R v Savage, DPP v Parmenter and the Law of Assault
| Author | Berni Bell,Kate Harrison |
| Published date | 01 January 1993 |
| Date | 01 January 1993 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1993.tb02855.x |
January
19931
R
v
Savage, DPP
v
Parmenter
and
the
Law
of
Assault
physical harm from property damage by referring to the particular kind of harm:
he
might equally have been referring to harm of the same degree of seriousness
as that set out in the
actus
reus.
Moreover, although
Mowatt
has been followed
in a handful of cases,55 the Court of Appeal in
Parmenter
plainly disapproved of
the decision, commenting that 'we do not disguise our opinion that the law
so
stated
will in marginal cases be as unworkable in practice as it is objectionable in
theory.'56 Thus, the House of Lords has again been diverted by a questionable line
of authority from addressing itself to the fundamental issues, a proper consideration
of which could have led to only one conclusion: that the referential point of fault
for section
20
should be foresight of a wound or grievous bodily harm.
Conclusion
There is thus some justification for regarding the result of these appeals as a
disappointment. The decision is perhaps all the more discouraging coming as it does
at a time when the House of Lords has revealed itself to be prepared to remove
anachronisms and illogicalities from other areas of the criminal law
.57
Indeed, the
case may be perceived as a conclusive demonstration of the common law's inability
to put its own house in order in relation to offences against the person. Perhaps
herein lies its one potential benefit, since the arguments for the intervention of
Parliament have now been rendered all the more compelling.
R
v
Savage, DPP
v
Parmenter
and the Law
of
Assault
Berni Bell and Kate Harrison"
The result of the important appeals in
R
v
Savage
and
DPP
v
Parmenter'
is that
both defendants stand convicted of offences under section
47
of the Offences Against
the Person Act
1861
(assault occasioning actual bodily harm). The purpose of this
note is to concentrate on the implications of the judgment specifically for the law
of assault.
Both Savage and Parmenter were originally charged, tried and convicted under
section
20
of the
1861
Act. Section
20
creates two offences, one of maliciously
wounding and the other of maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm.* Savage
was convicted of the former and Parmenter on four counts of the latter offence.
Savage had been charged following
an
argument
in
a pub. She had thrown the contents
55
Flack
v
Hunt;
Sullivan
(see n 45 above); and
R
v
Grimshaw
(see n 32 above). In
R
v
Jones
(1986)
83 Cr App
R
375, McCowan
J
expressed the tentative view that he would be reluctant
to
depart from
it.
56
per
Mustill
LJ,
at 712E and 417D. The Court of Appeal in
Savage
stated that, despite the doubts
that have been expressed about the case, they were bound
to
follow
Mowatt.
57
R
v
R
[I9921
1
AC 599; [1991] 3
WLR
767.
*Bristol Polytechnic.
1
[1991] 3
WLR
914.
2 The fact that
s
20 creates two separate offences was not addressed in the judgment. The certified question
asked only whether a verdict of assault occasioning actual bodily harm was a permissible alternative
verdict on a count alleging unlawful wounding.
0
The
Modern
Law Review Limited
1993
83
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