Property Rights and Democratic Socialism
| Published date | 01 December 1978 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1978.tb01310.x |
| Date | 01 December 1978 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC
SOCIALISM
NORMAN
FURNISS
Indiana
Universiry
Absrrarr.
This paper attempts to throw new light on what one might term the 'operational
component'
of
social democratic thinking, functional socialism. by focusing on the creation.
organization, and transformation
of
property rights.
I
argue that while democratic socialism
does provide a political and philosophical schema that justifies distribution rules not
sanctioned in 'the market'.' the novelty of the solution (and thus the necessary difference from
existing advanced industrial societies. including the United States) is exaggerated. In addition.
the tension between the attenuation of private property rights and their arrogation by the
state on the one hand and citizen control over state activities on the other is not sufficiently
perceived. My main purpose is to delineate and explore these problems.
1
also suggest ways in
which the argument might be strengthened.
FUNCTIONAL SOCIALISM DESCRIBED
THE
purpose
of
functional socialism, advanced, for example, by such theorists
as Gunnar Myrdal and Ernst Wigforss in Sweden,
R.
H.
Twaney in England,
and Michael Harrington in the United States, is to collectivize property rights
inconsistent with the public interest while preserving democratic norms and
procedures. Their argument takes the following general form
:
The first step is to shift the focus of concern from individuals endowed with
various rights (among them property rights) antedating the state. In place of
this inviolable conception of property should be put the more pragmatic
judgement of Blackstone andothers that, regardless
of
its origins, property with
'the modifications under which we at present find it, the method of conserving
it
in the present owner, and of translating
it
from man to man, are entirely
derived from society'.2
As
expressed by Tawney, all rights 'are conditional and
derivative
. . .
they are derived from the end of purpose of the society in which
they exist. They are conditioned on being used to the attainment of that
end
.
.
.'.3
With the new perspective of society defining property rights, we turn
to
the
question of how these rights are being employed. Here we need first to
underline the transformation in the conception of property to accord with the
desires of the powerfulS and second to note that many of the consequent legal
Pace
Daniel
Bell
who states, in language
I
have
just
adapted, that it does not:
The
Cultural
Contradictions
of
Capitalism
(New York, Basic Books,
1976).
p.
249.
For
an argument that arrives
at a similar position by ignoring, in my view, the historical transformations of property law,
see
F.
A.
Hayek,
The
Mirage
of
Social Justice
(Vol.
I1
of
Law,
Lagislation and Liberty)
(London,
Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1976).
2
William Blackstone.
Commentaries
on
rhe
Law
of
England,
Book
I:
Section
139.
See also Book
11:
Sections 11-15.
R. H. Tawney.
The Acquisitive
Society
(New
York,
Harcourt. Brace,
1920).
p.
51.
For
a magisterial study of the process in the United States, see
J.
Honvitz.
The Transformarion
of American
Law
I78@1860
(Cambridge, Mass.
:
Harvard University Press.
1977).
Political
Studies,
VoI.
XXVI,
No.
4
(450-461)
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