R v Alfred Brewah
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judgment Date | 16 February 2001 |
| Date | 16 February 2001 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) |
Court and Reference:Court of Appeal ; 1999/5553/Z4
Mance LJ, Hunt J, HHJ Pitchers
Appearances:T Cleeve (assigned by the Registrar of Criminal Appeals) for B; B Stephenson (instructed by the CPS) for the Prosecution.
Whether a disposal under the Mental Health Act 1983 was appropriate in light of further medical evidence.
B was convicted of 3 counts of arson reckless as to whether life would be endangered, relating to 3 fires which occurred within 5 days at the house B lived in with his parents and siblings. He was convicted and ultimately sentenced to 6 years' detention in a young offender institution. After conviction, an interim hospital order had been imposed under s. 38 Mental Health Act 1983; this lead to a report which was uncertain as to whether B suffered from schizophrenia or had been suffering from a drug-induced psychosis. B appealed against both conviction and sentence. By the time of the appeal hearing, B had been transferred to a medium secure hospital unit under s. 47 Mental Health Act 1983, and there was a clear diagnosis of schizophrenia.
1. On 13 August 1999, in the Crown Court at Winchester before Mr Recorder Martin, the appellant was convicted of 3 offences of arson being reckless as to whether life would be endangered. That is counts 1, 4 and 6; counts 1 and 4 by a majority of 11-1, and count 6 unanimously. He was acquitted of arson with intent to endanger life and no verdict was taken in relation to 3 other alternative counts.
2. He appeals against conviction by leave of the single judge who limited leave to the first ground, but an application has been made before us to renew the application for leave to appeal in respect of those other two grounds and we have heard argument on that.
3. The background facts are that the appellant lived with his parents and younger siblings at a rented mid-terrace house in Winchester where the family had lived for about 5 years. Within a matter of some 5 days the fire brigade was summoned to that house to extinguish 3 successive fires.
4. The first fire was on 10 March 1999 at about 10pm in the upstairs toilet where a mattress which had fallen over the toilet pan was burning and a discarded cigarette end was found nearby. The next morning, very early (about 3 hours later) at 1.00am on 11 March, the bottom of curtains to the rear window of the ground floor living room were burned. On 15 March, shortly after 4.00pm, a fire was set under a bed in the first floor bedroom. The appellant was then arrested at 4.30 that day and had matches in his pocket.
5. The Crown case was that the appellant set each fire. The Crown relied upon evidence and connections, particularly the fact that the fires occurred in the same house, involving the same family in a very close proximity of time, and also involved some knowledge of the house. In the case of the third fire that knowledge involved knowing the means of access through a rear window downstairs which, due to its previous use by this appellant, would no longer lock.
6. The Crown then relied upon the presence of this appellant; either his actual presence at the time of the fire or presence in the vicinity around the time of the fire. The Crown also relied upon the fact that this appellant had a grievance against his family, especially his father but also at least one of his sisters and apparently his mother, and had been told to leave the house after the first fire. He also disliked the house itself and wished they did not live there.
7. The defence case was that the appellant may have caused the first fire by carelessly discarding a cigarette in the toilet to which he had just been, as he accepted, but that he had not set either of the other two fires.
8. After he had been thrown out of the house after the first fire he went to a night shelter but he could not gain admittance. The reason he was seen in the presence of the house not long after the fire brigade came to extinguish the second fire was that he could not gain that admittance.
9. On 15 March, he said that he could not have been in the vicinity of the house at all because, although he had been to London and arrived back at Winchester by train, his movements to the Job Centre and then to the Sorting Office did not allow sufficient time. However, there was Crown evidence to the effect that he was seen both going to the house and coming back from it around the time of the fire.
10. At the Magistrates' Court it was proposed to commit on 4 counts: 3 of simple arson and a fourth of arson being reckless as to whether life would be endangered. But, after hearing evidence, the magistrates refused to commit in relation to the second fire.
11. The Crown Court hearing opened with the Crown applying to stay the original four count indictment and to prefer a fresh 7 count indictment with 3 pairs of counts in the alternative, one pair relating to each of the 3 fires, and a further count of arson with intent to endanger life in relation to the second fire.
12. The Crown argued that there was a prima facie case in relation to all 3 fires. After hearing submissions the Recorder decided to permit the amendment. He did so, as he said, in the light of the provisions of the relevant legislation, theAdministration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1933, and the proviso to it, which reads in s. 2(2):
"(2) Subject as hereafter provided no bill of indictment charging any person with an indictable offence shall be preferred unless either -
(a) the person charged has been committed for trial for the offence or
(b) the bill is preferred by the direction of the Court of Criminal Appeal or by the direction or with the consent of a judge of the High Court ;
Provided that -
(i) where the person charged has been committed for trial, the bill of indictment against him may include, either in substitution for or in addition to counts charging the offence for which he was committed, any counts founded on facts or evidence disclosed to the magistrates' court inquiring into that offence as examining justices, being counts which may lawfully be joined in the same indictment; "
13. The Recorder took into account the relationship of the appellant to his parents and his view of it; his dislike of the house; his availability at the time of the fire; his arrival soon after its discovery; his possession of the means to start the fire; and the comments he made to others. They were comments to the effect that if it was him it would have been a sensible thing to burn the house down, in answer to some question along those lines by the officer. Finally the Recorder took into account the two other fires and his view as to similar fact evidence. He applied the proviso.
14. Before us there is no objection made to the proposition that the counts were counts which might lawfully be joined in the same indictment (that is obvious). The first ground of appeal before us is that the jurisdiction to add counts in the way that was done under the proviso should only be exercised with considerable circumspection and in exceptional circumstances.
15. The trial proceeded. The jury heard evidence about the relationship between the appellant and his parents, and about his being told to leave, although he had previously been told to leave and such notices had been revoked. They heard evidence about the first fire, including evidence that the appellant had admitted smoking a cigarette while in the toilet upstairs and, having flushed the toilet, had chucked his cigarette end in the direction of...
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