Re-electing MEPs: The factors determining re-election probabilities
| Author | Elena Frech |
| DOI | 10.1177/1465116515615681 |
| Published date | 01 March 2016 |
| Date | 01 March 2016 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
European Union Politics
2016, Vol. 17(1) 69–90
!The Author(s) 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/1465116515615681
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Article
Re-electing MEPs:
The factors determining
re-election probabilities
Elena Frech
University of Mannheim, Germany
Abstract
By placing candidates on electoral lists for European elections, national parties hold a
very powerful position in the (re-)election of Members of the European Parliament
(MEPs). This article analyses the factors or individual characteristics of MEPs that affect
list placement decisions. I identify three possible national party goals in European elec-
tions, legislative leverage, loyalty and attractiveness to voters, and examine evidence for
each. Based on a unique data set of German MEPs from 1999–2009, the analysis shows
that national parties, in particular small parties, value MEPs from more powerful com-
mittees. National parties furthermore reward MEPs with national party positions during
the European Parliament term. Surprisingly, I find little evidence that German parties
reward very loyal parliamentarians.
Keywords
Candidate selection, European elections, European Parliament, Germany, party behavior
There’s firstly the track record of someone, that means what did he previously do?
How does he present himself? And thirdly, what does he want to do in future?
— Party Member on List Placement Criteria
Introduction
National parties are powerful principals of Members of the European Parliament
(MEPs) (see Faas, 2003; Hix, 2002; Hix et al., 2007). As the agent, the MEP is
Corresponding author:
Elena Frech, Collaborative Research Center SFB 884, ‘Political Economy of Reforms’, University of Mannheim,
L13 15, 68131 Mannheim, Germany.
Email: frech@uni-mannheim.de
‘torn’ between two principals: the party group inside the European Parliament (EP)
and the national party (Hix, 2002). To be successful MEPs should cater to the
interests of influential groups inside the EP, such as their EP party group; however,
the national party selects MEPs for re-election. National parties decide upon the
position of every candidate on their electoral list. In particular, in closed list pro-
portional representation election systems where voters are unable to influence the
list ordering, party placements effectively determine the re-election probability of
their MEPs. While a robust literature on European elections has emerged, virtually
all of it neglects the earlier role of list placements (for exceptions see Gherghina and
Chiru, 2010; Meserve et al., 2011).
This article sheds light on the national parties’ candidate selection for European
elections. It seeks to find out which factors affect the re-election probability of
MEPs. The characteristics national parties value in their parliamentarians
depend in large part upon their goals. This article identifies three party goals in
European elections, each of which identifies a different set of factors that influence
the re-election probabilities of MEPs. First, parties want MEPs who possess legis-
lative leverage (i.e. the potential and opportunity to influence decision making and
policy inside the EP). Second, national parties also desire loyal MEPs. Finally,
parties are interested in MEPs who attract votes.
What I call ‘factors’ in this article are essentially the individual characteristics of
MEPs related to behavior, past experience or qualities on the national or EU level
(for example, national political experience: Gherghina and Chiru, 2010; Hobolt
and Høyland, 2011; Meserve et al., 2011; or previous positions and activities in the
EP Lyder Hermansen, 2014; Sigalas, 2011). I complement factors identified in
previous research with a number of factors that contribute to the re-election of
MEPs: the type of legislative committee an MEP was a part of in the previous
legislative term (committee power) as well as variables related to the electoral
institutions, national party offices and competition.
1
I investigate factors influencing the re-election probabilities of MEPs based on
an innovative data set linking behavioral data, biographical information and party
list positions of German MEPs between 1999 and 2009. In EP elections Germany
maintains proportional representation in the form of a closed list system with a 5
per cent electoral threshold until 2009. Candidate selection of German parties for
European elections is partially informal and often dominated by the local and
district/regional party level. German parties select their MEP candidates either
on a national level or on a German state level. German parties thus have either
one (SPD, Greens, FDP, and Linke) or 16 (CDU/CSU) electoral lists. Another
feature of German candidate selection for the EP is the importance of the constitu-
ency, region or federal state. Geographical parity is an important principle within
German parties (Mittag, 2013, 202), and also respected in European elections.
Aiming for an even distribution of MEPs and thus for a fair representation of
voters, German parties with one federal electoral list have formal or informal rules
for aggregating MEP candidate proposals from different German regions or states
onto one list.
70 European Union Politics 17(1)
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