Proxy Intervention in Civil Wars
| Author | Bertil Dunér |
| Published date | 01 December 1981 |
| Date | 01 December 1981 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002234338101800404 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Proxy
Intervention
in
Civil
Wars*
BERTIL
DUNÉR
University
of
Uppsala
Military
intervention
in
civil
wars
by
smaller
states
has
often
been
interpreted
as a
sign
of
the
increasing
importance
of
indirect
intervention
as
a
means
of
foreign
policy:
the
smaller
intervening
states
are
seen
to
have
acted
as
the
proxy
of
a
major
power.
The
Angola
conflict
in
particular
has
been
cited
in
this
connection,
and
Cuba
is
often
said
to
have
intervened
on
behalf
of
the
Soviet
Union.
Other
examples
have
also
been
mentioned.
However,
it
is
not
always
clear
what
characterizes
a
proxy
in
this
sense.
This
article
tries
to
identify
relevant
criteria,
and
argues
that
a
reasonable
definition
of
a
proxy
relationship
must
be
formulated
in
terms
of
power.
Some
of
the
instances
of
intervention
by
proxy
mentioned
in
the
literature
are
then
examined
in
the
light
of
this
definition.
In
none
of
these
is
it
possible
to
demonstrate
that
the
intervening
state
actually
acted
as
proxy
for
another.
This
conclusion
may
be
the
result
of
defective
instruments
of
analysis,
but
it
may
also
reflect
the
fact
that
interventions
by
proxy
have
not
actually
taken
place.
It
is
often
assumed
that
civil
war,
by
its
very
existence,
invites
military
intervention
from
outside
the
country.
Several
attempts
have
also
been
made
to
provide
evidence
in
figures
of
the
extent
to
which
the
surround-
ing
countries
have
tended
to
intervene
on
one
side
or
the
other.
Such
military
inter-
ventions
show
no
reliable
signs
of
decreas-
ing.
In
the
judgement
of
many
observers,
the
state
of
affairs
is
just
the
opposite,
so
that
we
may
rather
expect
that
interventions
in
civil
wars
will
become
increasingly
common
in
the
future.
On
the
other
hand,
it
has
been
asserted
that
the
traditional
way
of
intervening
is
obsolete.2
It
is
said
that
it
has
become
more
and
more
hazardous
for
a
country
to
invade
with
its
own
troops
a
neighbouring
country
that
is
being
torn
asunder
by
internal
dis-
putes.
Above
all,
the
great
powers
or
super-
powers
would
feel
that
they
were
prevented
from
acting
in
this
way
on
account
of
the
realities
of
power
politics
in
the
modern
world.
At
first
sight,
it
seems
that
the
Soviet
Union’s
intervention
in
the
Afghanistan
con-
flict
would
somewhat
invalidate
such
ideas.
However,
according
to
such
reasoning,
mil-
itary
intervention
will
take
place
more
and
more
in
an
indirect
way.
A
certain
external
power
which
wishes
to
try
to
influence
the
outcome
of
an
internal
conflict
will,
above
all,
have
recourse
to
such
activities
as
sub-
version,
the
supply
of
arms
to
the
combat-
ants,
help
with
maintenance,
training
and
advisory
work
and
the
like.3
By
this
means,
it
can
keep
aloof
or
pretend
to
keep
aloof
from
the
warfare.
In
this
way,
it
can
also
more
easily
cope
with
the
international
corn-
sequences
of
its
involvement.
One
way
of
intervening
indirectly
is
not
to
do
the
work
oneself
but
to
let
someone
else
do
it,
entirely
or
in
part.
Relationships
of
this
kind
are
spoken
of
in
the
literature
in
varying
terms.
A
country
which
intervenes
may,
for
example,
be
a
’tool’
of
another
country
or
its
’puppet’
or
’satellite’
or,
using
a
milder
expression,
its
’client’.
There
are
many
turns
of
expression,
but
the
most
com-
mon
term
is
perhaps
’proxy’.
I
shall
use
this
word
in
the
present
paper
for
practical
reasons,
as
a
uniform
designation
of
this
kind
of
relationship,
irrespective
of
the
words
chosen
in
the
articles
and
books
to
which
I
refer.
Proxy
relationships
may
conceivably
exist
on
different
levels
of
analysis.
A
certain
country
may
intervene
in
a
civil
war
by
re-
*
I
would
like
to
thank
Mats
Hammarstrbm,
Peter
Wallensteen
and
Raimo
Väyrynen
for
helpful
comments.
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