A Pseudo Dichotomy: Hobbism and Kantianism in Political Philosophy
| Date | 01 December 2013 |
| Author | Chiayu Chou |
| Published date | 01 December 2013 |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9248.12003 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
A Pseudo Dichotomy: Hobbism and Kantianism
in Political Philosophy
Chiayu Chou
National Taipei University
This article examines the nature of a common tendency in studies of the political philosophies of Hobbes and Kant
to presume that a dichotomy exists between them.In order to investigate this tendency,the two prevailing approaches
in current scholarship on Kant and Hobbes are explored, and the content of two ideologies on which these studies
heavily rely, Hobbism and Kantianism,are revealed. In the final section,a discussion of Hobbes’ and Kant’s theor ies
of international politics will be used to point to how this tendency functions and what consequences it has for the
study of political philosophy.The article closes by drawing attention to the wider implications of this tendency when
it is applied to studies of Western political thought.
Keywords: Thomas Hobbes; Immanuel Kant; Kantianism; Hobbism; political philosophy
The theoretical relationship between Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant has been a
highly debated and revealing topic in studies of political philosophy.1It is revealing because
it illuminates a common tendency in studies on the history of political philosophy for
commentators to ‘model’ a specific political philosophy to suit their argumentative pur-
poses.2By ‘modelling’I mean a process in which the theoretical relations between two or
more political philosophies are presumed before the details of their political theories are
examined. The goals of this process are usually those of simplification and clarity. The
process consists of two steps:fir st, an over-simplified reading of the political philosophies is
typically made which commentators can conveniently criticise. Since the complexities
within the political philosophies are ignored criticism is easier.The result of this distortion
is that ‘[i]nstead of a real per son, a “man of straw” has been refuted’ (Parkin, 2011, p. 3). Jon
Parkin maintains that the construction of ‘straw men’ has been prevalent throughout the
history of political philosophy and is in some sense necessary. Following Trudy Govier,
Parkin defines a straw man as‘a logical f allacy that occurs whenever“a per son misrepresents
an argument, or theory or claim,and then, on the basis of that misrepresentation, claims to
have refuted the position that he or she has misrepresented” ’ (Parkin, 2011,p. 2). In other
words,‘if someone claims X is true, and you represent him as having claimedY and attack
Y as though it were an accurate account of X, then the straw men fallacy has been
committed’ (Parkin, 2011, p. 3). Crudely, ‘the straw man fallacy’ implies an unfaithful
argument which is made to make the original text more vulnerable to criticism.
One of the most obvious objections to this ‘straw man fallacy’ is that the distinction
between a straw man and a legitimate interpretation is not always clear, for any complex
political theory is always capable of ‘a wide range of legitimate interpretation’ (Parkin,2011,
p.3). By drawing on Oakeshott’s distinction between philosophical and political reflection,
Parkin argues that straw men are likely to be fostered when an interpretation is a
‘transformation of philosophical reflection into [a] crude practical or ideological stereotype’
bs_bs_banner
doi: 10.1111/1467-9248.12003
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2013 VOL 61, 799–815
© 2013The Author.Political Studies © 2013 Political Studies Association
(Parkin, 2011, p. 3). In other words, Parkin argues that one way to distinguish straw men
from legitimate interpretation is to ascertain whether the interpretation misrepresents the
original position as a defence of problematic political ideologies.
To clarify, the emphasis of this article is on the second step. The second step is an
over-simplified reading of the relations between two or more ‘straw men’, namely the
over-simplified reading of specific political philosophies.Again, this presumed but distorted
reading of the relationship might also help in reducing complexities to achieve greater
clarity when two or more political philosophies are compared.
The problem with this process is that the modelling (the first step) and consequent
over-simplification (the second step) might not only lead to the misrepresentation of a
political philosophy but also create a barrier to deeper understanding of both the history of
political philosophy and the political philosophy itself.This article will explore the nature
of this tendency using the political philosophies of Hobbes and Kant as a case study and the
consequent widely held but misleading view of the theoretical relationship between them.
The article is structured as follows: in the first section, the article reviews the prevailing
approaches to the study of the relationship between Hobbes’ and Kant’s political philoso-
phies. It asserts that the prevailing approaches are based on certain assumptions regarding
both political philosophies which are unjustified. The approaches are unjustified because
they dismiss some of their explicit statements as irrelevant from the outset. This article
argues that such neglect results in taking for granted certain presumptions about each
political philosophy (henceforth termed Hobbism and Kantianism). The second section
explores how dichotomous models of Hobbism and Kantianism have been established.
Finally, the existence of this dichotomy in the field of international relations is discussed in
order to illustrate how this dichotomised picture has succeeded in penetrating studies of
international relations and in so doing has contributed to reinforcing the ideologies
themselves.
The Two Prevailing Approaches
There are two main views regarding the theoretical relationship between Hobbes’ and
Kant’s political philosophies: the first regards their philosophies as antithetical,3while the
other argues that they share a number of common features.4These prevailing views both
depend upon presumptions that cannot withstand close scrutiny. For convenience, the main
presumptions are categorised under the terms Hobbism and Kantianism, which predetermine
the scope and approach of current studies on Hobbes’ and Kant’s political philosophies
before their actual accounts are examined. Before this article explores the way in which
these ideologies inform the two predominant approaches, their content needs to be
specified.
Hobbism and Kantianism
Hobbism
Hobbism originally referred to a specific inter pretation of Hobbes’ political philosophy by
his contemporaries, which often led to ‘something quite different in most fundamental
points from the theories Hobbes set forth in his writings’ (Lamprecht, 1940, p. 32).5Since
800 CHIAYU CHOU
© 2013The Author.Political Studies © 2013 Political Studies Association
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2013, 61(4)
To continue reading
Request your trial