Protection from Harassment Act 1997, S. 5: Terms of Restraining Order
| Author | Chris Newman |
| Published date | 01 April 2005 |
| Date | 01 April 2005 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1350/jcla.69.2.123.63515 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Protection from Harassment Act 1997, s. 5: Terms of
Restraining Order
R v Evans (Dorothy Gertrude) [2004] EWCA Crim 3102, The Times
(December 10, 2004)
On 8 November 1999, the appellant was convicted at Cwmbran Magis-
trates’ Court of three offences of harassment, specifically making threats
to her neighbours as a result of an ongoing neighbour dispute. Following
conviction, a restraining order was made by the court. Such orders can
be imposed by the court by virtue of s. 5 of the Protection from Harass-
ment Act 1997 following conviction for an offence of harassment. The
aim of the order is to restrain further harassing conduct by the offender.
The terms of the order were that the appellant should not ‘be abusive by
words or actions towards Miss Margaret Jones, Mr Peter Kenyon, Mr
Julian Edwards and their respective families’. The order also prohibited
the appellant from entering onto their property and depositing waste
material on their land.
On 4 February 2003, a plumber who was calling on one of the persons
mentioned in the order had parked his van in the street in which the
appellant and the person lived. Shortly after his arrival, the appellant
drove her car, which was already parked in the street, a short distance
forward, stopping very close to the rear of the van, totally blocking the
van’s exit. The appellant was arrested and charged with acting in breach
of a restraining order contrary to s. 5(5) of the 1997 Act. Section 5(5)
provides that an offence is committed if, without reasonable excuse, the
defendant does anything which he is prohibited from doing under the
terms of the restraining order. At trial, on 25 May 2004, at Cardiff Crown
Court, at the close of the prosecution case, the appellant submitted that
there was no case to answer. The principal submission was that, on a
common-sense and fair interpretation of the restraining order, parking a
car too close to the van did not amount to abusive action. The trial judge
rejected the submission and ruled that there was sufficient evidence in
respect of the appellant’s conduct that it was a matter for the jury to
determine whether the conduct was abusive in the widest application of
that term and not a task for the judge. Following the conclusion of the
trial, the appellant was convicted under s. 5(5) of the 1997 Act.
The appellant appealed on two grounds. The first ground was that the
judge should have acceded to the defence submission of no case to
answer, since...
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