Rebel funding and child soldiers: Exploring the relationship between natural resources and forcible recruitment
| Author | Roos Haer,Christopher Michael Faulkner,Beth Elise Whitaker |
| DOI | 10.1177/1354066119850622 |
| Published date | 01 March 2020 |
| Date | 01 March 2020 |
850622EJT0010.1177/1354066119850622European Journal of International RelationsHaer et al.
research-article2019
EJ R
I
Article
European Journal of
International Relations
Rebel funding and child
2020, Vol. 26(1) 236 –262
© The Author(s) 2019
soldiers: Exploring the
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relationship between natural
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https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066119850622
DOI: 10.1177/1354066119850622
resources and forcible
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recruitment
Roos Haer
Leiden University, The Netherlands
Christopher Michael Faulkner
University of Central Florida, USA
Beth Elise Whitaker
University of North Carolina at Charlotte, USA
Abstract
Why do some rebel groups forcibly recruit children while others largely refrain from
using this strategy? We argue that it depends, in part, on their ability to profit from natural
resources. Rebel groups that earn funding from natural resources have less incentive to
restrain abusive behavior such as the forced recruitment of children and more incentive
to tolerate and even promote this recruitment strategy. To test our expectations, we
collected new data on the level of forcible recruitment of children by rebel groups.
This is distinct from the broader use of child soldiers, a significant portion of whom
volunteer to join armed groups. We combined the information on forced recruitment
with a recent data set on rebel groups’ exploitation of natural resources. Our analyses
show that rebel groups that profit from natural resources are significantly more likely to
forcibly recruit children than groups that do not exploit natural resources. Looking at
specific characteristics, rebels that extract lootable resources are more likely to engage
in the forced recruitment of children than groups that profit only from non-lootable
resources or from no natural resources at all. The findings have important implications
Corresponding author:
Roos Haer, Institute of Political Science, Leiden University, Wassenaarseweg 52, 2333 AK Leiden, The
Netherlands.
Email: R.van.der.Haer@fsw.leidenuniv.nl
Haer et al.
237
for our understanding of the relationship between rebels’ revenue streams and their
engagement in human rights violations.
Keywords
Child soldiers, coercion, contraband, forced recruitment, natural resources, rebel
groups
Introduction
To sustain their operations, armed groups must have a steady supply of recruits to fill
their fighting ranks and to replace those lost to injury, death, or desertion (Richards,
2014). Most rebel groups rely initially on volunteers but resort to some form of forced
recruitment1 when they can no longer attract enough voluntary recruits (Eck, 2014). This
strategy is particularly prevalent among rebel groups that recruit children (Beber and
Blattman, 2013; Gates, 2017; Gates and Reich, 2010). Yet, the extent of forcible recruit-
ment of children differs across rebel groups and conflicts, and evolves over the course of
a conflict. Children have been forcibly abducted on a large scale by rebels operating in
Myanmar, Sierra Leone, and Colombia (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers,
2008), for example, while groups in Niger and Georgia have largely refrained from using
this recruitment strategy. Even within a single country, Burundi’s National Council for
the Defense of Democracy (CNDD) forcibly recruited children, while the Front de
Libération Nationale (FROLINA) used this strategy to a lesser extent.
Conflict scholars have focused primarily on the strategies used by rebels to enlist new
recruits on a voluntary basis, thereby neglecting coercive recruitment (Gates, 2002;
Weinstein, 2007).2 Studies that focus on why individuals revolt tend to assume some
level of free will, thus downplaying the possibility of coercion (Eck, 2014; Herbst, 2000).
Meanwhile, scholars working on the topic of child soldiering recognize that many chil-
dren are forced to join rebel groups, but they are primarily focused on explaining why
children join rebellions voluntarily (Machel, 1996; Singer, 2006; Wessells, 2006) and
why rebel organizations demand children (Beber and Blattman, 2013; Blattman and
Annan, 2008; Haer and Böhmelt, 2016a).
