Questioning universalism, devising an ethics without foundations: An exploration of international relations ontologies and epistemologies

AuthorLaura Zanotti
Date01 October 2015
Published date01 October 2015
DOI10.1177/1755088214555044
Journal of International Political Theory
2015, Vol. 11(3) 277 –295
© The Author(s) 2014
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1755088214555044
ipt.sagepub.com
Questioning universalism,
devising an ethics without
foundations: An exploration
of international relations
ontologies and epistemologies
Laura Zanotti
Virginia Tech, USA
Abstract
In this article, I explore the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the ethical
universalism that constitutes the basis for international intervention. I argue grounding
ethical decisions upon abstract normativity diverts attention from what is at stake in
specific situations and may lead to self-appeasement and de-responsabilization. In order
to re-imagine political agency in an interconnected world, we must engage in a reflection
about International Relations ontological and epistemological categories. I explore how
pragmatism (especially in Friedrich Kratochwil’s understanding), as well as the work
of philosophers of science and feminist metaethical philosophers, delineates pathways
for a non-foundationalist conceptualization of how we know the world, how we relate
to it, and how we may endeavor to change it as ethical and political actors. I conclude
by advocating the cultivation of an ethics of responsibility based upon contextualized
judgments and reflexivity rather than abstract universal claims.
Keywords
Epistemology, ethics, ontology, practical knowledge, universalism
There is massive disagreement about foundations: Is there one for moral judgment?
If yes, then what’s its nature? Is it universally or absolutely binding on all? How can we know
it? And if the answer is negative, then how does morality function in the absence of it? Is it all
a colossal error; is there really no foundation but we just act as if there is one?
Peg O’Connor (2008: ix)
Corresponding author:
Laura Zanotti, Department of Political Science, Virginia Tech, 509 Major Williams Hall (0130), Blacksburg,
VA 24060, USA.
Email: lzanotti@vt.edu
555044IPT0010.1177/1755088214555044Journal of International Political TheoryZanotti
research-article2014
Article
278 Journal of International Political Theory 11(3)
Critical reflections upon knowledge claims are always both moral/political and epistemic.
Rouse (2002: 158)
In the context of the extant de-territorialization of politics, universal norms and princi-
ples have played an increasing role in providing justification for international interven-
tion. Cosmopolitan international scholars praised political de-territorialization, the
emergence of the Responsibility to Protect as the organizing concept for international
intervention, the recognition of universal norms especially with regard to human rights,
the expanding role of civil society, and the growing awareness of a “common humanity”
(Finnemore, 1996; Kaldor, 2003). Martha Finnemore (1996) in particular theorized rela-
tions of causation between international norms (portrayed as independent variables with
fixed, intelligible, and context-independent prescriptive content) and states’ or interna-
tional organizations’ behavior (imagined as a dependent variable), thus substantializing
both “norms” and the actors whose behavior norms supposedly cause (Finnemore, 1996).
In this article, I argue “universal norms” provide a “reassuring” ground for interna-
tional action by privileging abstract principles over in-depth assessments of the context
of intervention. However, far from being an unbiased tool for addressing all problems of
humanity, universalism is rooted upon substantialist assumptions that on the one hand
posit a separation between the knowing subject and what is “out there,” and on the other
hand portray knowing as a process of abstraction performed by an individuals’ rational
mind. I argue ethical universalism may ultimately offer the ground for self-appeasement
and unethical choices. Justifying ethical choices based upon abstract norms actually
relieves international interveners from the responsibility of carefully gauging the appro-
priateness of abstract claims to the specifics of each situation and for assessing carefully
the consequences of their deeds.1
Scholars have critically addressed the limits of universal normativity as the foundation
of ethics (Amoureux and Steele, 2014; Connolly, 2013; Kennedy, 2004, 2006; Kuperman,
2008; Lang, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2011; Onuf, 2009; Zanotti, 2011). In the meantime, as a
recent issue of the European Journal of International Relations (2013) testifies,
International Relations (IR) has taken a reflexive turn on its own theorizing and concep-
tual apparatus.2 I build upon these contributions to argue re-conceptualizing (interna-
tional) ethics demands a reflection on the ontological and epistemological assumptions of
universalism.
Starting points are important. As metaethical philosopher Peg O’Connor aptly put it,
“start in the wrong place and you will quickly become mired in philosophical ‘problems’
that are unsolvable” (O’Connor, 2008: ix).3 IR scholarly positions by and large show a
preference for substantialism, that is, for assuming a few conceptual entities imagined as
endowed with fixed characteristics as the foundations of theorizing.4 Patrick T Jackson
and Daniel Nexon noted that “analytical or ontological commitment to substances cuts
across conventional divisions in the field, including theories in all major paradigms of
IR” (Jackson and Nexon, 1999). In this article, I explore the connections between norma-
tive universalism and substantialist assumptions about who we are, how we know the
world and, as a result, how we may bring about change. Furthermore, I outline how start-
ing from a non-substantialist ontology and epistemology rooted upon practices opens the
way for re-thinking ethics and political agency as radically contextual endeavors.

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT