Rawlance v Croydon Corporation
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Year | 1952 |
| Date | 1952 |
| Court | Court of Appeal |
Housing - House in some respects unfit for human habitation - Notice from local authority to do specified repairs - Service on landlord - Tenant liable to do indoor repairs - Premises rent controlled - “Person having control of house” - “Person who receives the rack-rent … or who would so receive it if the house were let at a rack-rent shall be deemed to the the person having control of the house” - “‘Rack-rent’ means rent which is not less than two-thirds of the full net annual value of the house” -
By section 9 (1) of the Housing Act, 1936, local authorities are empowered to serve upon the person having control of a house which is officially reported to be in any respect unfit for human habitation, a notice requiring him to execute such works, specified in the notice, as will render the house fit for human habitation. By subsection (4) the person who receives the rack-rent of the house or who would receive it if the house were let at a rack-rent, shall be deemed to be the person having control of the house, and the expression “rack-rent” means rent not less than two-thirds of the full net annual value of the house. In ascertaining the full net annual value the fact that the rent of the house is controlled by the Rent Restriction Acts is to be taken into consideration, for they restrict the value of the house to the landlord, and since the standard rent of such a house, plus statutory increases, is the full amount which the landlord can receive from the tenant, that rent is the full net annual value of the house within the meaning of subsection (4).
Thus, where a house was let at a controlled rent of £45 it was held that the landlord was receiving a rack-rent though that rent was less than two-thirds of the net annual value of the house on the hypothesis that there were no statutory restrictions on the rent and therefore the notice to repair was properly served on him.
Poplar Assessment Committee v. Roberts [
Reasoning of Atkin L.J. in Roberts v. Poplar Assessment Committee [
APPEAL from Judge Sir Gerald Hurst Q.C., sitting at Croydon county court.
The respondent, Mr. Alma du Hamel Rawlance, was the owner of the freehold of a dwelling-house, No. 3 Burlington Road, Thornton Heath, which was let on a yearly tenancy at a rent of £45 per annum, exclusive of rates, the tenant being liable for internal and the landlord for external repairs. The house was within the Rent Restriction Acts. It had been let in 1914 at a rent of £35 per annum, the rent of £45 representing that sum plus the increases permitted under the Acts. That rent was admittedly less than two-thirds of the value of the house, if that value were to be calculated on the assumption that the house was not within the Rent Restriction Acts. An official of the Croydon Corporation having reported that the house was unfit for human habitation by reason of the condition of the kitchen floor, the corporation served on the landlord a notice under section 9 of the Housing Act, 1936, F1 requiring him to execute certain specified works which, in their opinion, would render the house fit for human habitation.
The landlord appealed and the county court judge held, applying Poplar Assessment Committee v. Roberts, F2 that in ascertaining the full annual value of the house the Rent Restriction Acts were to be disregarded, and as £45 was less than two-thirds of that value ascertained on that hypothesis the landlord was not in receipt of a rack-rent, that he was not the person who would receive the rack-rent if the house were so let, and that therefore the notice was improperly served on him. The corporation appealed.
M. Lyell for the corporation.
M. Hoare for the landlord.
The arguments of counsel sufficiently appear in the judgments.
SOMERVELL L.J. stated the facts, read section 9 of the Housing Act, 1936, and continued:- It is common ground that the rent of £45 is less than two-thirds of the net annual value on the hypothesis that there were no statutory restrictions on the rent. On that hypothesis, therefore, the landlord would not be receiving a rack-rent. There would remain the question whether he was within the latter words of subsection (4) as the person who would receive the rack-rent if the house were so let. It is clear, in the first place, that the section is not concerned with the liability as between the person having control and a lessee for the repairs required by the notice. If there is a lessee who is liable under covenant for the repairs in question the person having control is required to do them and is left to exercise any remedy he may have under the covenant to recoup himself.
The county court judge held that the Rent Restriction Acts could not be treated as relevant to the meaning of the words “rack-rent” as defined, and he was led to this conclusion by the reasoning of the House of Lords in Poplar Assessment Committee v. Roberts.F3 He therefore held first that the landlord was not in receipt of a rack-rent. He further held that the landlord was not the person who would receive the rack-rent if the house was so let. The notice was therefore improperly served. With respect I have come to a different conclusion. The first question turns on whether in arriving at the “full net annual value” in the context of this subsection one has to have regard to the limitations placed by the Rent Restriction Acts on what is recoverable by the landlord as rent in respect of the annual value.
Poplar Assessment Committee v. RobertsF3 was relied on by each party to the appeal. Mr. Hoare, for the landlord, relied on the decision, and Mr. Lyell, for the local authority, on the reasoning. In that case the courts had to consider the effect of the Rent Restriction Acts in the application of the definition of gross value in the
The first relevant question in the case stated was whether the Rent Restriction Act was to be taken into account, and the second question was whether the highest gross value which could be placed was the standard rent plus permitted increases. Atkin L.J., who was of the majority, dealt with these two question as followsF4: “Applying the principles discussed above to the present case, the first question to be answered in the special case is: (2) Whether the said
“The second question, No. 3 in the special case, is: Whether the highest gross value which can be assigned to and placed upon the said hereditament … is the standard rent plus the highest increases of rent provided for in section 2 (1) (c)...
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Gldlow-Jackson v Middlegate Properties Ltd
...lets into account: because no rent could be charged which exceeded the rent permitted by the Acts, The situation is covered by Rawlance v. Croydon Corporation (1952) 2 Q. B. 803, rather than Poplar v. Roberts (1922) 2 A. C, 93. 32 Although it was right to take the Rent Acts into account, I ......
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