Focusing specifically on the coercive dimension of child soldiering, we posit that
rebel groups that profit from natural resources are more likely to forcibly recruit chil-
dren. These groups have less incentive to restrain abusive behavior such as the forced
recruitment of children and more incentive to use this strategy to maximize benefits for
adult members. Further, we expect different types of resources to impact forced recruit-
ment patterns. In particular, lootable resources that are relatively easy to access and
extract should increase rebels’ demand for low-cost, unskilled laborers; children can
often fill this role. In our empirical analysis, we show that rebel groups that profit from
natural resources are significantly more likely to forcibly recruit children than groups
that do not exploit natural resources. In addition, rebels that exploit lootable resources
are more likely to use coercive practices to recruit child soldiers than groups that exploit
only non-lootable resources or no resources at all.
238
European Journal of International Relations 26(1)
Understanding how natural resource exploitation influences rebels’ decision to forci-
bly recruit children is important for several reasons. It contributes to ongoing debates
about the determinants of the recruitment strategies of armed groups. The forcible
recruitment of children has received surprisingly little scholarly attention, despite ample
literature on the use of child soldiers more broadly. In addition, this research can help
policymakers improve efforts aimed at preventing forcible child recruitment and protect-
ing children during conflict (Eck, 2014; Kubota, 2013). If resource-rich rebel groups are
more likely to forcibly recruit children, policymakers may want to focus first on those
groups. Identifying the potential mechanisms contributing to coercive recruitment prac-
tices also provides an opportunity to address other human rights abuses. Studies have
identified a correlation between forced recruitment and abuses such as sexual violence
during conflict, for example (Cohen, 2013; Eck, 2014).
This article proceeds in several parts. After reviewing existing research, we present
our theoretical argument about the influence of natural resource exploitation on rebel
recruitment practices toward children. In the research design, we introduce a new meas-
ure to capture the degree of rebel groups’ forcible recruitment of children and combine
this information with a recent data set on rebel exploitation of natural resources. The
results of our analyses, presented in the next section, support the central argument that
rebel groups profiting from natural resources are more likely to engage in the forcible
recruitment of children. We conclude with a brief discussion of policy implications and
directions for future research.
The supply and demand for children
Scholars generally distinguish between the supply and demand sides of labor to illumi-
nate the “market” for child soldiers.3 On the supply side, scholars argue that certain fac-
tors make children readily accessible to, and more likely to join, rebel groups. They point
to factors such as poverty, lack of education, and lack of political opportunities (Brett and
Specht, 2004; Dallaire, 2011; Honwana, 2006; Singer, 2006).4 Children often voluntarily
join rebellions when employment prospects are low or basic necessities such as food are
scarce (Cohn and Goodwin-Gill, 1994; Wessells, 2006). Scholars seeking to explain
variation in child soldier usage generally consider the supply of children to be fairly
consistent across conflict zones.5 Thus, supply-side arguments are unable to fully account
for variation in child soldier usage across non-state armed groups operating in similar
areas (Andvig and Gates, 2010). To explain such variation, recent studies focus more on
the demand side of the equation (Beber and Blattman, 2013; Haer and Böhmelt, 2016a;
Lasley and Thyne, 2015).
Demand-side explanations focus instead on the costs and benefits of utilizing child
soldiers (Lasley and Thyne, 2015). Scholars have explored the motivations of recruiters
and the conditions under which armed groups are likely to recruit children over adults
(Andvig and Gates, 2010; Brett and Specht, 2004; Gates, 2017; Haer and Böhmelt,
2016a; Tynes, 2011). They suggest that using children for rebellion is cost-effective for
several reasons: children are easier to retain, take more risks, and are less likely to desert
(Andvig, 2006; Beber and Blattman, 2013; Blattman and Annan, 2008; Gates, 2011,
2017; Shepler, 2004; Singer, 2006). Recruiting children reduces operational costs as they
Haer et al.
239
are cheaper to feed and clothe. Moreover, children are often satisfied with a dispropor-
tionate share of resources and can easily be prevented from sharing them. By limiting the
number of members eligible for revenue-sharing, leaders maintain more resources for
themselves and for the armed struggle (Beber and Blattman, 2013; Gates, 2011). Lastly,
children are comparatively easier for rebels to capture because they are generally less
mobile than adults and are often concentrated in poorly policed locations such as refugee
camps and schools (Achvarina and Reich, 2006; Andvig, 2006: 20; Andvig and Gates,
2010: 90; Gates, 2017;...
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