Re Coventry, decd.; Coventry v Coventry
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Year | 1979 |
| Date | 1979 |
| Court | Chancery Division |
Family Provision - Son - “Reasonable financial provision” - Son sharing accommodation with father - Father dying intestate - Son in good health and earning - Deceased wife, estranged from husband and son, living on pension and supplementary benefit - Whether reasonable financial provision to be made for son -
The plaintiff, who was born in 1931, was the only child of the deceased and the defendant. In 1957, the defendant left home, never to return, having been induced to leave by joint conduct towards her of her husband, the deceased, and the plaintiff. Thereafter the plaintiff lived with his father in the former matrimonial home until his father's death on June 10 1976, and at the date of the hearing he was still living there. Between 1957 and the deceased's death, the plaintiff had enjoyed rent free accommodation, but had provided his father's food and had contributed to the outgoings. The deceased had made no will, dying intestate, and the defendant, his widow, took out letters of administration to his estate. The estate consisted substantially of the deceased's share in the value of the former matrimonial home, a third of which belonged to the defendant who had contributed to its purchase. The house was valued at about £12,000, so that, after allowing for the costs of administration and of the legal proceedings, the amount available for possible distribution was some £7,000. Under the laws of intestacy the whole value of the estate would go to the defendant, as next of kin. The defendant brought proceedings in the county court for possession of the former matrimonial home, but those proceedings were transferred to the High Court and were heard together with the present proceedings in which the plaintiff sought an order for such property transfer, lump sum payment or periodical payments to be made to him out of his father's estate as the court might think fit, under the provisions of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. The plaintiff was able bodied, in good health and was earning about £70 a week as a self employed chauffeur. He was under a duty to pay maintenance of £12 per week for the benefit of his children, so that after allowing for tax and national insurance contributions, his disposable weekly income was reduced to about £40 a week. The defendant had not been maintained in any way by the deceased since she left home in 1957, and her sole income was derived from an old-age pension and supplementary benefits, and amounted to about 26.76 a week. The claim made by the plaintiff was that a lump sum of £7,000 should be paid to him, thus depriving the defendant of the whole of her statutory entitlement. The master was prepared to award him £2,000.
On the plaintiff's request, the matter having been adjourned to the judge: —
Held, that on the true construction of section 1 (1) and (2) of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, the “reasonable financial provision” to be provided in the case of a “child of the deceased” was confined to reasonable provision for such child's maintenance; that “maintenance” was to be construed in the same way as under previous legislation and the existing body of case law built up under the
The following cases are referred to in the judgment:
Black-Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg A.G. [
Christie, decd., In re [
Ducksbury, decd., In re [
E., decd., In re [
Millward v. Shenton [
Styler, In re [
Sylvester, In re [
Wachtel v. Wachtel [
The following additional cases were cited in argument:
Borthwick, decd., In re [
Chamberlain v. Chamberlain [
Sivyer, decd., In re [
ORIGINATING SUMMONS
On June 10, 1976, Albert James Coventry died intestate. By an originating summons dated March 22, 1977, his son, Albert Edward Coventry, the plaintiff, sought an order for such property transfer, lump sum payment or periodical payments as the court might think fit to be made to him out of his father's estate, under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. The defendant, Blanche Elizabeth Coventry, was the plaintiff's mother and, the widow of the deceased, who had lived apart from her husband since 1957. The plaintiff had lived with his father at the former matrimonial home, 41, Glanville Road, Hayes, Middlesex, since that date, and was still living there at the date of the hearing.
The defendant had commenced proceedings in the Uxbridge County Court for possession of 41, Glanville Road, but those proceedings had been transferred to the High Court and were heard together with the present proceedings.
The facts are stated in the judgment.
Michael Stephen for the plaintiff.
G. T. Harrap for the defendant.
November 9. OLIVER J. read the following judgment. This is an application under section 2 of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. The plaintiff is a son, and the only child, of the deceased who died intestate on June 10, 1976. The defendant is the plaintiff's mother, and the widow of the intestate, and she is, under the provisions of the
The estate is a modest one and consists substantially of the intestate's interest in a dwelling house, 41 Granville Road, Hayes, Middlesex. in which he was living with the plaintiff at the date of his death, and which is still occupied by the plaintiff. There was, in addition, a small amount of insurance money — all of which has been used to defray, in part, the intestate's funeral expenses — and an insignificant sum — possibly some £50 or so — in respect of such chattels constituting the contents of the dwelling house as belonged to the intestate.
