manufactured in Malaysia, had been secretly purchased on the international
nuclear black market from the illicit Pakistan-based nuclear smuggling network
headed by Abdal-Qadir Khan. American and British offi cials claimed that the seizure
convinced the Libyan leadership that the West already knew a great deal about Libya’s
secret nuclear weapons program and that it could not escape detection. Other reports
claimed that the Libyans alerted Washington and London to the ship as a gesture
of their good faith.3 Negotiations picked up pace after the seizure.
The outcome of these negotiations won praise from around the world. Naturally,
London and Washington claimed the credit. European, Chinese, Russian, Iranian,
and Arab leaders critical of the war in Iraq hailed the move as an indication of how
effective diplomatic means could be without the need to use military power.4 Israel
also expressed cautious support for the Libyan decision.5 Following this dramatic
announcement several IAEA inspection teams as well as US and British weapons
specialists visited Libya where they were given access to all facilities, provided
with substantial documentation about WMD programs, and allowed to take samples
and photographs. In other words, Libya showed a great deal of transparency and
openness.
According to US government sources the process of eliminating Libya’s WMD
capabilities was divided into three phases.6 The fi rst phase involved removing some
of the key material that was of greatest proliferation risk on a priority basis. This inclu-
ded nuclear weapons design documents (such as the ones provided by the Pakistani
scientist Abd al-Qadir Khan), uranium hexafl uoride, key centrifuges and equipment,
and parts of Scud-C missiles to make them inoperable. In the second phase the focus
was on eliminating the remaining elements of Libya’s programs. The American and
British teams removed a large amount of material and equipment from the nuclear
and missile programs and the Libyans destroyed chemical munitions. The goal of
the third phase was verifi cation. The US and British experts interviewed their Libyan
counterparts in order to understand and assess the extent of the WMD programs and
the networks supporting them. Following these three phases, in a testimony before
the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights,
Paula A. DeSutter, Assistant Secretary for Verifi cation and Compliance, stated, ‘We
have verifi ed with reasonable certainty that Libya has eliminated, or has set in place
the elimination of all its WMD and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
class missile programs.’7 In another testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Assistant Secretary DeSutter stated that Libya’s work to implement
its December commitments ‘has been outstanding’8 and that Tripoli’s decision ‘stands
as a model for other proliferators to mend their ways and help restore themselves
to international legitimacy’.9
To continue reading
Request your trial