Jordan’s (Hugh) Applications 13/002996/1; 13/002223/1; 13/037869/1

JurisdictionNorthern Ireland
JudgeMorgan LCJ,Girvan LJ,Gillen J
Judgment Date17 November 2014
Neutral Citation[2014] NICA 76
Docket NumberMOR9446
CourtCourt of Appeal (Northern Ireland)
Date17 November 2014
1
Neutral Citation No. [2014] NICA 76
Ref:
MOR9446
Judgment: approved by the Court for handing down
Delivered:
17/11/2014
(subject to editorial corrections)*
IN HER MAJESTY’S COURT OF APPEAL IN NORTHERN IRELAND
________
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION (JUDICIAL REVIEW)
________
IN THE MATTER OF THREE APPLICATIONS BY HUGH JORDAN FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW
JORDAN’S APPLICATIONS 13/002996/1; 13/002223/1; 13/037869/1
Before: Morgan LCJ, Girvan LJ and Gillen LJ
________
MORGAN LCJ (delivering the judgment of the court)
[1] This is the judgment of the court to which each member has contributed.
[2] On 25 November 1992 Patrick Pearse Jordan (the deceased) was shot and
killed at Falls Road, Belfast by an officer of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)
later identified as Sgt A, a member of the RUC's Headquarters Mobile Support Unit
(HMSU). These are appeals and cross appeals in respect of judicial review
applications by Hugh Jordan, the father of the deceased, concerning the
investigation of his son's death and the conduct of an inquest which was heard
before the Coroner, Mr Sherrard, with a jury between 24 September 2012 and 26
October 2012. Mr Macdonald QC and Ms Quinlivan QC appeared for Mr Jordan, Mr
McGleenan QC and Mr Wolfe appeared for the PSNI and Mr Simpson QC and Mr
Dornan appeared for the Coroner. We are grateful to all counsel for their helpful
written and oral submissions.
Background
[3] Stephens J heard the judicial review touching on the inquest. He summarised
the material evidence given in the hearing at paragraphs 33 to 42 of his judgment.
He stated that the central issue in the inquest was whether the killing was justified.
He then considered at paragraphs 46 to 48 the factual questions which had to be
2
determined in relation to the shooting of the deceased, the debrief of those involved
and the planning and control of the operation. There was no criticism of those
paragraphs in the course of the hearing of these appeals and we consider it
appropriate to incorporate them in this judgment with some minor modifications.
Inquest evidence
[4] Detective Superintendent AB and Detective Inspector AA gave evidence that
they were part of the Tasking and Co-ordinating Group (TCG) responsible for co-
ordinating a joint police/Army surveillance operation mounted in West Belfast on
25 November 1992 to monitor activity at Arizona St., which was thought to be a
location for IRA bomb-making for the city centre and throughout the province. On
22 November 1992, three days earlier, a bomb had been defused in the city centre in
Chichester Street. TCG were in radio communication with HMSU officers who were
at the scene. The arrangement was that HMSU officers would act in support of
surveillance personnel and might be tasked to stop a vehicle or perform searches.
That afternoon, both AA and AB were in the operations room at Castlereagh. At
around 3.40 pm there was a report that a red Ford Orion, BDZ 7721, was being
driven in the area of Whiterock Leisure Centre and appeared to be on IRA business.
AB said that the information was that the car was delivering or collecting IRA
munitions. The Orion had been hijacked outside a community centre at Monagh
Road, Belfast between 3.15pm and 3.30pm by two men who told the driver that they
were “Irish Republican Army”. One of the men in the back seat gave the driver the
impression that he had a gun. He was told to drive to Whiterock Leisure Centre and
ordered to go to, and remain at, the swimming pool viewing gallery. One of the men
sat behind him. At approximately 7pm he was told to wait 10 minutes then report
the car to the police as being hijacked.
[5] At 4.30pm the Orion was observed leaving Arizona Street. It was seen to
travel in the direction of Upper Springfield Road and then went unsighted for a
period. At 5pm the Orion was observed returning to Arizona Street. At
approximately 5.08 pm the Orion left Arizona Street. It headed towards
Andersonstown. In view of the previous activity around Arizona Street AB
instructed M, a HMSU officer in the operation room, to have the car stopped. The
car had defective rear lights and that was to be used as a reason for checking the
vehicle out. He said that because of the earlier reports they could not let the vehicle
go without a check. At its height, it was a suspicious vehicle. He said that he did not
know who was driving it at that time.
[6] AA said that once a decision had been made to have the vehicle stopped the
task and tactics then passed to the HMSU officers on the ground. HMSU would not
have been instructed on how to stop the car. AA said he could not recall if there had
been any assessment of the risk of stopping. He said that the overriding concern was
whether a car bomb was going to the City Centre. The priority was to ensure that a
bomb did not go to the City Centre because the IRA was hell bent on a bombing
3
campaign. AA recalled that a few days after 25 November 1992 a bomb had
exploded in Upper Queen Street, Belfast, in which 27 people were injured.
[7] At around 5.18 pm HMSU reported that they had rammed the car after it had
failed to stop, that one person had run off and been shot by police. Following the
fatal shooting, a statement was released which claimed that the deceased was a
member of the IRA and that the car had been hijacked.
[8] Officer M’s specific role on that day was to direct communications and to
coordinate the HMSU units on the ground. He said that HMSU gave effect to TCG
decisions and that the rear stop was the safest way to stop the vehicle. He said that
he did not anticipate a high speed chase and if he had he would possibly then have
put crews into a different location. He accepted that he could be seen as being at
fault for not anticipating that particular eventuality.
[9] Sergeant A was the most senior HMSU officer on the ground. He was in the
front passenger seat of Call Sign 8. C was the driver of Call Sign 8 and B was the rear
seat passenger sitting behind Sergeant A. Call Sign 12 was working in support of
Call Sign 8. E was its driver, D was the front seat passenger and F was the rear seat
passenger.
[10] Sergeant A gave an account of the pursuit of the car on the Falls Road and
that account broadly matched the accounts given by the other officers in Call Sign 8.
Sergeant A directed the driver of his vehicle to drive alongside the Orion and he
signalled for Mr Jordan to stop. He said that Mr Jordan slowed down and then
accelerated city bound on Falls Road. He described ramming the Orion. He said
they tried a soft stop, which then became a forcible stop when Mr Jordan's car failed
to stop.
[11] Sergeant A's account of the shooting was that when the cars had stopped he
burst out of his vehicle from the passenger door and then moved back towards the
Orion. He said that he saw the driver of the Orion on the road. He stated in
evidence that the driver had already got out of the Orion by the time he got out of
his vehicle. He described him as running at an angle from left to right away from
him. He said that the driver had turned his head to the right, looking in his
direction. He said in his evidence that he could see the driver's upper body but
could not see the bottom part of his arms. He described the man's arms as being
straight down, but said he could not see his hands and claimed that he had shouted
“Halt police” or Police halt”. He said that the driver of the Orion, Mr Jordan,
turned towards him in a clockwise direction. In his account to the police, he used
the word "spun". He said that at this moment he feared that his life, or the life of the
driver of his car, was in danger. He fired a short burst from his firearm, a Heckler
and Koch MP 5. Sergeant A said that when he released the safety catch on his
weapon he erroneously pushed it too far as a result of which the weapon went onto
automatic rather than single shot. He fired 5 shots on automatic and maintained that

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