Re F (Children) (Care: Termination of Contact), Re sub nom F (Minors) (Care Proceedings: Contact)
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judgment Date | 2000 |
| Year | 2000 |
| Date | 2000 |
| Court | Family Division |
Care proceedings – Parental contact – Termination of contact – Local authority applying for care orders – Care plan adoption with annual letter box contact to mother – Mother seeking on-going face-to-face contact after adoption – Local authority applying for leave to terminate mother’s contact with children – Whether order granting local authority leave to terminate parental contact ‘Human Rights compliant’ – Children Act 1989, s 34(4).
Human Rights – Care proceedings – Children in care – Termination of parental contact – Whether order granting local authority leave to terminate parental contact ‘Human Rights compliant’ – Children Act 1989, s 34(4).
On 22 March 1999 the local authority commenced care proceedings in respect of the three children who were aged five, three and two respectively. Interim care orders were made in August and thereafter the children were removed from the mother and placed into foster care. The local authority’s care plan was for the children to be placed for adoption as soon as possible, and they proposed a gradual reduction of contact with the mother once the care orders were made; and that prior to the introduction to prospective adopters, face-to-face contact would be replaced by post-adoption annual ‘letter box’ contact. As the mother wanted on-going face-to-face contact after adoption if that was what happened to the children, the local authority also applied for leave to terminate her contact with the children, pursuant to s 34(4) of the Children Act 1989. The justices made the care orders and also granted the local authority leave to terminate contact. The mother appealed against the order under s 34(4) of the 1989 Act contending, inter alia, that the justices had failed to give proper consideration to arts 6(1) or 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the European Convention on Human Rights) in that, once the order under s 34(4) of the 1989 Act was made, a decision by the local authority to terminate contact in due course would be administrative, not judicial, and would be ‘wrong in law’.
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a Section 34 of the Children Act 1989, so far as material, is set out at p 487h–488f, post
b Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, so far as material, provides: ‘(1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law . . .’
c Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, so far as material, is set out at p 497f–497g, post
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Held – There was nothing in s 34 of the 1989 Act which was not ‘Human Rights compliant’ when used in appropriate cases as an inherent part of a care plan
approved by the court and as a means of avoiding drift or delay in the interests of the child concerned. The justices in the instant case had adopted a very sensible approach: they had applied the various provisions of the 1989 Act to the facts of the case before them, and then used the Human Rights Act 1998, and arts 6 and 8 of the Convention as set out in Sch 1 to that Act as cross-checks to ensure what they had done was fair and necessary in the interests of the children. They concluded, correctly, that it was, and that decision was both correct and proportionate. The appeal would be dismissed.
Per curiam. It would be disappointing if the European Convention for Human Rights were to be routinely paraded in cases of this nature as make-weight grounds of appeal, or if there were to be extensive citation of authorities from the European Court of Human Rights in every case, particularly where reliance is placed on cases pre-dating the Children Act 1989.
Cases referred to in judgmentB (children in care: contact), Re [1993] 1 FCR 363; sub nom Re B (minors) (termination of contact: paramount consideration) [1993] Fam 301, [1993] 3 All ER 524, [1994] 3 WLR 63; sub nom Re B (minors) (care: contact: local authority’s plans) [1993] 1 FLR 543, CA; rvsg [1993] 1 FCR 363.
D and H (care: termination of contact), Re [1997] 1 FLR 841, CA.
E (children in care: contact), Re [1994] 1 FCR 584; sub nom Re E (a minor) (care order: contact) [1994] 1 FLR 146, CA.
L (minors) (care proceedings: appeal), Re [1996] 2 FCR 352; sub nom Re L (sexual abuse: standard of proof) [1996] 1 FLR 116, CA.
T (children in care: contact), Re [1997] 3 FCR 73; sub nom Re T (minors) (termination of contact: discharge of order) [1997] 1 All ER 65, [1997] 1 WLR 393, [1997] 1 FLR 517, CA.
W v UK (denial of access to children taken into public care) (1987) 10 EHRR 29, ECt HR.
AppealThe mother of three children appealed from the decision of justices sitting at Eastbourne Family Proceedings Court on 14 February 2000 whereby on the local authority’s application they made an order under s 34(4) of the Children Act 1989 granting it leave to terminate her contact with the children in accordance with the care plan. The facts are set out in the judgment.
Aviva Le Prevost (instructed by Shuttleworth & Co) for the mother.
