Re Monolithic Building Company. Tacon v The Company

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
Date1915
Year1915
CourtCourt of Appeal
[COURT OF APPEAL] In re MONOLITHIC BUILDING COMPANY. TACON v. THE COMPANY. [1914 M. 826.] 1914 Oct. 19, 20. 1915 Feb. 25, 26. ASTBURY J. LORD COZENS-HARDY M.R., PHILLIMORE L.J., and JOYCE J.

Company - Mortgages - Registration - Unregistered Mortgage - Notice - Priority - Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 69), s. 93.

Sect. 93 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, avoids an unregistered mortgage as against a subsequent registered incumbrancer even though he had express notice of the prior mortgage at the time when he took his own security.

Decision of Astbury J. reversed.

WITNESS ACTION.

The above company was incorporated as a private company on November 9, 1912.

By a mortgage dated March 3, 1913, the company conveyed certain freehold hereditaments at Barnet Gate to the plaintiff in fee simple by way of mortgage for securing the repayment with half-yearly interest of a sum of 500l. advanced by the plaintiff to the company.

The company's seal was affixed in the presence of the two managing directors, namely, the defendant Jenkins and another, and the secretary.

The company's solicitor acted for both parties in this transaction, but owing to a misapprehension of the law caused by a misstatement in a well-known text-book the mortgage, being a mortgage of land not for securing debentures, was not registered under s. 93 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908.F1

On June 12, 1913, the company issued a first mortgage debenture to the plaintiff to secure another advance of 800l. with half-yearly interest. This debenture stated that the 800l. advance was entirely independent and separate from the previous 500l. secured by the mortgage. The debenture created a floating charge on the company's undertaking and assets including the Barnet Gate property comprised in the mortgage.

The company's seal was affixed in the presence of the two managing directors and the secretary, and the debenture was registered on June 26, 1913.

On December 12, 1913, the company issued a second mortgage debenture to the defendant Jenkins to secure an advance of 500l. with half-yearly interest. This debenture was expressly subject to the plaintiff's debenture, but it did not mention the mortgage.

The company's seal was affixed in the presence of the defendant Jenkins and a new secretary who was also a director and the debenture was duly registered on December 24, 1913.

The indorsement on this debenture stated that it was “subject to prior incumbrances.” It was originally indorsed “subject to a prior incumbrance,” but there was no evidence when the alteration was made.

By a sub-mortgage dated March 3, 1914, the defendant Jenkins charged the moneys secured by his second debenture with the payment of certain moneys to the defendant Calway.

On March 13, 1914, Calway's solicitors gave the company's solicitor notice of this sub-mortgage, and pointed out that the mortgage of the plaintiff for whom he was also acting was void against the liquidator and any creditor for want of registration under s. 93.

By an order dated March 27, 1914, and made on the plaintiff's application against the company as sole respondent, the time for registration of the plaintiff's mortgage was extended until April 17, 1914, “without prejudice to the rights of parties acquired prior to the time when such mortgage shall be actually registered.” The mortgage was subsequently registered on April 3, 1914.

The mortgage interest due on March 3, 1914, was not paid and no interest had been paid on the first debenture.

On March 31, 1914, the plaintiff brought this action against the company and the defendants Jenkins and Calway to enforce her securities, claiming priority for her mortgage as well as her first debenture over the securities of the defendants Jenkins and Calway.

The priority of the first debenture was not contested, but the priority of the mortgage was contested on the ground that it had not been registered within twenty-one days of its creation, or at the time the securities of the defendants Jenkins and Calway were effected. The defendant Calway also relied on want of notice of the plaintiff's mortgage, but this point failed on the evidence.

The company appeared, but put in no defence, and as against them judgment went in default of defence.

The action came on for hearing before Astbury J. on October 19, 1914.

