Realism, moralism, models and institutions
| Published date | 01 June 2016 |
| Date | 01 June 2016 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1755088215626939 |
| Author | Christopher Bertram |
Journal of International Political Theory
2016, Vol. 12(2) 185 –199
© The Author(s) 2016
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1755088215626939
ipt.sagepub.com
Realism, moralism, models
and institutions
Christopher Bertram
University of Bristol, UK
Abstract
This article distinguishes between three methodologies for thinking about justice:
principle-based, model-based and ‘realist’, concentrating mainly on the differences
between the first two. Both model-based and realist approaches pride themselves on
taking institutions seriously and argue that institutions make a fundamental difference
to justice. This claim is at best not proven, and it may be possible to account for
the difference that institutions make to what justice requires while retaining a non-
institutional account of what justice is.
Keywords
Cosmopolitanism, ideal theory, justice, moralism, non-ideal theory, realism
Introduction
It is understandable that political theorists and political philosophers aspire to ‘rele-
vance’, whatever that is. After all, what is the point of abstract theorising about politics,
of all things, if that theorising is not to some purpose? What is the point of a theory of
justice, if it has no purchase on the ‘real world’ and has no chance of being put into prac-
tice? Many political philosophers were drawn to the subject by an interest in and a com-
mitment to making the world a better place, and it can be hard to see that pure theory,
disconnected as it is from the concerns of politicians and the exigencies of policy,
contributes to the very goal that motivated us in the first place. There are therefore all
kinds of reasons why political philosophers should be drawn towards ‘relevance’, to
‘realism’ and to ‘non-ideal theory’. However, this desire for relevance should not and
cannot affect the truth of matters involving the relationship between practice and value,
between facts and principles, between reality and utopia. Those are truths (if there are
Corresponding author:
Christopher Bertram, Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Cotham House, Bristol BS6 6JL, UK.
Email: C.Bertram@bristol.ac.uk
626939IPT0010.1177/1755088215626939Journal of International Political TheoryBertram
research-article2016
Article
To continue reading
Request your trial