Raising the stakes: Land titling and electoral stability in Kenya
| Author | Kathleen Klaus |
| Published date | 01 January 2020 |
| Date | 01 January 2020 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319890383 |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles |
Raising the stakes: Land titling
and electoral stability in Kenya
Kathleen Klaus
Department of Politics, University of San Francisco
Abstract
How does large-scale land reform affect electoral stability and the prospects for election violence? While scholars have
theorized elite-level logics of land distribution, few studies analyze the effects of land reform on the attitudes of
ordinary citizens, and the implications such reforms have for electoral violence. The article uses an original survey and
qualitative interviews in coastal Kenya to examine the effects of the Kenyan government’s recent land titling
campaign, the most ambitious and extensive since independence. It theorizes and tests the micro-mechanisms
through which the selective distribution of land rights in the pre-electoral period heightens or lowers the stakes of
an electoral outcome by altering levels of political trust and perceived threat. Results indicate that title deed
beneficiaries are more likely to trust political institutions than non-beneficiaries. Yet, while title deed recipients are
more likely to trust state institutions, they are also more likely to fear the electoral process compared to non-
beneficiaries. The findings reveal how the perceived stakes of an election can vary across local spaces. Where political
trust is low and threat is high, citizens may view elections as particularly high-stakes events and, thus, may be more
willing to take on the costs of participation in violence to ensure their preferred political outcome, or to defend
themselves against anticipated attacks.
Keywords
Africa, distribution, election violence, Kenya, land rights, micro-level
Introduction
In recent years, scholars of democratization and political
violence have turned to the phenomenon of electoral
violence, focusing on the broad institutional and ethnic
configurations that make violence more likely (Birch &
Muchilinski, 2017). Existing theories tend to emphasize
the strategic calculations of national elites (Hafner-
Burton, Hyde & Jablonski, 2013; Wilkinson, 2004),
constitutional design, electoral rules and election type
(Fjelde & Ho
¨glund, 2016; Daxecker & Rauschenbach,
2019), state capacity (Brancati & Snyder, 2011), ethnic
polarization and exclusion (Eifert, Miguel & Posner,
2010; Brosche
´, Fjelde & Ho
¨glund, 2020), and the role
of international observers (Daxecker, 2012). Many of
these studies suggest that election violence is more likely
where the perceived stakes of an election are high
(Boone, 2011). Yet aside from a few notable studies on
electoral systems (Fjelde & Ho
¨glund, 2016) and party
competition (Wilkinson, 2004), scholars know very little
about how local-level factors affect perceived electoral
stakes. This article addresses this question by examining
how state-led distributive policies mitigate or exacerbate
such stakes. It examines one potentially powerful distri-
butive good: the selective allocation of title deeds to
individuals. As existing research on electoral violence
observes, in contexts where tenure institutions are weak
and land provides a source of livelihood and identifica-
tion, the distribution and enforcement of land rights can
be a highly contentious and divisive political process
(Boone, 2011; Dercon & Gutie
´rrez-Romero, 2011;
Klaus, forthcoming). Yet rather than predict the likeli-
hood of election violence, the article examines the micro-
mechanisms through which the distribution of land
Corresponding author:
kfklaus@usfca.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2020, Vol. 57(1) 30–45
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343319890383
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rights alters the stakes of an election, raising or mitigating
the likelihood for violent conflict. It does so by focusing
on how the acquisition or loss of land rights in the pre-
electoral period shape an individual’s level of political
trust and perception of election-time threat.
A large literature in political economy considers the
logics of distribution, focusing on the strategic target-
ing of social services and material goods. Scholars of
African politics, for example, emphasize the role of
ethnic identity in shaping both the provision of pub-
lic goods and voter expectations of distributive returns
(e.g. Nathan, 2016). Other studies analyze how elites
grant or withhold property rights to consolidate polit-
ical support or suppress rebellion(Boone,2014).Yet,
while theories of distributive politics and election vio-
lence provide insight into the incentives of political
elites, few studies specify how such strategies shape
the attitudes and beliefs of ordinary citizens and how
these changes can alter the possibilities for electoral
violence.