Hon. Frank Russell, K.C., and Lyttelton Chubb, for the plaintiff. The question is whether s. 93 avoids an unregistered mortgage against a subsequent registered incumbrancer with notice. Sub-s. 1 (d) provides that a mortgage or charge on any land “shall, so far as any security on the company's property or undertaking is thereby conferred, be void against the liquidator and any creditor of the company,” unless the prescribed particulars of the mortgage or charge, together with the instrument, are delivered to the registrar for registration within twenty-one days after its creation. Sub-s. 2 provides that the registrar shall register the date, amount, short particulars of the property, and the names of the mortgagees. Sub-s. 7 provides that it shall be the duty of the company to send the particulars of the mortgage to the registrar, but registration may be effected on the application of any person interested therein. Sect. 96 enables the Court to extend the time for registration. Sect. 99 imposes penalties on the company and its officers for knowing and wilful default. In the present case, however, all parties to the transaction were misled by the text-book, and the non-registration arose from an innocent mistake.

Now s. 93 is merely an extension of the Companies Act, 1900 (63 & 64 Vict. c. 48), s. 14, the purpose of which was to ensure the means of notice to those who contemplated giving credit to the company: In re Cardiff Workmen's Cottage Co.F2 Sect. 93 was evidently passed with the same object and not for the purpose of enabling a subsequent incumbrancer with notice to get priority.

The policy of the section is the same as that of the Middlesex Registry Act, 1708 (7 Anne, c. 20), which is explained in Le Neve v. Le NeveF3 and numerous other authorities. In the present case the defendant Jenkins is clearly postponed by notice, and as his security was only equitable, his assignee Calway, whether he had notice or not, is in no better position: Ford v. White.F4 The same rule obtained in the case of annuities that had not been registered under the Judgments Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 15), s. 12, and a purchaser with notice was postponed to the unregistered annuity: Greaves v. Tofield.F5

[ASTBURY J. Does s. 93 affect a going company at all?]

A going company cannot repudiate an unregistered mortgage, but a creditor without notice can do so.

[ASTBURY J. A registered title can only be affected by clear and distinct notice, amounting to fraud: Chadwick v. Turner.F6]

The notice here was clear and distinct. There was no fraud in taking and registering the second debenture. No one knew the mortgage required registration. But when the necessity for registration was discovered, it became a quasi-fraud to take advantage of the omission.

Sir Charles Macnaghten, K.C., and J. W. Manning, for the defendant Jenkins. There are two kinds of registration of company securities — (a) registration in the company's register, and (b) registration with the registrar. The former was directed by the Companies Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89), s. 43, now replaced by ss. 100, 101, of the Consolidation Act, and there was no provision for avoidance of the security in default of registration: Wright v. Horton.F7 The latter, with which we are now dealing, was first imposed by the Companies Act, 1900, s. 14, and the security, in default of registration within twenty-one days, was avoided against the liquidator and any creditor.

The 1900 Act applied to mortgages for securing debentures, mortgage debentures, and other specified securities, but not to a mere mortgage of land. The was, however, included in the Companies Act, 1907 (7 Edw. 7, c. 50), s. 10, and is included in s. 93 of the Consolidation Act. It is clear, therefore, that registration of covering deeds and mortgage debentures has been in force for fourteen years, and registration of simple land mortgagee for seven years, and the fact that the point as to notice has never before been raised shows that there is no substance in it.

The Middlesex Registry Act, 1708, is entirely different from s. 93. There is no obligation to register, no time limit or provision for extending that limit, and no penalty for non-registration. An unregistered deed is merely avoided against a subsequent purchaser who registers, and in effect the Act does nothing more than give priority by registration. The annuity section of the Judgments Act, 1855, falls a fortiori in the same category. It merely provides that an annuity “shall not affect” any lands as to purchasers, mortgagees, or creditors, unless and until registered. Both Acts were designed to protect a limited class, namely, purchasers of specific land, against secret incumbrances on that land, and the Courts held that purchasers with notice did not require that protection.

Sect. 93 is quite different. Registration is obligatory. There is a time limit with a provision for extending it. Penalties are imposed in default of registration, and the security is avoided not merely against subsequent mortgagees of the same property who register, but against all creditors. It is no longer a case of losing priority against registered securities, it is a case of absolute avoidance against any creditor.

This class of registration is very analogous to registration under the Bills of Sale Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 31). Sect. 8 imposed a time limit of seven days for registration and s. 14 enabled the Court to extend the time. Unregistered bills of sale were avoided against assignees in bankruptcy and execution creditors. This analogy is really recognized in In re Joplin Brewery Co.F8, In...

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