The summons in this matter was issued on March 22, 1977, and seems to have been the plaintiff's riposte to possession proceedings commenced by the defendant against him, for possession of the house, in the Uxbridge County Court. Those proceedings were transferred to the High Court to come on with the present summons, and they alone came before me on October 12, 1978, on an adjournment from the master, the intention that both proceedings should be heard together having, apparently, been lost sight of. I took the view that they should continue to be heard together, and directed the present summons to be brought before me, so that both sets of proceedings are now before the court.
The evidence filed in the inheritance proceedings threw up certain issues of fact and the matter was originally tried in chambers before the master, who received oral evidence and who subsequently delivered a written judgment. The matter was then adjourned to the judge and there should, technically, have been a re-hearing on the transcript of the proceedings before the master. In fact, in the time which has elapsed since I directed that the matter was to be brought before me and to come on with the possession proceedings, it has not been possible to obtain a full transcript from the mechanical recording department, but counsel have, very sensibly agreed to accept the master's findings of fact. I shall have to refer to some of those findings a little later, but there is one finding to which I should allude straight away, because it crucially affects the size of the estate with which the application is concerned. The master found, on the evidence, that the defendant widow had made a substantial contribution to the purchase of the dwelling house vested in the deceased and, on the basis of that finding, it is now common ground between the parties that the deceased's beneficial interest in the property was limited to two-thirds, the remaining one-third being held by him, at all material times, on trust for the defendant. At the date of the hearing before the master the value of the house with vacant possession was some £10,000 and the net estate out of which provision was sought by the plaintiff was therefore of the order of £5,500 after payment of the estimated costs of administration. The master concluded that the plaintiff had established a claim under the Act and proposed to award him, out of the estate, a lump sum of £2,000.
It is now agreed that the value of the house is about £12,000 and at the present moment, I approach the case on the footing that, disregarding any sums payable by the plaintiff for use and occupation since his father's death, which would form a deduction from any award under the Act, the estate available is about £8,000 subject to the costs of these proceedings and of administration which cannot now well be less than £1,000. Effectively, therefore, the disposable balance is some £7,000.
The defendant is an elderly lady living...
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- Re Coventry, decd.; Coventry v Coventry
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Ilot v Mitson
...v Treasury Solicitor[1997] 1 FCR 188, [1996] 2 FLR 716, CA. Coventry (decd), Re [1979] 3 All ER 815, [1980] Ch 461, CA; affg [1979] 2 All ER 408, [1980] Ch Debenham (decd), Re [1986] 1 FLR 404. Dennis (decd), Re [1981] 2 All ER 140. Ducksbury (decd), Re, Ducksbury v Ducksbury [1966] 2 All E......
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Baynes v Hedger and Others
...EWHC 3230 (Ch), [2004] 3 FCR 744, [2004] 2 FLR 989, [2003] WTLR 779. Coventry (decd), Re [1979] 3 All ER 815, [1980] Ch 461, CA; affg [1979] 2 All ER 408, [1980] Ch 461. Crake v Supplementary Benefits Commission [1982] 1 All ER 498. Dennis (decd), Re [1981] 2 All ER 140. Espinosa v Bourke[1......
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Ilott v Mitson (1st Respondent) Michael Peter Lane (personal representatives of Melita Jackson Deceased) (2nd Respondent) The Blue Cross Animal Welfare Charity (3rd Respondent) Royal Society for The Protection of Birds (4th Respondent) Royal Society for The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (5th Respondent)
...to maintenance. The applicant has to show that the will fails to make provision for his maintenance: see Re Coventry (deceased) [1979] 2 All ER 408, [1980] Ch 461; affd [1979] 3 All ER 815, [1980] Ch 461. In that case both Oliver J at first instance and Goff LJ in the Court of Appeal disa......