Quantifying European Legislative Research
| Author | Thomas König,Tanja Dannwolf,Brooke Luetgert |
| Published date | 01 December 2006 |
| Date | 01 December 2006 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1465116506069444 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Forum Section
Quantifying European
Legislative Research
Using CELEX and PreLex in EU
Legislative Studies
Thomas König
German University of Administrative Sciences, Speyer, Germany
Brooke Luetgert
German University of Administrative Sciences, Speyer, Germany
Tanja Dannwolf
University of Mannheim, Germany
ABSTRACT
Research on European legislative decision-making has
entered a stage of quantitative analysis. The quantitative
approach promises to advance the current dialogue by allow-
ing for the evaluation of competing approaches across multi-
ple policy domains and over time. At the same time, the
quantitative study of EU decision-making introduces a
number of drawbacks: it is difficult to identify one definitive
source for legislative information, and case-level data are not
directly accessible in a machine-readable format. In order to
identify the most crucial pitfalls and provide a reliable data
source, we evaluate the most frequently cited, publicly avail-
able EU legislative database, CELEX, and compare it with a
less publicized legislative database referred to as PreLex. We
find that CELEX documents legislative events, whereas
PreLex records inter-institutional activities in the legislative
process. Unsurprisingly, each of these databases has particu-
lar advantages, and we discuss which of the two might be
better suited for the analysis of specific research questions.
553
European Union Politics
DOI: 10.1177/1465116506069444
Volume 7 (4): 553–574
Copyright© 2006
SAGE Publications
London, Thousand Oaks CA,
New Delhi
KEY WORDS
CELEX
European legislation
legislative analysis
PreLex
Legislative studies in the European Union
Research on legislative decision-making in the European Union (EU) has
entered the stage of quantitative analysis, and this step promises to advance
the current dialogue by evaluating and controlling for competing approaches
(Jupille et al., 2003: 29).1After numerous case studies and intense theoretical
debates, rich and systematic data analyses on the process of legislative
decision-making may help in answering some of the most important ques-
tions raised in the controversies between rational choice analysts (Moravcsik,
1998; Schneider and Aspinwall, 2001) and constructivists (Checkel, 2001;
Risse, 2000), between cooperative (Felsenthal and Machover, 2001; Hosli,
2000) and non-cooperative game theorists (Garrett and Tsebelis, 2001;
Steunenberg et al., 1999; Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000), and among rational
choice scholars themselves (Crombez, 1996, 2000; Moser, 1996; Steunenberg,
1994; Tsebelis, 1994, 2002). Has the EU moved towards majority voting, and
to what extent does the European Parliament (EP) influence legislative
decision-making? And what are the crucial factors influencing the process
and outcomes – is the number of veto players decisive, or do we have to take
other factors into account such as the kind of legislative instrument, the policy
sector, the packaging or even the sequencing of proposals?
The legislative arena is the centre of European integration as the
Commission, the member states and the EP adopt binding decisions that
affect the lives of roughly 450 million citizens. Numerous legislative studies
ask how EU institutions matter for these decisions, and whether institutional
involvement varies across policy fields and procedures. In the past 15 years
these institutional provisions have been modified several times, and the
current European constitutional debate has centred around the distribution
of voting weights, the involvement of the EP and access to the Commission
in legislative decision-making (König and Hug, 2006). Quantitative analysis
may shed light on the extent to which inter-institutional involvement and
specific procedural rules affect legislative outcomes. We may look for changes
in the application of particular procedures or voting rules in specific sectors
and identify general trends in the quantity and type of legislative decisions
over time, while considering the effects of treaty revisions and the accession
of new members.
Although we possess a great deal of theoretical insight on these effects,
the quantitative study of inter- and intra-institutional decision-making can
provide cross-sectional and intertemporal evidence for many important claims
about EU legislative processes. This evidence is not just required for EU legisla-
tive scholars. Implementation studies also suggest that the legislative process
may influence correct and timely compliance with Community directives, and
European Union Politics 7(4)
554
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