Drawing on studies of land politics, electoral violence,
and clientelism, I examine the mechanisms through
which the distribution of land rights affects political trust
and perceived threat. Observing changes in trust and
threat can have implications for predicting the local
spaces that are more vulnerable to electoral violence.
Broadly, I argue that gaining or losing land rights alters
the perceived stakes of an election by changing an indi-
vidual’s level of political trust or perceived threat. By
‘stakes’, I refer to the ways that individuals link elections
with their ability to secure property, resources, services,
and livelihood. Elections in much of Africa are particu-
larly high stakes events due to the persistence of patron–
client politics, whereby citizens believe that the electoral
loss of their political patron translates into their inability
to secure essential goods and services (e.g. Posner, 2005;
So
¨derberg Kovacs & Bjarnesen, 2018). As Fjelde &
Ho
¨glund (2016) observe, the ‘winner takes all’ structure
of majoritarian elections heightens this zero-sum view of
elections. The possibilities for election violence are thus
higher where elites and citizens alike view elections as
high-stakes moments (e.g. Ho
¨glund, 2009; Daxecker,
2012).
To evaluate this argument, I examine the effects of a
highly ambitious title deed distribution program carried
out by the Kenyan government between 2013 and 2017.
Rather than test a set of predictions, this article serves as a
plausibility probe to explore a set of micro-mechanisms
that may alter the stakes of an election. The analysis
draws on data from an original survey that I conducted
in Kenya’s Coast region in the month preceding the
country’s August 2017 general election. As the 2017
general election approached, the Jubilee Administration
claimed to have issued 3.2 million title deeds across the
county (Kenya Land Alliance, 2018). This number com-
pares to the 5.6 million title deeds that the government
issued over the preceding 50 years since gaining inde-
pendence (1963–2013). This surge in land titling in the
lead-up to Kenya’s 2017 election offers a critical moment
to analyze the effects of this program by comparing the
attitudes of title deed beneficiaries with non-
beneficiaries. I sampled respondents in three sites across
Kwale county: (1) those where the state expropriated
land rights; (2) where the state issued title deeds; and
(3) where there no significant change in tenure status. In
addition, because Kwale county is ethnically homoge-
nous, sampling within the county enables me to better
observe the independent effects of title deed allocation or
eviction. I find that title deed beneficiaries are, overall,
more likely to trust state and electoral institutions com-
pared to non-beneficiaries and those who have lost land
rights. Yet, while title deed recipients are more trusting
of state institutions, they are nonetheless more likely to
see elections as moments of threat compared to non-
beneficiaries.
This article aims to contribute to scholarship on elec-
tions and violence. Some of these studies examine the
effects of vote-buying and electoral violence on voter
behavior (e.g. Bratton, 2008; Gutie
´rrez-Romero, 2014;
Ho
¨glund & Piyarathne, 2009), focusing primarily on
how the exchange of gifts or the threat of violence alters
vote choice and turnout. Gutie
´rrez-Romero & LeBas
(2020), for example, find that for most voters, the use
of election violence erodes rather than bolsters support
for a given candidate.
1
A related set of studies examines
elite decisions to use electoral fraud, vote-buying, or
intimidation (e.g. Mares & Young, 2016). For instance,
Gonzales-Ocantos et al. (2020) find that parties may rely
on intimidation where the cost of buying votes is prohi-
bitively high. This article departs from these studies in
important ways. First, rather than focus on vote-buying
as the exchange of money or gifts, it analyzes the effects
of land titling, which represents a distinct form of polit-
ical exchange. In theorizing this exchange, it engages
with a set of studies focusing on the power of patronage
networks (Berenschot, 2020) and, more specifically, the
use of land distribution as a patronage good (Boone,
1
Importantly, the authors also find that the very poor and those who
have experienced previous election violence are less likely to sanction
candidates who have used violence.
Klaus 31
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