Michael Valks (instructed by the local authority solicitor) for the local authority.
Elizabeth Szwed (instructed by Hart Reade Solicitors) for the guardian ad litem.
Cur adv vult
8 June 2000. The following judgment was handed down in open court.
WALL J.In this appeal, the mother of three children whom I will identify by the initials, JF, JW and TW, seeks to overturn an order made on 14 February 2000 by the Eastbourne Family Proceedings Court giving the local authority leave to terminate her contact with the children, pursuant to s 34(4) of the Children Act 1989.
JF is a boy, born on 25 October 1994; JW, also a boy, was born on 1 April 1996; TW is a girl, born on 20 September 1997. The children were thus respectively five years and three months; three years and ten months; and two years and four months at the date of the justices’ order.
The principal orders made by the justices on 14 February 2000 were care orders in relation to all three children. The mother does not appeal those orders.
JW and TW have the same father. JF has a different father. Neither father has parental responsibility, nor is the mother living with either. Both are irrelevant for the purposes of this appeal.
The case before the justices took four days. There was abundant material before them. There was a substantial amount of documentation, which included medical reports on the children. They also heard a great deal of oral evidence. Firstly, they had the evidence of the key social worker in the case, who had the advantage of having been the social worker throughout the local authority’s period of involvement with the mother and the children. They then heard from the health visitor, who first met the family in July 1996. They heard from a specialist speech and language therapist instructed by the guardian ad litem to assess the extent of the mother’s language difficulties; they heard from a chartered clinical psychologist instructed by the guardian ad litem to make an assessment of the mother’s capacity adequately to parent the children. They heard from the mother herself and from the guardian ad litem.
At the end of the case, the justices gave clear and cogent reasons for making care orders. The case for doing so was very powerful—indeed, one might say, overwhelming. The justices, in their findings on disputed facts, set out a catalogue of neglect. Under the heading ‘safety in the home and beyond’ they detail (inter alia) JF setting fires, playing with matches and electric sockets. They describe an occasion when JF trod on a bag containing broken glass, and another when he climbed into the washing machine. They give numerous examples of the children not being properly supervised and found wandering away from home. They make findings about the standards of hygiene in the home and the lack of any routine for the children; about the children being left with unsuitable carers; about the lack of stimulation and the absence of any commitment by the mother to the children being introduced to formal education. They find that the children have suffered significant harm by way of neglect. They then go on to say:
‘We find that the children should not be returned to [the mother] as there is substantial evidence to show that [she] is unable adequately to supervise,
feed or safeguard the children physically, emotionally and educationally. There have been numerous incidents of the children wandering from the house unsupervised. There (sic) are highlighted in [the social worker’s] statement . . . The children have not been given a balanced diet and this is highlighted by the low weight gain of the children and the observations of the Guardian ad Litem . . . We find that Social Services put in intensive work over a long period of time . . . [the mother] disagreed with this and put the blame on others for any deficiencies . . . We find that even with sufficient support from the various agencies [the mother] could not care for at least once (sic) of the children at home.’
The justices were clearly impressed by and accepted the evidence of the professional witnesses, particularly that of the social worker and the guardian ad litem. They rejected the mother’s evidence, albeit in sympathetic terms:
‘[The mother’s] evidence was given in a way that was totally at odds with all the other evidence given. Although she believed what she was saying we find it very difficult to accept. She did, however, remain calm despite lengthy questioning in a stressful situation.’
There is not, nor could there be, any appeal against the making of the care orders, or, indeed, against any of the clear findings made by the justices. It is, however, in my judgment, important when considering the mother’s appeal against the order under s 34(4) of the 1989 Act to bear in mind throughout: (1) the serious nature of the case against the mother; (2)...
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Bcc v L
...English decisions which have had regard to convention rights, in particular Article 8 (e.g. Re F (Care: Termination of Contact) [2000] 2 FCR 481, in particular 488G to 491H, where Wall J. helpfully summarises existing English authority and at 495D to 498D, where he deals with arguments rela......
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Re R (Care: Disclosure: Nature of Proceedings)
...and English decisions which have had regard to Convention rights, in particular Article 8 (e.g. Re F (Care: Termination of Contact) [2000] 2 FCR 481, in particular 488G to 491H, where Wall J. helpfully summarises existing English authority and at 495D to 498D, where he deals with arguments ......