R (M) v Chief Constable of Hampshire Constabulary
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judgment Date | 18 December 2014 |
| Date | 18 December 2014 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
Court of Appeal
Before Lord Justice Moore-Bick, Lord Justice Tomlinson and Lady Justice King
Informal visits by police officers, seeking entry by consent, to the home of a registered sex offender who was subject to notification requirements were lawful. The scheme for the protection of vulnerable persons from sex offenders including notification requirements placed on the offender, informa l monitoring and the power of authorised search and entry was not disproportionate.
The Court of Appeal so stated when dismissing the appeal of M, a sex offender subject to notification requirements, against the decision of the Administrative Court (Lady Justice Hallett and Mr Justice Collins)UNK ([2012] EWHC 4034 (Admin)) to refuse his claim for judicial review against the Chief Constable of Hampshire Constabulary.
The applicant had sought, inter alia, declarations that the powers contained in section 96B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (as inserted by section 58 of the Violent Crimes Reduction Act 2006) could be used only if there was a reasonable suspicion of offending; that a warrant could be sought under that section only if the person whose house was to be searched was given notice of the proceedings; and (alternatively) that section 96B was incompatible with the right to respect for private and family life guaranteed by article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
He also claimed damages in respect of the informal visits to his home by officers of the Hampshire Constabulary on the grounds that they involved a breach of his article 8 rights.
Mr Hugh Southey, QC, for the applicant; Mr DiJen Basu for the chief constable; Mr Martin Chamberlain, QC, for the Secretary of State for the Home Department, intervening.
LORD JUSTICE MOORE -BICK said that on several occasions the police had visited the applicant's house informally, that was, otherwise than pursuant to a warrant, and had been allowed entry. It had not been suggested that they had forced their way in on any occasion, but it was said tha t the applicant had not truly consented to their entry because his will had been overborne by the knowledge that, if he refused to let them in, they would be able to obtain a warrant under section 96B of the 2003 Act.
The knowledge that the police might apply for (and possibly obtain) a warrant if he refused to let them in, might influence an offender's thinking, but even...
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