R v Tandy and the Concept of Alcoholism as a Disease

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1990.tb01843.x
AuthorJonathan Goodliffe
Date01 November 1990
Published date01 November 1990
November
19901
Our
Patchy
Law
of
Privacy
-
Time to
do
Something about
It
a behind-the-scenes deal to abandon its declared intention to do something about the defective
state of our law.
Postscript
After this case note was written the Calcutt Committee published its Report
On
Privacy
and Related Matters (Cm 1102, June 1990). The Kaye decision, which the various law
reports have inexplicably chosen to ignore, is set out in Appendix 1. In chapter 12, which
repays careful reading, the Committee explains why it does not recommend at this stage
the introduction of a statutory tort of infringement of privacy; but the Committee is emphatic
that definitional difficulties did not influence this decision. It does, however, recommend
the establishment of a series of new criminal offences (leading to civil remedies as well)
which are similar (but not identical) to articles 184.2 and 368-371 of the French Criminal
Code and which would provide an effective remedy for victims in Mr Kaye’s position
(chapter
6).
Finally, in chapter 10, the Committee recommends increased protection of
the anonymity
of
victims of all sexual offences and not just rape, something which this
author has now been advocating for over four years. See The Times, 26 March 1986,
The Times, 18 November 1987 and ‘The Right to be Let Alone
v
Freedom of Speech’
[
19861 Public
Law
67.
R
v
Tandy
and the Concept
of
Alcoholism as a Disease
Jonathan
Goodliffe*
The
Court
of
Appeal’s
Decision in
R
v
Tundy
The
decision of the Court of Appeal in R
v
Tandy’ illustrates the inability of most
lawyers and judges to understand the concept
of
alcoholism as a disease. In that case the
defendant, who was an alcoholic, strangled her daughter to death. At the time she was
in a state which is described medically as ‘alcoholic amnesia’ and is more commonly known
as ‘blackout.’ In blackout an alcoholic may appear conscious of what he is doing and may
not appear to be drunk but subsequently has no recollection of his actions which often
involve the commission of serious crimes.
The defendant subsequently explained her crime by saying that she had been drinking
vodka rather than her usual Cinzano
or
barley wine. She was charged with murder. Her
defence was that she suffered from diminished responsibility within section 2( 1) of the
Homicide Act 1957 which reads:
Where a person kills
. .
.
he shall not be convicted of murder if he was suffering from such
abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested
or
retarded development of
mind
or
any inherent causes
or
induced by disease
or
injury) as substantially impaired his mental
responsibility
for
his acts and omissions in doing
.
. .
the killing.
The defendant, her legal advisers and the medical experts called on her behalf did not,
*Solicitor.
1
[I9891
1
WLR
350.
2
ibid
at
p
3536.
3
ibid
at
p
356E.
4
ibid
at
p
356E.
5
ibid
at
p
357C.

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